Bethea v. SLED

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Shawn Bethea, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000270

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-314
Submitted May 1, 2018 – Filed July 11, 2018

AFFIRMED

Thurmond Brooker, of Brooker Law Firm, of Florence,
for Appellant.

Adam L. Whitsett, of the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this appeal from a contested case hearing, Shawn Bethea
appeals the order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirming the South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division's (SLED's) denial of his application for a
concealed weapon permit. On appeal, Bethea argues the ALC erred by finding he
failed to satisfy the requirements for a concealed weapon permit due to his prior
conviction for criminal domestic violence because he is not prohibited from
possessing a firearm under (1) federal law or (2) state law. We affirm1 pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether Bethea's 1993 conviction disqualifies him from possessing a
firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) when the conviction is excluded from the
definition of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i): Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d
505, 510 (2006) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved."); Helms
Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005)
(explaining an appellant has "the burden of providing a sufficient record" for
review).
2. As to whether the denial of the concealed weapon permit was proper under state
law: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2017) (providing that, on review of an
ALC decision, this court is "confined to the record," and may affirm, remand,
reverse, or modify the ALC's decision); Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of
Revenue, 415 S.C. 351, 355, 782 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016) ("Questions of statutory
interpretation are questions of law, which this [c]ourt is free to decide without any
deference to the [ALC]."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-215(A) (2007)
("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except subject to subsection (B),
SLED must issue a [concealed weapon] permit . . . to a resident . . . who is at least
twenty-one years of age and who is not prohibited by state law from possessing the
weapon . . . . "); S.C. Code Ann. § 23­31-215(B) (2007) (requiring SLED to
conduct a federal fingerprint review and a background check and providing that
"[i]f the fingerprint review and background check are favorable," SLED must issue
the permit) (emphasis added); State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569,
575 (2010) ("A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair
interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers."
(quoting Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 125, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117
(1992))); id. at 351, 688 S.E.2d at 575 ("Courts will reject a statutory interpretation
[that] would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended
by the Legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention.").

AFFIRMED.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.