State v. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Willie Marion Brown, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001666

Appeal From Williamsburg County
George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-298
Submitted March 1, 2016 – Filed June 15, 2016

AFFIRMED

Lionel S. Lofton and William H. Waring, III, both of
Lofton & Lofton, PC, of Charleston; and G. Wells
Dickson, Jr., of Kingstree, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney,
III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Willie Marion Brown appeals his convictions for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct with a minor and committing a lewd act on a minor.
Brown argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and
improper bolstering testimony. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding prior bad
acts committed by Brown: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265
(2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and
will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Wallace, 384 S.C.
428, 432, 683 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2009) ("Evidence of other bad acts is not
admissible to prove the defendant's guilt except to show . . . existence of a common
scheme or plan . . . ."); id. at 433, 683 S.E.2d at 278 (stating "the trial court must
analyze the similarities and dissimilarities between the crime charged and the bad
act evidence to determine whether there is a close degree of similarity"); id.
("When the similarities outweigh the dissimilarities, the bad act evidence is
admissible under Rule 404(b)[, SCRE]."); id. at 434 n.5, 683 S.E.2d at 278 n.5
("Requiring a 'connection' between the crime charged and the bad act evidence is
simply a requirement that the two be factually similar and does not add an
additional layer of analysis."); id. at 435, 683 S.E.2d at 278 (stating the trial court
must conduct a Rule 403, SCRE analysis after finding prior bad act evidence
admissible); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . .").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony: Pagan, 369
S.C. at 208, 631 S.E.2d at 265 ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion
of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v.
Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460, 474, 523 S.E.2d 787, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[B]oth
expert testimony and behavioral evidence are admissible as rape trauma evidence
to prove a sexual offense occurred whe[n] the probative value of such evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect." (quoting State v. Shumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 506,
435 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1993))); id. at 474-75, 523 S.E.2d at 794 (stating "expert
testimony concerning common behavioral characteristics of sexual assault victims
and the range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible"
because it helps the jury understand victims' "often strange behavior"); State v.
Brown, 411 S.C. 332, 345, 768 S.E.2d 246, 253 (Ct. App. 2015) ("The fact that
[the expert's] testimony corroborated some of the . . . victims' reasons for delaying
disclosure of the abuse does not mean her testimony improperly bolstered their
accounts."); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 360, 737 S.E.2d 490, 500 (2013)

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
(providing that a forensic interviewer may testify regarding the time, date, and
circumstances of the interview); State v. Barrett, Op. No. 5395 (S.C. Ct. App. filed
Mar. 23, 2016) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 12 at 80-81) (holding the trial court did
not err in qualifying the expert and admitting her testimony while acknowledging
"the more prudent practice would have been to call an independent mental health
professional in lieu of the forensic interviewer").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.