Ganotakis v. City of Columbia Board of Zoning Appeals

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Andreas Ganotakis d/b/a Seven Days Food Mart, LLC,
Appellant,

v.

City of Columbia Board of Zoning Appeals, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001824

Appeal From Richland County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-153
Submitted December 1, 2015 – Filed March 30, 2016

AFFIRMED

Dietrich A. Lake, of The Lake Law Firm, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Peter M. Balthazor, of Riley Pope & Laney, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Andreas Ganotakis d/b/a Seven Days Food Mart, LLC (Food
Mart) appeals the circuit court's decision affirming the decision of the Board of
Zoning Appeals (the Board) to deny Food Mart's request for a special exception to
operate a liquor store in a C-3 zoning district. Food Mart argues the circuit court
erred in determining (1) the Board's decision to deny Food Mart's request for a
special exception was not arbitrary and capricious when the Board did not adhere
to its own criteria for granting special exceptions, and (2) Food Mart was not
prejudiced by a conflict of interest between the Board, City Council, and private
counsel. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in determining the Board's decision to deny
Food Mart's request for a special exception was not arbitrary and capricious: S.C.
Code Ann. § 6-29-840(A) (Supp. 2015) ("The findings of fact by [the Board] . . .
must be treated in the same manner as a finding of fact by a jury, and the court may
not take additional evidence."); Rest. Row Assocs. v. Horry Cty., 335 S.C. 209,
216, 516 S.E.2d 442, 446 (1999) ("A court will refrain from substituting its
judgment for that of the reviewing body, even if it disagrees with the decision.");
id. ("However, a decision of a municipal zoning board will be overturned if it is
arbitrary, capricious, has no reasonable relation to a lawful purpose, or if the board
has abused its discretion."); S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-800(A)(3) (Supp. 2015)
(stating the Board has the power "to permit uses by special exception subject to the
terms and conditions for the uses set forth for such uses in the zoning ordinance");
Columbia City Code § 17-112(2)(b)(4) (2013) (stating the Board "shall make a
finding that it is empowered under the section of this article described in the
application to grant the special exception and that the special exception will not
adversely affect the public interest"); Columbia City Code § 17-112(2)(c) (2013)
("[The Board] . . . shall consider the following: (1) [t]raffic impact; (2) [v]ehicle
and pedestrian safety; (3) [p]otential impact of noise, lights, fumes, or obstruction
of air flow on adjoining property, (4) [a]dverse impact of the proposed use on the
aesthetic character of the environs . . . ; and (5) [o]rientation and spacing of
improvements or buildings.").

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in determining Food Mart was not
prejudiced by a conflict of interest between the Board, City Council, and private
counsel: Rule 1.7(a), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR ("A concurrent conflict of interest
exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."); Rule 1.8(l), RPC,

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
Rule 407, SCACR ("In any adversarial proceeding, a lawyer shall not serve as both
an advocate and an advisor to the hearing officer, trial judge or trier of fact.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, A.C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.