Huggins v. Pritchett

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

David Glenn Huggins, Respondent,

v.

Susan "Ashley" S. Huggins Pritchett, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002425

Appeal From Greenville County
James A. Spruill, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-369
Heard May 6, 2015 – Filed July 22, 2015

REVERSED

Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Vanessa Hartman Kormylo, of Vanessa Hartman
Kormylo, P.A., of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Susan Pritchett (Mother) appeals the family court's order
splitting custody of two of her minor children. She seeks to reverse the change in
custody of the older child, M, who was transferred to David Huggins (Father). We
reverse.
At the hearing, the family court heard testimony from Mother, Father, Father's
mother, the guardian ad litem, and the father of an older child of Mother's who is
not involved in these proceedings. Pursuant to Rule 22, SCRFC, the family court
also privately interviewed both children, aged eight and nine, in chambers. In its
order, the family court ruled there was a substantial change in circumstances and
transferred custody of M to Father. Specifically, the court found that the younger
child "has required tremendous attention and support since the divorce of the
parties due to her special educational, medical and developmental needs." Mother,
subsequent to the court's order, filed a motion for reconsideration and for
supersedeas, challenging the family court's reliance on its in chambers interview
with the children. The court denied the motion, stating

any error in reliance upon the children's interview would
in fact be error in reliance on the younger child's pitiful
and emotional pleas to stay with her mother which this
court did in fact defer to. Therefore, any error would
have favored the mother in the maintenance of custody of
the younger daughter with her.

We find insufficient evidence in the record to support the family court's
determination that a substantial change in circumstances warranted a change in
custody. To change a custody arrangement established by a family court, there
must be a substantial change in circumstances and the change of custody must be
in the best interest of the child. See Tillman v. Oakes, 398 S.C. 245, 249, 728
S.E.2d 45, 47 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating to change the custody of a child, the non-
custodial parent must establish a substantial change in circumstances that affects
the welfare of the child and that a change in custody is in the best overall interests
of the child); see also Brown v. Brown, 362 S.C. 85, 93, 606 S.E.2d 785, 789 (Ct.
App. 2004) ("The court shall place weight upon the [child's] preference based upon
the child's age, experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to express a
preference." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see Bolding v.
Bolding, 378 S.C. 129, 131, 293 S.E.2d 699, 700 (1982) (reversing change of
custody of eleven-year-old child because the only change of circumstances
involved the wishes of the child).

Much of the family court's order focuses on the change in circumstances with
regard to the younger child, but it is not apparent how the younger child's situation
has impacted the older child. In particular, there is very little evidence to indicate
that the extra attention the younger child requires is given to the detriment of the
older child. The family court gave no indication of what information it learned
through its discussion with the children during the in chambers interview. See
Rule 210(h), SCACR (stating the appellate court will not consider any fact which
does not appear in the record).

We find Father failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances. Accordingly,
we reverse the family court's ruling changing custody.

REVERSED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.