21st Mortgage v. Youmans

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

21st Mortgage Corporation, Appellant,

v.

Robert Youmans and Tonya Stoney, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001844

Appeal From Allendale County
Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-112
Heard December 10, 2014 – Filed March 4, 2015

AFFIRMED

Thomas E. Lydon, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie
LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Mark Brandon Tinsley, of Gooding & Gooding PA, of
Allendale; and Robert Norris Hill, of Law Office of
Robert Hill, of Lexington, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this action for claim and delivery of a mobile home, 21st
Mortgage Corporation appeals the circuit court's granting of summary judgment to
Robert Youmans and Tonya Stoney (Respondents), arguing the court erred in
finding: (1) 21st Mortgage was bound by a default judgment that Respondents
obtained against the dealer who sold them the mobile home and financed the
purchase, (2) 21st Mortgage had notice of the default judgment when it acquired
the note securing the transaction, and (3) 21st Mortgage was subject to punitive
damages and attorney's fees awarded against the dealer who defaulted in the prior
lawsuit. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether 21st Mortgage was bound by the default judgment: Helms
Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611 S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005)
(stating the appellant has the burden of providing a sufficient record upon which
the appellate court can make its decision); Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 625,
576 S.E.2d 156, 163 (2003) ("A due process claim raised for the first time on
appeal is not preserved."); Allegro, Inc. v. Scully, 409 S.C. 392, 411, 762 S.E.2d
54, 64 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding certain issues were unpreserved for appellate
review because there was nothing in the record on appeal indicating the objections
at trial included arguments on those issues).

2. As to 21st Mortgage's allegation that record notice of the default judgment
against a prior holder of the note was insufficient under subsection 37-2-404(2) of
the South Carolina Code (2015): Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v. White, 296 S.C. 165,
171, 370 S.E.2d 923, 927 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Section 37-2-404 limits the extent of
the defense White may assert against American to the amount owing to American
at the time of written notice." (emphasis added)). We further agree with
Respondents that the court never ruled that the 2004 default judgment satisfied the
notice requirement of subsection 37-2-404(2); rather, in stating "all the world was
on notice" about the judgment, the court was merely observing that 21st Mortgage
could have discovered the judgment before it purchased the note.

3. As to 21st Mortgage's argument that it should not be subject to attorney's fees
awarded against the dealer who defaulted in the prior lawsuit: Austin v. Stokes-
Craven Holding Corp., 387 S.C. 22, 56, 691 S.E.2d 135, 153 (2010) ("[A]ttorney's
fees are intended to make [statutory] claims economically viable for private
citizens whereas an award of punitive damages is designed to punish wrongful
conduct and deter future misconduct."). Because the sum of the actual damages,
attorney's fees, and costs awarded to Respondents in 2004 exceeded the amount
owed on the note, we decline to address 21st Mortgage's argument that it should
not have been subject to treble damages awarded in the prior lawsuit. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (declining to address certain issues raised by the appellant because
resolution of a prior issue was dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.