SCDSS v. Veronica D. Chandler

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Veronica Denise Chandler and Monroe Holmes,
Defendants,

Of whom Veronica Denise Chandler is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002482

Appeal From Horry County
Monét S. Pincus, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-003
Heard December 12, 2017 – Filed January 4, 2018

AFFIRMED

Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
Union, for Appellant.

Ernest Joseph Jarrett, of Jenkinson Jarrett & Kellahan,
PA, of Kingstree, for Respondent.
Ian Andrew Taylor, of The Taylor Law Office, of
Pawleys Island, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Veronica Denise Chandler (Mother) appeals the family court's
termination of her parental rights (TPR) to two of her minor children (Son and
Daughter, collectively Children)1 on the statutory grounds of severe and repetitious
harm, failure to remedy the condition causing Children's removal, and a
diagnosable condition unlikely to change. On appeal, Mother argues the family
court erred by ordering TPR after ruling several drug tests were inadmissible.2 We
affirm.

"In appeals from the family court, an appellate court reviews factual and legal
issues de novo." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jennifer M., 404 S.C. 269, 276, 744
S.E.2d 591, 595 (Ct. App. 2013). However, "de novo review does not relieve an
appellant of his burden to 'demonstrate error in the family court's findings of fact.'"
Id. at 277, 744 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709
S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011)).

The family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of twelve statutory
grounds is satisfied and TPR is in the best interest of the child. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2017). "In a [TPR] case, the best interests of the children are
the paramount consideration." Doe v. Baby Boy Roe, 353 S.C. 576, 579, 578
S.E.2d 733, 735 (Ct. App. 2003). "Grounds for TPR must be proved by clear and

1
The family court also terminated Monroe Holmes's parental rights to Children;
however, Holmes did not appeal.
2
Mother first appealed to this court from a July 2014 TPR order, which relied on
the same statutory grounds. During her first appeal, Mother argued in part that the
family court erred by admitting July 2013 and January 2014 positive drug test
results into evidence because there was an insufficient chain of custody. In an
April 2016 opinion, this court found the family court erred by admitting the test
results, and we reversed and remanded to the family court "with leave to open the
record to receive any other evidence pertinent to a determination as to whether
[M]other has overcome her drug addiction and to give [the South Carolina
Department of Social Services (DSS)] the opportunity to present a proper chain of
custody" for the test results. The family court held a remand hearing in September
2016 and subsequently entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights. This
appeal followed. In its order, the family court also ruled the contested test results
were inadmissible. That ruling is not challenged on appeal.
convincing evidence." Id. "TPR statutes must be liberally construed in order to
ensure prompt judicial procedures for freeing minor children from the custody and
control of their parents by terminating the parent-child relationship." Id. at 581,
578 S.E.2d at 736.

We find clear and convincing evidence shows Son was in foster care for fifteen of
the twenty-two months preceding the family court's June 2014 TPR hearing. See
§ 63-7-2570(8) (providing a ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has been in
foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months"). In addition, Mother conceded during argument before this
court that "both children would fit under" this statutory ground.

We further find clear and convincing evidence shows that, as of the 2014 TPR
hearing, Mother failed to remedy the condition causing Children's removal—
namely, her drug addiction. See § 63-7-2570(2) (providing a ground for TPR is
met when "[t]he child has been removed from the parent pursuant to [the
emergency protective custody (EPC) statutes] or [s]ection 63-7-1660 [of the South
Carolina Code (2010 & Supp. 2017)] and has been out of the home for a period of
six months following the adoption of a placement plan by court order or by
agreement between the department and the parent[,] and the parent has not
remedied the conditions which caused the removal"). Mother has struggled with
drug addiction and relapse for years, testing positive at least eight times between
April 2006 and July 2012. Notably, she tested positive for cocaine twice during
her pregnancy with Son and once during her pregnancy with Daughter. The family
court removed Son from Mother in January 2011, less than a month after his birth,
due to Mother's positive drug test during her pregnancy with him. In March 2011,
the court approved a placement plan requiring Mother to participate in drug
treatment and submit to random drug tests, among other things. The family court
returned Son to Mother in October 2011 but removed him again in February 2012
after DSS discovered Mother was using crack cocaine while Son was in the home.
Similarly, DSS gained legal custody of Daughter in September 2012, less than a
month after her birth, due to Mother's positive drug test during that pregnancy.
Although Mother completed drug treatment in December 2012, DSS again referred
her to treatment, which she refused, in July 2013. Mother agreed to undergo
treatment in March 2014; however, she did not attend and was discharged as
unsuccessful several months later. At the 2016 remand hearing, the Guardian ad
Litem (GAL) testified Mother had not completed her placement plan by the 2014
TPR hearing. We find the above evidence clearly and convincingly shows Mother
failed to remedy her drug addiction as of the 2014 TPR hearing.
Finally, viewed from Children's perspective, we find clear and convincing
evidence shows TPR is in their best interest. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah
W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must
consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when
determining whether TPR is appropriate."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010)
("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights
conflict."). Except for the first few weeks after his birth and a four-month period
between October 2011 and February 2012, Son has been in foster care his entire
life. Similarly, Daughter has been in foster care continuously since July 2013,
when she was less than a year old. Children have remained in the same home for
the duration of their time in foster care, and their foster mother stated she was
prepared to adopt them. Additionally, the DSS foster care case worker and the
GAL both testified TPR was in Children's best interest. The GAL opined
Children's home "is not with [Mother]. Home is with . . . the foster family." She
expressed concern about Mother's history of drug use and the stress that caring for
several young children would cause, and she stated returning Children to Mother
was equivalent to "rolling the dice." The GAL added she had "grave concerns"
about returning Children to Mother, who was already caring for two additional
children, and she believed removing Children from their foster home would
emotionally traumatize them. Finally, the GAL stated that if Children were
returned to Mother and she continued using drugs, Children will have "lost their
good, one chance, at being placed in a loving stable home." We find the above
evidence clearly and convincingly shows it is in Children's best interest to order
TPR, thereby freeing them for adoption by their foster family.

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.