State v. Stackhouse

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Phillip Antonio Stackhouse, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002048

Appeal From Marlboro County
Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-160
Submitted May 1, 2020 – Filed May 27, 2020

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Benjamin Rogers, Jr.,
of Bennettsville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Phillip Stackhouse appeals his conviction and forty-two-year
sentence for murder. On appeal, Stackhouse argues the trial court erred in failing
to dismiss his indictment for murder because he was denied the right to a speedy
trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss
Stackhouse's indictment for murder because Stackhouse's right to a speedy trial
was not violated. Although Stackhouse experienced an eighteen-month delay
between his arrest and his trial, the delay occurred when the State moved for a
continuance of his original trial date because one of its witnesses was unavailable.
Further, Stackhouse failed to show actual prejudice, and under the facts of this
case, we find the eighteen-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial.
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335, 342, 794 S.E.2d 368, 371 (2016)
(stating an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on whether to dismiss an
indictment based on speedy trial violations for an abuse of discretion); id. at 342,
794 S.E.2d at 371-72 (stating an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
makes a decision based upon an error of law or upon factual findings which are
without evidentiary support); State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 441, 735 S.E.2d
471, 482 (2012) (stating a court considers four factors when determining whether a
defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, including: "the length of the
delay, the reason for [the delay], the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy
trial, and any prejudice [the defendant] suffered"); id. (stating no one factor is
dispositive; rather, "they are all related and must be considered along 'with such
other circumstances as may be relevant.'" (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
529-30 (1972))); Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966)
("A speedy trial does not mean an immediate one; it does not imply undue haste,
for the [S]tate, too, is entitled to a reasonable time in which to prepare its case; it
simply means a trial without unreasonable and unnecessary delay."); State v.
Reaves, 414 S.C. 118, 130, 777 S.E.2d 213, 219 (2015) ("The delay begins to be
measured when a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise accused.");
Langford, 400 S.C. at 442-43, 735 S.E.2d at 482-83 (finding a twenty-three-month
delay was sufficient to trigger the remaining factors); State v. Cooper, 386 S.C.
210, 217-18, 687 S.E.2d 62, 67 (Ct. App. 2009) (acknowledging the State's reasons
for the delay when considered together justified a majority of the delay in bringing
the defendant to trial); Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 346, 794 S.E.2d at 374 (stating "a
valid reason, such as a missing witness, justifies an appropriate delay"); id. at 351,
794 S.E.2d at 376 ("When the government persistently fails to try an accused and
the delay is excessive, the accused need not show actual prejudice in order to
prevail [on a] speedy trial [motion]."); State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 551, 647
S.E.2d 144, 156 (2007) (refusing to find a thirty-eight-month delay of the
defendant's trial presumptively prejudicial); Reaves, 414 S.C. at 132, 777 S.E.2d at
220 (finding the defendant did not "show that he suffered particularized prejudice
as the result of the delay").
AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and GEATHERS and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.