State v. Gibson

201THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT
BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Joey Latwan Gibson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001585

Appeal From Darlington County
Roger E. Henderson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-137
Submitted March 1, 2019 – Filed April 17, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Caroline M. Scrantom, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Benjamin Rogers, Jr.,
of Bennettsville, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Cardwell, 414 S.C. 416, 424, 778 S.E.2d 483, 487 (Ct. App.
2015) ("In criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only."); id. at 425,
778 S.E.2d at 488 ("The court will only reverse the [trial] court's ruling on a
motion to suppress when there is clear error."); State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C.
62, 70, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459-60 (2002) (explaining that on appeal from a Fourth
Amendment motion to suppress, an appellate court will only reverse the trial court
if there is clear error and will affirm if there is any evidence to support the ruling);
State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521, 698 S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010) ("The Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States grants citizens the right to be
secure against unreasonable search and seizure."); State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637,
645, 541 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2001) ("The South Carolina Constitution, with an
express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy
protection than the Fourth Amendment."); Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 185,
754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014) ("Evidence seized in violation of the warrant
requirement must be excluded from trial."); id. ("However, a warrantless search
may nonetheless be proper under the Fourth Amendment if it falls within one of
the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement."); Palacio v. State, 333
S.C. 506, 514, 511 S.E.2d 62, 66 (1999) ("The constitutional immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived by valid consent."); id. ("The
existence of consent is determined from the totality of the circumstances."); id.
("On a motion to suppress, the State has the burden of proving the validity of the
consent."); Forrester, 343 S.C. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841 ("[L]ike the federal
standard, our state standard does not require a law enforcement officer conducting
a search to inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent."); State v. Abdullah,
357 S.C. 344, 351, 592 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The exigent
circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[']s
protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective
standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant
exist."); State v. Counts, 413 S.C. 153, 174, 776 S.E.2d 59, 71 (2015) (finding the
exigent circumstances exception to South Carolina's constitutional protection
against warrantless searches applied when the defendant answered his door holding
a gun); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 592, 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017)
("The Fourth Amendment does not prevent an officer from making a
warrantless . . . search if the officer reasonably believes there is a risk that the
evidence will be destroyed before he or she can obtain a search warrant."); id.
("Exigent circumstances—such as imminent destruction of evidence, the potential
for a suspect to flee, or a risk of danger to police or others—may justify a
warrantless entry, but absent hot pursuit, there must be at least probable cause to
believe the exigent circumstances were present."); State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571,
580, 769 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2015) ("Probable cause to conduct a search exists where
'the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.'"
(quoting Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996))); id. at 581, 769 S.E.2d at 859
("[D]etermining whether an officer has probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search depends on the totality of the circumstances.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, AND HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.