Catalina London Limited v. Elisa Narruhn

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Catalina London Limited f/k/a Alea London Limited,
Respondent,

v.

Elisa Narruhn and R.K.C. Entertainment, LLC d/b/a The
Red Room, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002305

Appeal From Horry County
Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-439
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed October 26, 2016

AFFIRMED

Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Kelaher Connell &
Connor, PC, of Surfside Beach, for Appellants.

Mark Steven Barrow, William Roberts Calhoun, Jr., and
Mark V. Gende, all of Sweeny Wingate & Barrow, PA,
of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: R.K.C. Entertainment LLC d/b/a The Red Room (The Red
Room) and Elisa Narruhn (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order,
which granted summary judgment to Catalina London Limited f/k/a Alea London
Limited (Catalina) on the following grounds: (1) the assault and battery exclusion
applied; (2) the policy of liability insurance was properly canceled on March 29,
2005; (3) The Red Room's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the
policy substantially prejudiced Catalina; and (4) no occurrence triggering coverage
under the policy had arisen. Appellants argue the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment to Catalina because there were genuine issues of material fact
and they presented the mere scintilla of evidence necessary to withstand Catalina's
motion for summary judgment. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

1. As to whether the assault and battery exclusion applied: M & M Corp. of S.C. v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 390 S.C. 255, 259, 701 S.E.2d 33, 35 (2010) ("Insurance
policies are subject to the general rules of contract construction."); Sphere Drake
Ins. Co. v. Litchfield, 313 S.C. 471, 474, 438 S.E.2d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 1993)
("While a policy should be liberally construed in favor of coverage and against
exclusion, courts are not permitted to torture the ordinary meaning of language to
extend coverage expressly excluded by the terms of the policy."); B.L.G. Enters.,
Inc. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 334 S.C. 529, 535-36, 514 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1999)
("Although exclusions in an insurance policy are construed against the insurer,
insurers have the right to limit their liability and to impose conditions on their
obligations provided they are not in contravention of public policy or a statutory
prohibition." (citation omitted)); Sphere Drake, 313 S.C. at 474, 438 S.E.2d at 277
(stating "the intention to exclude coverage of claims arising from assault and
battery [was] unmistakable"); Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C.
220, 230, 317 S.E.2d 748, 754 (Ct. App. 1984) ("A battery is the actual infliction
of any unlawful, unauthorized violence on the person of another, irrespective of its
degree; it is unnecessary that the contact be by a blow, as any forcible contact is
sufficient . . . ."); id. at 230, 317 S.E.2d at 754-55 ("[A]n assault occurs when a
person has been placed in reasonable fear of bodily harm by the conduct of the
defendant."); Mellen v. Lane, 377 S.C. 261, 277, 659 S.E.2d 236, 245 (Ct. App.
2008) ("There is a well[-]recognized distinction between criminal assault and a
civil action for an assault and battery. In civil actions, the intent, while pertinent
and relevant, is not an essential element." (quoting Herring v. Lawrence
Warehouse Co., 222 S.C. 226, 241, 72 S.E.2d 453, 458 (1952))); Herring, 222 S.C.
at 241, 72 S.E.2d at 458 ("Where, however, the basis of an action is assault and
battery, the intention with which the injury was done is immaterial so far as the
maintenance of the action is concerned, provided the act causing the injury was

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
wrongful, for if the act was wrongful, the intent must necessarily have been
wrongful . . . ." (quoting 4 Am. Jur., Sec. 5, Page 128)); id. (holding the trial court
committed prejudicial error in charging the jury the intent to inflict injury is a
necessary element in a civil action for assault and battery).

2. As to issues two, three, and four: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding appellate courts need
not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.