State v. Short

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ricky Anthony Short, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000782

Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2021-UP-057
Submitted December 1, 2020 – Filed February 24, 2021
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled March 31, 2021

_____________

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody J. Brown, and Senior
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Ricky Short appeals from his convictions for two counts of
murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He
argues the trial court erred in (1) allowing two detectives to testify they did not
believe Short's explanation and another detective to testify the detective cleared a
suspect during his investigation, and (2) denying Short's motion to suppress
statements he made to police. We affirm.1

1. Short argues the trial court erred in allowing two detectives to testify they
did not believe his explanation and another detective to testify he cleared a suspect
during his investigation. We find that even if the officers' opinion testimony was
admitted in error, it was harmless error based on the overwhelming evidence of
Short's guilt, particularly his statements to police, which we find were properly
admitted as outlined below. See Pagan, 369 S.C. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at 267
("Generally, appellate courts will not set aside convictions due to insubstantial
errors not affecting the result."); id. ("Error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
where it did not contribute to the verdict obtained."); id. ("[A]n insubstantial error
not affecting the result of the trial is harmless where 'guilt has been conclusively
proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be
reached.'" (quoting State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989)));
State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 447-48, 710 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2011) ("A harmless error
analysis is contextual and specific to the circumstances of the case: 'No definite
rule of law governs [a finding of harmless error]; rather the materiality and
prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to the
entire case. Error is harmless when it could not reasonably have affected the result
of the trial.'" (quoting State v. Reeves, 301 S.C. 191, 193-94, 391 S.E.2d 241, 243
(1990))).

2. Short argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements he made to police. He asserts his interrogation violated Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and State v. Navy, 386 S.C. 294, 688 S.E.2d 838
(2010), because officers interrogated him for approximately three hours prior to
giving him his Miranda2 warnings; thus, they used the "question-first" tactic
prohibited by Seibert. We disagree because we find this case is distinguishable
from Seibert and Navy. In this case, although Short had been in custody for
approximately three hours prior to being read his Miranda rights, he did not make
the statements he sought to exclude until after being read and waiving his rights.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Furthermore, we do not believe the questioning prior to the Miranda warning was
intended to elicit an incriminating response from Short. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at
616-17 (holding Miranda warnings given mid-interrogation, after the defendant
had given an unwarned confession, were ineffective, and thus, the confession
repeated after the warnings were given was inadmissible at trial); Navy, 386 S.C. at
303-04, 688 S.E.2d at 842 (finding Navy made the admission of guilt prior to being
given his rights, and the officers then used the pre-Miranda admission to obtain a
post-Miranda admission); Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613-14 ("[W]hen Miranda warnings
are inserted in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are
likely to mislead and 'depriv[e][] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability
to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.'"
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986))); id. at 617 ("[T]he
question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda's purpose of reducing
the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted . . ."); State v. White, 410 S.C.
56, 57, 762 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ct. App. 2014) ("In both Seibert and Navy, the courts
emphasized that Miranda's warnings requirement cannot be skirted by
interrogative tactics that undermine the very purpose of Miranda, i.e., unless and
until such warnings and waiver are given, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against a defendant at trial.").

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, HILL, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.