Green v. Teleperformance Group, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Shameka S. Green, Employee, Appellant,

v.

Teleperformance Group, Inc., Employer; Zurich North
America, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001380

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-355
Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed July 6, 2016

AFFIRMED

Everett H. Garner, of Holler Garner Corbett Plante
Gilchrist & Hayes, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Kelly Fitzharris Morrow and Helen F. Hiser, both of
McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Shameka S. Green appeals the order of the Appellate Panel of
the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission affirming the single
commissioner's decision, which found Green failed to prove she suffered a change
of condition and the single commissioner's prior order governed Green's
entitlement to future medical treatment. Green argues the Appellate Panel erred in
(1) giving greater weight to the deposition testimony of Dr. Frank Noojin, (2)
failing to give greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Joseph Jackson, (3) finding
Green failed to meet her burden as to change of condition, (4) failing to refer
Green for an independent medical examination in order to reconcile the divergent
medical opinions and provide a contemporary evaluation, and (5) adopting the
findings of the single commissioner wherein he denied Green the opportunity to
take Dr. Noojin's deposition subsequent to Dr. Jackson's opinion. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issues 1 through 3: S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-90(A) (2015) ("[T]he
[Appellate Panel] may review an award and on that review may make an award
ending, diminishing, or increasing the compensation previously awarded, on proof
by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a change of condition
caused by the original injury, after the last payment of compensation."); Gattis v.
Murrells Inlet VFW No. 10420, 353 S.C. 100, 107, 576 S.E.2d 191, 195 (Ct. App.
2003) ("It is not the province of this [c]ourt to determine whether the greater
weight of the evidence supported the finding that a change had taken place in the
condition of the claimant such as would warrant an extension or enlargement of the
award, or whether the greater weight of the evidence supported the finding that
such change resulted from the injury . . . . Such facts must be determined by those
whose duty it is to find the facts." (quoting Krell v. S.C. State Highway Dep't, 237
S.C. 584, 588, 118 S.E.2d 322, 323-24 (1961))); id. ("The Administrative
Procedures Act establishes the substantial evidence standard of review for factual
findings made by the [Appellate Panel]."); Laws v. Richland Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
270 S.C. 492, 495-96, 243 S.E.2d 192, 193 (1978) ("'Substantial evidence' is not a
mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the
case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or
must have reached in order to justify its action."); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co.,
360 S.C. 276, 290, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence.");
Corbin v. Kohler Co., 351 S.C. 613, 624, 571 S.E.2d 92, 98 (Ct. App. 2002)
("[T]he [Appellate Panel] determines the weight and credit to be given to the
expert testimony."); Nettles v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. #7, 341 S.C. 580, 592, 535
S.E.2d 146, 152 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Where there is conflicting medical
evidence, . . . the findings of fact of the [Appellate Panel] are conclusive.");
Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 318 S.C. 431, 435, 458 S.E.2d 76, 78 (Ct.
App. 1995) ("The test is whether the decision of the [Appellate Panel] is supported
by substantial evidence."); Causby v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 249 S.C.
225, 230, 153 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1967) (denying the application for a change of
condition when necessity for surgery did not change between the initial hearing
and the change of condition hearing).

2. As to issues 4 and 5: S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-707(B) (2012) ("When a party
seeks to introduce new evidence into the record on a case on review, the party shall
file a motion and affidavit with the [Appellate Panel]'s Judicial Department."); S.C.
Code Ann. Regs. 67-707(C) (2012) ("The moving party must establish the new
evidence is of the same nature and character required for granting a new trial and
show: (1) The evidence sought to be introduced is not evidence of a cumulative or
impeaching character but would likely have produced a different result had the
evidence been procurable at the first hearing; and (2) The evidence was not known
to the moving party at the time of the first hearing, by reasonable diligence the new
evidence could not have been secured, and the discovery of the new evidence is
being brought to the attention of the [Appellate Panel] immediately upon its
discovery."); Martin v. Rapid Plumbing, 369 S.C. 278, 287, 631 S.E.2d 547, 552
(Ct. App. 2006) ("A conflicting doctor's report created after a hearing does not
mandate a new trial."); Holcombe v. Dan River Mills/Woodside Div., 286 S.C. 223,
225-26, 333 S.E.2d 338, 340 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding the Appellate Panel was not
required to allow the doctor's deposition to be taken and entered as evidence where
the record reflected that, at the time of the hearing before the single commissioner,
a party knew of the testimony of a doctor).

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.