Nagy v. Bob Rice Realty

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Gerald J. Nagy, Appellant,

v.

Bob Rice Realty Inc., Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002177

Appeal From Lexington County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-089
Submitted January 1, 2020 – Filed April 1, 2020

AFFIRMED

Gerald Nagy, of West Columbia, pro se.

Cynthia K. Mason, of Holler, Garner, Corbett, Gilchrist
& Mason, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this landlord-tenant dispute, Gerald Nagy appeals the circuit
court's order regarding the magistrate court's decision in favor of Bob Rice Realty,
Inc. (BRR), arguing the circuit court erred in (1) failing to fully consider all of the
terms of the residential lease agreement, and (2) failing to fully consider section
27-40-910(h) of the South Carolina Code (2007) and finding BRR engaged in
retaliatory conduct.1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities.

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to fully consider all of the terms
of the residential lease agreement: Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v.
Kiwi Corp., 280 S.C. 232, 233, 312 S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that in
ejectment proceedings first heard in magistrate's court, the court of appeals "is
without jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt if there is
any supporting evidence"); Hadfield v. Gilchrist, 343 S.C. 88, 94, 538 S.E.2d 268,
271 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Unless [the court of appeals] finds an error of law, [it] will
affirm the [circuit court's] holding if there are any facts supporting [its] decision.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-320(a) (2007) ("If the landlord does not sign and deliver a
written rental agreement which has been signed and delivered to the landlord by
the tenant, acceptance of rent without reservation by the landlord gives the rental
agreement the same effect as if it had been signed and delivered by the landlord.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-320(c) (2007) ("If a rental agreement given effect by the
operation of this section provides for a term longer than one year, it is effective for
only one year."); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-35-30 (2007) ("All tenancies of real estate
other than agricultural lands shall be deemed from month to month unless there be
an agreement otherwise."); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-35-120 (2007) ("A tenancy from
month to month may be ended by either party giving to the other written notice of
thirty days to the effect that such tenancy shall be then terminated.").

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to fully consider section
27-40-910(h) and failing to find BRR engaged in retaliatory conduct: Kiawah
Prop. Owners Grp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 359 S.C. 105, 113, 597 S.E.2d
145, 149 (2004) (finding an argument not made to an intermediate appellate court

1
In its respondent's brief, BRR asserts the circuit court erred in reversing the
magistrate court "to the extent of allowing [Nagy] to remain on the property until
December 31, 2016," because the lease expired on December 31, 2014, section
27-40-320(c) of the South Carolina Code (2007) prevented the lease from
automatically renewing after the expiration of the lease, and the circuit court
considered evidence not submitted to the magistrate court, including emails in
which the parties attempted to settle the case. BRR failed to file a notice of appeal;
therefore, we find these arguments are not properly before this court and decline to
address them. See Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v. Riddle, 334 S.C. 176, 187,
512 S.E.2d 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1999) (declining to address a trial court's alleged
error raised in a respondent's brief because the respondent failed to file a notice of
appeal and follow proper procedure for filing a cross appeal).
and not ruled on by that court is not preserved for review in the supreme court or
court of appeals).

AFFIRMED.2

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.