State v. Heyward

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Cedric Xavier Heyward, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000295

Appeal From Richland County
Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-073
Submitted January 1, 2018 – Filed February 7, 2018

AFFIRMED

Assistant Public Defender Jonathan Scott Comish, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Jessica Mangum, of the City Attorney's Office, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Cedric Xavier Heyward appeals the circuit court's order
affirming his conviction for simple possession of marijuana, arguing the municipal
court erred by failing to suppress (1) drug evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal extension of his traffic stop and (2) drug analysis results because the
Respondent failed to properly establish the chain of custody of the marijuana. We
affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly
admitted the marijuana into evidence: State v. Adams, 409 S.C. 641, 647, 763
S.E.2d 341, 344 (2014) ("On appeals from a motion to suppress based on Fourth
Amendment grounds, this [c]ourt applies a deferential standard of review and will
reverse if there is clear error." (quoting State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 521, 698
S.E.2d 203, 205 (2010))); State v. Pichardo, 367 S.C. 84, 96, 623 S.E.2d 840, 846
(Ct. App. 2005) ("The 'clear error' standard means that an appellate court will not
reverse a trial court's finding of fact simply because it would have decided the case
differently."); State v. Moore, 415 S.C. 245, 251, 781 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2016)
("Rather, appellate courts must affirm if there is any evidence to support the trial
court's ruling."); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614
(2015) (internal citations omitted) ("[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in
the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'—to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop and to attend to related safety concerns.");
id. (alteration in original) ("Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the
stop, it may 'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.'" (quoting
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983))); id. at __, 135
S. Ct. at 1615 ("An officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an
otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the
stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual."); id. (alteration in original) ("Beyond determining whether to issue a
traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes 'ordinary inquires incident to [the traffic]
stop.'" (quoting Illinois v. Cabelles, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837
(2005))); id. ("Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance."); id. ("Lacking the
same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is
not fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission."); id. at __, 135 S.
Ct. at 1616 (internal citations omitted) ("The critical question, then, is not whether
the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether
conducting the sniff 'prolongs'—i.e., adds time to—'the stop.'").

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the municipal court properly
admitted the drug analysis results into evidence: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208,
631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v.
Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 91, 708 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2011) ("[A] party offering into
evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete
chain of custody as far as practicable." (quoting State v. Sweet, 374 S.C. 1, 6, 647
S.E.2d 202, 205 (2007))); id. ("Where the substance analyzed has passed through
several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and
what was done with it between the taking and analysis." (quoting Benton v. Pellum,
232 S.C. 26, 33-34, 100 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1957))); id. ("Testimony from each
custodian of fungible evidence, however, is not a prerequisite to establishing a
chain of custody sufficient for admissibility." (quoting Sweet, 374 S.C. at 7, 647
S.E.2d at 206)); id. ("Where other evidence establishes the identity of those who
have handled the evidence and reasonably demonstrates the manner of handling of
the evidence, our courts have been willing to fill gaps in the chain of custody due
to an absent witness." (quoting Sweet, 374 S.C. at 7, 647 S.E.2d at 206)); id. at 92,
708 S.E.2d at 753 ("In applying this rule, [courts] have found evidence
inadmissible only where there is a missing link in the chain of possession because
the identity of those who handled the [substance] was not established at least as
far as practicable." (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Carter, 344 S.C. 419,
424, 544 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2001))).

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HILL, JJ., concur.