Bouchelle Inc. v. Charleston Wrecking, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Bouchelle Incorporated, Appellant,

v.

Charleston Wrecking, Inc. and Michael C. Golemis,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001532

Appeal From Charleston County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-301
Submitted June 1, 2019 – Filed August 21, 2019

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART

Karen Marie DeJong, of DeJong Law Firm, LLC, of Mt.
Pleasant, for Appellant.

Michael W. Sautter, of Query Sautter & Associates,
LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent Michael C. Golemis;
and Kerry W. Koon, of Kerry W. Koon, Attorney at Law,
of Charleston, for Respondent Charleston Wrecking, Inc.

PER CURIAM: In this action arising from the demolition of a wall on a
construction site, Bouchelle Incorporated appeals the grant of summary judgment
to Michael C. Golemis and the grant of the stay of the action to Charleston
Wrecking, Inc. We affirm the grant of summary judgment and dismiss as moot the
appeal of the stay.

1. Pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities, we affirm the
grant of summary judgment to Golemis: Rule 56(e), SCRCP ("When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."); Pertuis v. Front
Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 655, 817 S.E.2d 273, 280 (2018) ("[C]orporations
are often formed for the purpose of shielding shareholders from individual liability;
there is nothing remotely nefarious in doing that."); Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453,
457-58, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving a two-pronged test to
determine whether to disregard the corporate entity: (1) the observance of
corporate formalities by the dominant shareholders and (2) an element of injustice
or fundamental unfairness if the acts of the corporation are not regarded as the acts
of the individuals); Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht
Club, 310 S.C. 132, 141, 425 S.E.2d 764, 770 (Ct. App. 1992) ("The second prong
requires that there be an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness should the
separate corporate existence of [the corporation] not be disregarded."); Sturkie, 280
S.C. at 458, 313 S.E.2d at 319 ("The corporate form may be disregarded only
where equity requires the action to assist a third party."); Coker v. Cummings, 381
S.C. 45, 55, 671 S.E.2d 383, 388 (Ct. App. 2008) ("When a party makes no factual
showing in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the trial 'court must
grant summary judgment to the moving party if, under the facts presented, the
latter is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting S.C. Elec. &
Gas. Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 283 S.C. 182, 189, 322 S.E.2d 453, 457 (Ct.
App. 1984))).

2. As to Bouchelle's appeal of the stay granted to Charleston Wrecking, Inc., we
note the requested stay was to last "until a final determination in" a separate action
that Bouchelle filed against its own insurer, which denied coverage for the events
leading to the appeal presently before this court. It has come to our attention that
an order granting summary judgment to Bouchelle's insurer was issued in the other
action. Furthermore, although Bouchelle appealed another order issued in that
proceeding, it did not appeal the grant of summary judgment to its insurer.
Therefore, there has been a final determination in the separate action between
Bouchelle and its insurer, and the stay can now be lifted. Based on these
circumstances, the appeal is now moot because any judgment rendered by this
court would "have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy." See
Sloan v. Greenville Cty., 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670 S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2009).
Furthermore, we do not view the grant of the stay as (1) an issue capable of
repetition but generally evading review, (2) an event involving "questions of
imperative and manifest urgency to establish a rule for future conduct in matters of
important public interest," or (3) a decision that "may affect future events, or have
collateral consequences for the parties." S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. S.C. Dep't of
Transp., 421 S.C. 110, 121, 804 S.E.2d 854, 861 (2017) (quoting Curtis v. State,
345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001)). Because Bouchelle's action
against Charleston Wrecking can now proceed, we dismiss as moot Bouchelle's
appeal insofar as it concerns the grant of the stay.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.