Stow Away Storage, LLC v. Sisson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Stow Away Storage, LLC, and MSC MTP, LLC,
Appellants,

v.

George W. Sisson, 4.0, LLC, The Sisson Foundation
Limited Partnership, Sweetgrass Hardware, Inc. and
Timarand, Inc., Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001221

Appeal From Charleston County
J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-401
Submitted November 1, 2019 – Filed December 18, 2019

AFFIRMED

G. Dana Sinkler, of Gibbs & Holmes, of Wadmalaw
Island, and Ainsley Fisher Tillman, of Ford Wallace
Thomson, LLC, of Charleston, both for Appellants.

George Hamlin O'Kelley, III, of Buist Byars & Taylor,
LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: This case stems from an easement dispute between Appellant Stow
Away Storage, LLC ("Stow Away") and Respondents George W. Sisson ("Sisson")
and Sweetgrass Hardware, Inc. ("Sweetgrass"). The action was bifurcated by the
circuit court and Appellants prevailed on the easement interpretation issue. That
order was affirmed by this court and the case was remanded to the circuit court for
an order on damages.1 The circuit court awarded Appellants $20,382.41 in actual
damages, but the court denied Appellants' request for attorney's fees, punitive
damages, and the rental value of the easement. Appellants argue the circuit court
erred by (1) failing to award attorney's fees against Sisson under the principle of
equitable indemnification; (2) failing to award punitive damages against Sweetgrass
for tortious interference with contract; and (3) failing to award lost rent. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to award Appellants attorney's
fees under the principle of equitable indemnification: Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of
Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976) ("In an action in equity,
tried by the judge alone, without a reference, on appeal the [appellate court] has
jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its [own] view[] of the preponderance
of the evidence."); Baron Data Sys., Inc. v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 383, 377 S.E.2d
296, 297 (1989) ("The general rule is that attorney's fees are not recoverable unless
authorized by contract or statute."); Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 33–34, 183 S.E.2d
708, 709–10 (1971) (holding that in the absence of an express contract for
indemnification, claimants may recover on the theory of (1) an implied contract to
indemnify or (2) equitable indemnity); id. at 33, 183 S.E.2d at 709–10 ("In order to
recover attorneys' fees under [equitable indemnity], the plaintiff must show: (1) that
the plaintiff had become involved in a legal dispute either because of a breach of
contract by the defendant or because of [the] defendant's tortious conduct; (2) that
the dispute was with a third party—not with the defendant; and (3) that the plaintiff
incurred attorneys' fees connected with that dispute." (citation omitted)); 13 S.C. Jur.
Implied Contracts § 10 (1992) ("[Attorney fees] are awarded to a party seeking
indemnity when the expenses were incurred in the successful defense of a claim . . .
.").

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to award Appellants punitive
damages for Respondent Sweetgrass's alleged tortious interference with contract:
Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 110, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1991) ("In South
Carolina, 'punitive damages are allowed in the interest of society in the nature of

1
Stow Away Storage, LLC v. Sisson, Op. No. 2016-UP-014 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 13,
2016) (unpublished opinion).
punishment and as a warning and example to deter the wrongdoer and others from
committing like offenses in the future.'" (quoting Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243
S.C. 388, 396, 134 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1964))); id. ("Moreover, they serve 'as a
vindication of private rights when it is proved that such have been wantonly,
willfully, or maliciously violated." (quoting Harris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 196,
199 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1973))); Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 394 S.C. 383, 398, 714
S.E.2d 904, 912 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Reckless disregard for the property rights of
others can be sufficient misconduct to support an award of punitive damages.");
Eldeco, Inc. v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 372 S.C. 470, 480, 642 S.E.2d 726, 731
(2007) ("To establish a cause of action for tortious interference with contractual
relations, a plaintiff must show: 1) the existence of a contract; 2) knowledge of the
contract; 3) intentional procurement of its breach; 4) the absence of justification; and
5) resulting damages."); id. at 481, 642 S.E.2d at 732 ("[I]t is not necessary that the
interfering party intend such harm. . . . Instead, it is only necessary that they intend
to interfere with . . . an existing contract . . . .").

3. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to award Appellants the rental
value of the easement against (1) Sisson for breach of the easement agreement and
(2) Sweetgrass for tortious interference with contract: Vortex Sports & Entm't, Inc.
v. Ware, 378 S.C. 197, 208, 662 S.E.2d 444, 450 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The [circuit]
court is vested with considerable discretion over the amount of a damages award,
and our review of the amount of damages is limited to the correction of errors of
law."); 11 S.C. Jur. Damages § 58 (1992) ("In tort actions, damages may be
recovered for all injuries [that] proximately follow. . . . In breach of contract actions,
only such damages as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties at the time the contract was made may be collected." (footnote
omitted) (quoting Hutson v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 269 S.C. 322, 332, 237 S.E.2d
375, 379 (1977), overruled on other grounds by O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525, 431
S.E.2d 555 (1993))); Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of S.C. v. Res. Planning Corp.,
358 S.C. 460, 472, 596 S.E.2d 51, 58 (2004) (clarifying that in Yadkin Brick Co. v.
Materials Recovery Co., 339 S.C. 640, 529 S.E.2d 764 (Ct. App. 2000) the supreme
court held that where there is physical injury to real property resulting in the
depreciation in the rental or usable value of the property, the landowner can recover
damages in the amount of the depreciation); Yadkin Brick Co., 339 S.C. at 645–46,
529 S.E.2d at 767 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Where the pollution . . . results in a temporary
or nonpermanent injury to real property, the injured landowner can recover the
depreciation in the rental or usable value of the property caused by the pollution."
(quoting Gray v. S. Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558, 569, 183 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1971)));
Vortex Sports & Entm't, Inc., 378 S.C. at 208, 662 S.E.2d at 450 ("When the tortious
conduct of a defendant causes a plaintiff to lose prospective profits, the plaintiff may
recover such profits when he can prove: (1) it is reasonably certain that such profits
would have been realized except for the tort; and (2) such lost profits can be
ascertained and measured from the evidence produced with reasonable certainty.");
Eldeco, Inc., 372 S.C. at 480, 642 S.E.2d at 731 ("To establish a cause of action for
tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show: 1) the
existence of a contract; 2) knowledge of the contract; 3) intentional procurement of
its breach; 4) the absence of justification; and 5) resulting damages."); id. at 481, 642
S.E.2d at 732 ("[I]t is not necessary that the interfering party intend such harm. . . .
Instead, it is only necessary that they intend to interfere with . . . an existing contract
. . . .").

AFFIRMED.2

SHORT, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.