State v. Kelley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lawrence Laverne Kelley, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000364

Appeal From Berkeley County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-154
Submitted April 1, 2020 – Filed May 27, 2020

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua A. Edwards, both of Columbia;
and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, all for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lawrence Laverne Kelley, Jr. appeals the trial court's order
requiring him to register as a sex offender on the Sex Offender Registry. On
appeal, Kelley asserts the trial court erred in finding good cause to require he
register because the State's doctor relied on unreliable data and his doctor
recommended he not be required to register. Because the trial court considered
two doctors' evaluations and multiple incident reports involving the alleged abuse,
we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Kelley to register.
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: In re M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010) ("A [trial
court] has broad discretion in sentencing within statutory limits."); id. ("A [trial
court] must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might
bear on the proper sentence for a particular defendant."); id. ("A sentence will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is based on an error of
law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 23-3-430 (2007) ("Upon . . . guilty plea . . . the [trial court] may order as a
condition of sentencing that the person be included in the sex offender registry if
good cause is shown by the solicitor."); In re M.B.H., 387 S.C. at 327, 692 S.E.2d
at 542 ("[A] finding of good cause . . . means only that the [trial court] must
consider the facts and circumstances of the case to make the determination of
whether or not the evidence indicates a risk to reoffend sexually. Such a
determination is a matter of the [trial court's] discretion.").1

AFFIRMED.2

HUFF, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur

1
To the extent Kelley argues this court should reweigh the evidence and rely more
heavily on one doctor's evaluation than the other because the State's doctor
allegedly relied on unreliable data, we decline to do so. See State v. Douglas, 411
S.C. 307, 316, 768 S.E.2d 232, 238 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[T]he abuse of discretion
standard of review does not allow this court to reweigh the evidence or
second-guess the trial court's assessment of witness credibility.").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.