Shred with Us v. Dorn

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Shred with Us, LLC, Appellant,

v.

Steffanie Dorn, City of Greenwood Business License
Official, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000847

Appeal From Greenwood County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-064
Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 13, 2019

AFFIRMED

Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Appellant.

James Graham Padgett, III, of Bacot & Padgett, LLC, of
Greenwood, and Danny Calvert Crowe, of Crowe
LaFave, LLC, of Columbia, both for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Gay v. City of Beaufort, 364 S.C. 252, 254, 612 S.E.2d 467, 468 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("Where the city council of a municipality has acted after considering
all of the facts, the court should not disturb the finding unless such action is
arbitrary, unreasonable, or an obvious abuse of its discretion."); id. ("This court
will not disturb on appeal such findings of the city council, concurred in by a
circuit judge, unless they are without evidentiary support or against the clear
preponderance of the evidence."); Univ. of S. Cal. v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274,
617 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An issue regarding statutory interpretation
is a question of law."); Town of Summerville v. City of North Charleston, 378 S.C.
107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008) ("[T]his [c]ourt reviews questions of law de
novo."); S.C. Code Ann. § 58-23-620 (2015) ("[N]o city, town, or county shall
impose a license fee or license tax on the holder of a certificate E[,] . . . except the
city or town of such carrier's residence or the location of his principal place of
business."); Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle Beach Election Comm'n, 342 S.C. 373,
380, 537 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("All rules of statutory construction are
subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably
discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light
of the intended purpose of the statute."); Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C.
332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) ("A statute as a whole must receive practical,
reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy
of lawmakers." (quoting Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C.
452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 608-07 (2006))); Lexington Cty. Health Servs. Dist. v.
S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 384 S.C. 647, 653, 682 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If
[an] interpretation would lead to a result unintended by the legislature and plainly
absurd, [this court] should reject it.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.