Manning v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Torrey Deaund Manning, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000548

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-074
Submitted January 1, 2020 – Filed March 18, 2020

AFFIRMED

Torrey Deaund Manning, pro se.

Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Torrey Deaund Manning appeals the decision of the
Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirming the South Carolina Department of
Corrections' (SCDC) decision classifying him as a Class B felon who must serve
eighty-five percent of the total sentence imposed. On appeal, Manning argues (1)
the ALC erred in denying his motion for summary judgment in light of SCDC's
failure to respond to his requests for admission, (2) sections 24-13-100 and 24-13-
150 of the South Carolina Code (2007 & Supp. 2019) are unconstitutional as
applied to him, (3) SCDC denied him due process by applying the aforementioned
code sections to his sentence, and (4) he should not be required to serve eighty-five
percent of his sentence because he was not sentenced to the statutory maximum
sentence for trafficking in illegal drugs. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issue 1: The issues of Manning's motion for summary judgment and
SCDC's failure to respond to requests for admission were not raised to and ruled
upon by the ALC. See Brown v. S.C. Dept. of Health and Evtl. Control, 348 S.C.
507, 519, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417 (2002) ("[I]ssues not raised to and ruled on by the
AL[C] are not preserved for appellate consideration.").

2. As to issues 2 and 3: Manning's claims regarding alleged violations of his due
process rights and the constitutionality of the statutes under which he was
sentenced are not preserved for appellate review. See id. ("[I]ssues not raised to
and ruled on by the AL[C] are not preserved for appellate consideration.").

3. As to issue 4: Manning's sentence was correctly calculated and properly
classified as an eighty-five percent "no parole" offense. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 44-53-370(e)(3) (2018) (defining the offense of "trafficking in illegal drugs");
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e)(3)(a)(1) (2018) (detailing a person convicted of
trafficking in illegal drugs must be sentenced to no less than seven years'
imprisonment but no more than twenty-five years' imprisonment); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-1-90(B) (Supp. 2019) (providing trafficking in illegal drugs is a Class B
felony); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (2007) (providing Class B felonies are "no
parole" offenses); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-150 (Supp. 2019) (providing persons
convicted of "no parole" offenses are not eligible for early release or discharge
until they have served at least eighty-five percent of the actual sentence imposed).

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.