State v. Weaver-Lawrence

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Carissa Marche Weaver-Lawrence, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001207

Appeal From Beaufort County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-076
Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 13, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone,
III, of Bluffton, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Carisa Marche Weaver-Lawrence appeals the imposition of
$8,813.82 in restitution following her guilty plea for breach of trust with fraudulent
intent in the amount of more than two thousand dollars, but less than ten thousand
dollars. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Dawson, 402 S.C. 160, 163, 740 S.E.2d 501, 502 (2013) ("In
criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); id. ("A
sentence will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion when the ruling is
based on an error of law."); State v. Gulledge, 326 S.C. 220, 229, 487 S.E.2d 590,
594 (1997) ("The restitution hearing is part of the sentencing proceeding."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 17-25-322(A) (2014) ("When a defendant is convicted of a crime
which has resulted in pecuniary damages or loss to a victim, the [circuit] court
must hold a hearing to determine the amount of restitution due the victim or
victims of the defendant's criminal acts."); State v. Cox, 326 S.C. 440, 442, 484
S.E.2d 108, 109 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The [circuit court] has broad discretion in
determining the manner, method, and amount of restitution."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 17-25-322(C) (2014) (requiring the circuit court to "stat[e] its findings and the
underlying facts and circumstances of them" in a restitution order); Gulledge, 326
S.C. at 228, 487 S.E.2d at 594 (providing "the [circuit] court may consider
information which may be inadmissible under evidentiary rules" during a
restitution hearing because "[a] restitution hearing is part of the sentencing
proceeding"); State v. Franklin, 267 S.C. 240, 246, 226 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1976)
(providing "a [circuit court] may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [it] may consider or the
source from which [the information] may come," to assist it in determining the
sentence to be imposed); Gulledge, 326 S.C. at 230, 487 S.E.2d at 595 ("Further,
the evidence admitted during the restitution hearing must be reliable and
trustworthy.").

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.