National Bank of SC v. Segars

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

National Bank of South Carolina, Respondent,

v.

Thaddeus F. Segars; KCS Investments, LLC; Singleton
Place Homeowners Association, Inc., and Suntrust
Mortgage Inc., Defendants,

Of Whom Thaddeus F. Segars is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001296

Appeal From Beaufort County
Marvin H. Dukes, III, Special Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-325
Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed June 22, 2016

AFFIRMED

Thomas Justin Finn, of Finn Law Firm, PC, of Hilton
Head Island, for Appellant.

Bryson Moore Geer, Merritt Gordon Abney, and Erika
Jensene Karnaszewski, all of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, of Charleston; and Daniel Allen
Saxon, of Novit & Scarminach, PA, of Hilton Head
Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Tad Segars appeals from the circuit court's order granting
National Bank of South Carolina's (NBSC's) motion for summary judgment on the
basis that the applicable three-year statute of limitations expired on Segars'
counterclaims. Segars argues the master erred in granting summary judgment to
NBSC (1) when Segars filed compulsory counterclaims within the time allowed to
file a responsive pleading and (2) on the basis the statute of limitations had expired
when Segars had no way of discovering NBSC's negligence until Segars obtained a
copy of the appraisal. We affirm.

1. Segars argues the master erred in granting summary judgment to NBSC
when he filed compulsory counterclaims within the time allowed to file a
responsive pleading. Sections 15-3-530(1) and (5) of the South Carolina Code
(2005) provide a three-year statute of limitations for an action upon a contract,
obligation, or liability, and tort claims. "Under 'the discovery rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run when a cause of action reasonably ought to have been
discovered.'" CoastalStates Bank v. Hanover Homes of S.C., LLC, 408 S.C. 510,
517, 759 S.E.2d 152, 156 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321
S.C. 360, 363, 468 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1996)). "By definition, a counterclaim is
compulsory only if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
opposing party's claim." First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of S.C. v. Hucks, 305
S.C. 296, 298, 408 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1991); see also Rule 13(a), SCRCP. Our
supreme court has held a counterclaim is compulsory "if there is a 'logical
relationship' between the claim and the counterclaim." Mullinax v. Bates, 317 S.C.
394, 396, 453 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1995) (citation omitted). During the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, Segars conceded his counterclaims for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. Therefore,
the only remaining counterclaim for the master to consider was Segars' claim for
negligent misrepresentation. Segars filed his counterclaims on September 28,
2009; however, the master's order erroneously stated they were filed on August 19,
2009. The master determined the statute of limitations barred Segar's
counterclaims if he knew or should have known prior to August 19, 2006, that the
claim against NBSC might exist.1 The master also held that by March 16, 2005, at
the latest, Segars had actual knowledge the Office of Coastal Resource
Management (OCRM) line was not located where he thought it was at the time of
purchase and the line's location would affect his ability to build a residence on Lot
2. We find Segars was not entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations for his
remaining counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation because the statute of
limitations for his claim expired on March 16, 2008, before NBSC filed its
foreclosure action on July 6, 2009.

2. Segars argues the master erred in granting summary judgment to NBSC on
the basis the statute of limitations had expired when he had no way of discovering
NBSC's negligence until he obtained a copy of the appraisal. NBSC's appraisal of
Lot 2 was prepared on June 2, 2004, seven days before the closing, and Segars
testified he did not review the appraisal prior to closing. We find that once Segars
had notice the OCRM baseline had not been moved, which the trial court
determined was by March 16, 2005, at the latest, he had notice that the value of Lot
2 was negatively impacted and there might be a problem with the appraisal.
Further, Segars testified the contingency that Lot 2 be appraised for $1.6 million or
greater was for NBSC's benefit and protection. There was no such contingency for
Segars' benefit, and the contract to purchase Lot 2 had no contingency that the
property be appraised for a specific amount. In fact, at the time of NBSC's
appraisal, the financing contingency of Segars' contract to purchase Lot 2 had
expired, so he was required to purchase the property regardless of NBSC's
appraisal of the property. Finally, the deed conveying Lot 2 to Segars specifically
referenced the second OCRM-approved plat, and Segars acknowledged receipt of
the plat by acceptance of the deed. Therefore, we find the master did not err in
granting summary judgment to NBSC on the basis the statute of limitations had
expired.

AFFIRMED.2

SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

1
The corrected date for the statute of limitations would have been September 28,
2006.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.