State v. Young

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Raymond Lewis Young, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000149

Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2017-UP-426
Submitted September 7, 2017 – Filed November 15, 2017

REVERSED AND REMANDED

J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia,
and Solicitor W. Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Raymond Lewis Young appeals his convictions and sentences of
seven counts of attempted murder, one count of second degree assault and battery
by mob, and one count of conspiracy.1 Young argues, among other issues, the trial
court erred in denying his Batson2 motion. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The codefendants were tried together for their involvement in a shootout at a Li'l
Cricket gas station in Greenville. Prior to jury selection, the trial court agreed to
permit counsel for Booker to "speak[] for the group." The State struck three black
jurors: 281, 81, and alternate juror 215. Young challenged the strikes, noting of
the State's six strikes, three were used on black jurors. The trial court noted three
black jurors were seated. The State explained it excused Juror 281 because during
voir dire, she "expressed some concerns regarding her ability to withstand the
duration of the trial. She indicated she had a substantial number of health issues
and wanted to be excused based on those issues." Regarding Juror 81, the State
noted she lived on Prancer Avenue in Greenville County near some of the
witnesses. Finally, the State explained it struck Juror 215 because he lived in the
Piedmont area, possibly near many of the witnesses.

Young argued the State's explanations were not "satisfactory rac[e] neutral
reasons," and the State did not strike Juror 106, a white, female juror who lived on
Piedmont Avenue in Piedmont. The State argued it did not have any concern about
that particular Piedmont address and it did not "know the geography of Greenville
County with enough sophistication to appreciate the minor details of the
community . . . ." The trial court noted Young made a valid point but denied the
motion, relying on State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1, 512 S.E.2d 99 (1998), and Payton v.
Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 495 S.E.2d 205 (1998), and finding no discriminatory intent
inherent in the State's explanation. After the presentation of the case, the jury
convicted Young and the court denied all post trial motions. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, this court sits to review errors of law only and is bound by the
trial court's factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v.
Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009). Thus, on review, the
court is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. A

1
Kinjta Sadler (State v. Sadler, Op. No. 2015-UP-013 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 14,
2015)), Michael Antonio Williams, and Esaiveus Frantrez Booker were tried
together as Young's codefendants.
2
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
trial court's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is unsupported by
the evidence or controlled by an error of law. State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16, 732
S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012). The appellate court "does not re-evaluate the facts based
on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines
whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence." Edwards, 384 S.C.
at 508, 682 S.E.2d at 822.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Young argues the trial court erred in denying his Batson motion. We agree.

In Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, the Supreme Court of the United States held the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States forbids a prosecutor from challenging "potential jurors solely on account of
their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable
impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." In Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992), the Supreme Court held the Constitution also
prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in
the exercise of peremptory challenges. When one party strikes a member of a
cognizable racial group, the trial court must hold a Batson hearing if the opposing
party requests one. State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 629, 515 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1999).

In State v. Giles, our supreme court explained the proper procedure for a Batson
hearing:

First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must
make a prima facie showing that the challenge was based
on race. If a sufficient showing is made, the trial court
will move to the second step in the process, which
requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a race
neutral explanation for the challenge. If the trial court
finds that burden has been met, the process will proceed
to the third step, at which point the trial court must
determine whether the opponent of the challenge has
proved purposeful discrimination.

407 S.C. 14, 18, 754 S.E.2d 261, 263 (2014) (citations omitted).

Merely denying a discriminatory motive is insufficient; however, the proponent of
the strike need only present a race or gender neutral reason. State v. Casey, 325
S.C. 447, 451-52, 481 S.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Ct. App. 1997). "[A] 'legitimate reason'
is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection."
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). The explanation "need not be
persuasive, or even plausible, but it must be clear and reasonably specific such that
the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext
in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of
the reason in light of all the evidence with a bearing on it." Giles, 407 S.C. at 21-
22, 754 S.E.2d at 265. "The burden of persuading the court that a Batson violation
has occurred remains at all times on the opponent of the strike." State v. Evins, 373
S.C. 404, 415, 645 S.E.2d 904, 909 (2007).

In denying Young's motion, the trial court relied on Tucker and Payton, neither of
which we find instructive in this case. In Tucker, the State used all six of its
preemptory strikes against black jurors. 334 S.C. at 8, 512 S.E.2d at 102. As its
race-neutral explanations, the State proffered the first juror was argumentative and
the second juror, among other things, lived in a high crime area, did not understand
the court process, and stated she could not sign a death verdict form. Id. at 8-9,
512 S.E.2d at 102-03. As to the remaining four jurors, the State struck them based
on their equivocality regarding the death penalty. Id. at 9, 512 S.E.2d at 103.
Regarding the first two jurors, our supreme court determined the trial court did not
err in finding the reasons for the strikes were race neutral and noted no similarly
situated jurors of a different race were struck. Id. at 8-9, 512 S.E.2d at 102-03. As
to the remaining four jurors, our supreme court referenced the deference it gives
the solicitor when the solicitor "perceives a person will have difficulty imposing
the death penalty." Id. at 9, 512 S.E.2d at 103.

In Payton, the plaintiff exercised all of his peremptory strikes to remove
prospective white jurors. 329 S.C. at 54, 495 S.E.2d at 207. Counsel for the
plaintiff stated he used a strike against Juror 18 because she was opinionated and
"what we refer to as a redneck variety." Id. at 55, 495 S.E.2d at 208. Our supreme
court found the term "redneck" was "a racially derogatory term applied exclusively
to members of the white race" and it was "not a valid race-neutral reason to strike a
potential juror." Id. at 55-56, 495 S.E.2d at 208. The court found the purported
reason for the strike was not a valid race-neutral reason, prefacing its finding by
stating it "need not go beyond the second step of the analysis." Id. at 55, 495
S.E.2d at 208. The court reminded that "the right to serve on a jury and not to be
discriminated against because of race or gender belongs to the potential juror, not
the party" and rejected the dual motivation analysis, finding "[o]nce a
discriminatory reason has been uncovered . . . this reason taints the entire jury
selection procedure." Id. at 56-59, 495 S.E.2d at 208-10; see id. at 59, 495 S.E.2d
at 210 (explaining other jurisdictions find "a discriminatory explanation will vitiate
the entire selection process regardless of the genuineness of the other explanations
for the strike").

We find neither of these cases was controlling on the trial court, which failed to
exercise its discretion in stating the cases "required [it] to find the reason offered to
be deemed race neutral." In this case, the State's stated reason for striking these
jurors was a concern that they lived in the same area as some of the witnesses.
Regarding Juror 215, the State "was concerned that he may be familiar with some
of the witnesses." We agree the State's explanation for striking Jurors 81 and
215−they lived in an area near many of the witnesses−is a race-neutral explanation.
Accordingly, the burden shifted to Young to show pretext because a similarly
situated juror of another race was seated.

Thus, we look to step three, in which the opponent of the strike must show the
reason offered, though facially race-neutral, was actually mere pretext to engage in
purposeful racial discrimination. See Haigler, 334 S.C. at 629, 515 S.E.2d at 91
("[T]he opponent of the strike must show that the race- or gender-neutral
explanation given was mere pretext."). The opponent of the strike has the burden
of proving the pretextual nature of the stated reason for the strike. State v.
Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 315, 631 S.E.2d 294, 298 (Ct. App. 2006). "This burden is
generally established by showing similarly-situated members of another race were
seated on the jury." Id. In this case, the State struck two black jurors on the basis
they lived in the same area as some of the State's witnesses, yet seated at least one
similarly situated white juror. Thus, Young has shown the pretextual nature of the
stated reason for the strike.

However, this inconsistent application of a neutral reason does not automatically
result in a finding of discrimination if the strike's proponent provides a race-neutral
explanation for the inconsistency. See State v. Kelley, 319 S.C. 173, 177, 460
S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) (finding the solicitor provided a racially neutral
explanation for why it did not strike a juror with similar characteristics to one
previously striken when she stated she was "saving her last strike to use on other
potential jurors" who had criminal records). However, the record in this case does
not reflect any race-neutral explanation for the solicitor's strikes. Rather, the
solicitor stated the following:

I've offered race neutral reasons. If the Court wants a
more specific inquiry. I didn't make that address on [the
white juror who lived on Piedmont], it is something that I
had no concern. I had concerns about the Piedmont
address but not this one. I don't know the geography of
Greenville County with enough sophistication to
appreciate the minor details of the community the basis
of my strike, Judge.

The trial court recognized Young made "a very valid point." However, the court
stated, "I don't see a discriminatory intent inherent in the proponent's explanation
and so I believe those cases require me to find the reason offered to be deemed
race neutral."

We find the trial court erred in failing to conduct a proper analysis under the third
step of a Batson review. Rather than considering the State's failure to articulate a
race neutral reason for its disparate treatment of the jurors, the court seemingly
found only that the reason given in the first place was race neutral. See State v.
Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 281, 379 S.E.2d 891, 892 (1989) (finding the solicitor
negated his neutral reason for striking three black jurors when he failed to strike a
white juror who was similarly situated); id. (finding the solicitor's stated neutral
reason "was proven to be a pretext because it was not applied in a neutral
manner"). "Furthermore, no showing of actual prejudice is required to find
reversible error for the denial or impairment of the right to a peremptory
challenge." State v. Smalls, 336 S.C. 301, 309, 519 S.E.2d 793, 797 (Ct. App.
1999). Thus, we reverse Young's conviction and remand for a new trial.3

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the trial court is

REVERSED AND REMANDED.4

SHORT, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

3
Based on our disposition of the Batson issue, we decline to address Young's
remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address the remaining issues
because its resolution of a prior issue was dispositive).
4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.