Ex Parte Anthony L. Mathis v. MD Medical

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ex Parte Anthony L. Mathis, Appellant,

Invacare Corporation, Inc. and all of its subsidiaries,
assignors, and assignees, Respondent,

v.

MD Medical, LLC and Gary Day, Defendants.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000916

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Gordon G. Cooper, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-173
Submitted March 1, 2018 – Filed May 2, 2018

AFFIRMED

Carlos C. Johnson, of Lyles, Darr & Clark, LLC, of
Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Bonum Sams Wilson, III, and Brandon Todd Reeser,
both of Wilson & Heyward, LLC, of Charleston, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Anthony L. Mathis appeals the master-in-equity's order setting
aside a transfer of funds between MD Medical, LLC (MD Medical) and Mathis
because the conveyance violated the Statute of Elizabeth. On appeal, Mathis
argues (1) the master-in-equity erred in finding the contract between Mathis and
John Petrich was fraudulent in nature and (2) the master-in-equity exceeded its
authority by entering a judgment against Mathis and ordering Petrich to redirect
payments on the asset sale contract to Invacare Corporation, Inc. (Invacare). We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the master-in-equity erred in finding the Statute of Elizabeth
rendered the transfer of funds between MD Medical and Mathis null and void:
Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C. 229, 237, 391 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1989)
("Our scope of review for a case heard by a [m]aster-in-[e]quity who enters a final
judgment is the same as that for review of a case heard by a circuit court without a
jury."); Oskin v. Johnson, 400 S.C. 390, 396-97, 735 S.E.2d 459, 463 (2012) ("A
clear and convincing evidentiary standard governs fraudulent conveyance claims
brought under the Statute of Elizabeth."); id. at 397, 735 S.E.2d at 463 ("An action
to set aside a conveyance under the Statute of Elizabeth is an equitable action, and
a de novo standard of review applies."); id. ("However, an appellate court is not
required to disregard the findings of fact by the [master-in-equity] nor ignore the
fact that the [master-in-equity] is in the better position to assess the credibility of
the witnesses."); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10(A) (2007) ("Every gift, grant,
alienation, bargain, transfer, and conveyance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
goods and chattels or any of them, or of any lease, rent, commons, or other profit
or charge out of the same, by writing or otherwise, and every bond, suit, judgment,
and execution which may be had or made to or for any intent or purpose to delay,
hinder, or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts,
accounts, damages, penalties, and forfeitures must be deemed and taken . . . to be
clearly and utterly void . . . ."); Oskin, 400 S.C. at 397, 735 S.E.2d at 463 ("In
interpreting this statute, this [c]ourt has held conveyances shall be set aside under
two conditions: First, where there was valuable consideration and the transfer is
made by the grantor with the actual intent to defraud; and, second, where a transfer
is made without actual intent to defraud but without valuable consideration.");
Albertson v. Robinson, 371 S.C. 311, 317, 638 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Ct. App. 2006)
("Where a transfer is made without valuable consideration . . . , the transfer will be
set aside only when the creditor establishes the following: (1) the grantor was
indebted to the creditor at the time of the transfer; (2) the conveyance was
voluntary; and (3) the grantor failed to retain sufficient property to pay his
indebtedness to the creditor in full, not merely at the time of transfer, but in the
final analysis when the creditor seeks to collect the debt."); Future Grp., II v.
Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, 98, 478 S.E.2d 45, 49 (1996) ("One who is in debt
cannot make a conveyance without consideration that will prevail against existing
debts.").

2. As to whether the master-in-equity exceeded its authority by entering a
judgment against Mathis and ordering Petrich to redirect payments on the asset
sale contract to Invacare: Johnson v. Serv. Mgmt., Inc., 319 S.C. 165, 167, 459
S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 324 S.C. 198, 478 S.E.2d 63 (1996) ("If a
judgment is unsatisfied, the judgment creditor may institute supplementary
proceedings to discover assets."); Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. Daggerhart, 281 S.C.
380, 383, 315 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Supplementary proceedings are
equitable in nature."); Lynn v. Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 228 S.C. 357, 362,
90 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1955) ("Proceedings supplementary to execution . . . provid[e]
for examination of the judgment debtor for the purpose of discovering property out
of which the judgment against him may be satisfied . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-39-410 (2005) (establishing a master-in-equity "may order any property of the
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the hands either of himself or any
other person or due to the judgment debtor, to be applied toward the satisfaction of
the judgment" (emphasis added)); Johnson, 319 S.C. at 168, 459 S.E.2d at 902
("After conducting supplementary proceedings, the [master-in-equity] may order
non-exempt property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third party or owed
to the judgment debtor to be applied toward satisfaction of the judgment."
(emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.