State v, Miller

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jonathan Xavier Miller, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001860

Appeal From Richland County
Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-040
Submitted November 1, 2015 – Filed January 20, 2016

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Interim Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin,
and Solicitor Daniel Edward Johnson, all of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jonathan Xavier Miller appeals his conviction of simple
possession of crack cocaine arguing the trial court erred in denying his: (1) motion
to suppress crack cocaine found during an inventory search of his vehicle; and (2)
his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Miller's pre-trial motion to
suppress crack cocaine found during an inventory search of his vehicle: S.C. Code
Ann. § 56-5-5635(A) (2006) ("Notwithstanding another provision of law, a law
enforcement officer who directs that a vehicle be towed for any reason, whether on
public or private property, must use the established towing procedure for his
jurisdiction. A request by a law enforcement officer resulting from a law
enforcement action, including . . . vehicle recovery incident to an arrest, is
considered a law enforcement towing . . . ."); Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 185,
754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014) ("[I]f police officers are following their standard
procedures, they may inventory impounded property without obtaining a warrant."
(citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987))); State v. Weaver, 374
S.C. 313, 322, 649 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2007) ("We find there is no meaningful
distinction to be made between vehicles parked in public and private places.");
State v. Cox, 290 S.C. 489, 492, 351 S.E.2d 570, 571 (1986) ("No prior Supreme
Court cases have recognized a distinction between vehicles parked in public and
private places. Indeed, such a distinction would not harmonize with the Court's
reasoning in automobile search cases.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Miller's motion for a directed
verdict because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show Miller was
in constructive possession of crack cocaine: State v. Mollison, 319 S.C. 41, 46,
459 S.E.2d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 1995) ("If there is any direct or any substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we
must find that the issues were properly submitted to the jury."); State v.
Muhammed, 338 S.C. 22, 27, 524 S.E.2d 637, 639 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Possession
requires more than mere presence."); State v. Hudson, 277 S.C. 200, 202, 284
S.E.2d 773, 774-75 (1981) ("To prove constructive possession, the State must
show a defendant had dominion and control, or the right to exercise dominion and
control, over the [drugs]. Constructive possession can be established by
circumstantial [evidence] as well as direct evidence . . . ."); id. at 202, 284 S.E.2d
at 774 ("Conviction of possession . . . requires proof of possession-either actual or
constructive, coupled with knowledge of its presence."); State v. Hernandez, 382
S.C. 620, 624, 677 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2009) ("In drug cases, the element of
knowledge is seldom established through direct evidence, but may be proven
circumstantially. Knowledge can be proven by the evidence of acts, declarations,

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
or conduct of the accused from which the inference may be drawn that the accused
knew of the existence of the prohibited substances." (citing State v. Attardo, 263
S.C. 546, 550, 211 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1975))).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.