Jarmuth v. The International Club

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ronald Jarmuth, Appellant,

v.

The International Club Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Rosemary Toth, and K.A. Diehl & Associates, Inc.,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000714

Appeal From Horry County
Ralph P. Stroman, Special Referee
Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-111
Submitted January 1, 2015 – Filed March 4, 2015

AFFIRMED

Ronald Jarmuth, of Murrells Inlet, pro se.

Henrietta U. Golding and Alicia E. Thompson, both of
McNair Law Firm, PA, of Myrtle Beach, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Ronald Jarmuth appeals the special referee's order dismissing his
claims, awarding judgment against him, and granting injunctive relief. On appeal,
Jarmuth argues: (1) the special referee denied him a fair trial; (2) the special
referee did not address all of his issues; (3) the International Club Homeowners
Association, Inc. (the Association) did not have any rights under the declaration of
covenants and restrictions; (4) the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act1
preempted the declaration of covenants and restrictions; (5) K.A. Diehl &
Associates, Inc. (K.A. Diehl) and the Association were liable to him for
defamation and invasion of privacy; (6) Rosemary Toth and K.A. Diehl were liable
to the Association for mishandling Association funds; (7) certain covenant
obligations under the declaration of covenants and restrictions were voidable
personal service contracts; (8) he was entitled to the approval of various
modifications to his unit; (9) Pebble Creek and the Villas were not subject to the
declaration of covenants and restrictions; (10) certain waivers of covenants
contained within the first amendment to the declaration of covenants and
restrictions were general waivers; (11) Horry County owned certain roads within
the International Club community free of covenant restrictions; (12) the
Association illegally withheld the voter list from him; and (13) the Association was
not entitled to attorney's fees. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

As to Issue 1: Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998)
("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate
review."); Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, L.L.C., 368 S.C. 444, 476, 629 S.E.2d
653, 670 (2006) ("[A] party may not complain on appeal of error or object to a trial
procedure which his own conduct has induced."); Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 358 S.C.
78, 99, 594 S.E.2d 485, 496 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]here an issue is not argued
within the body of the brief but is only a short conclusory statement, it is
abandoned on appeal."); Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals need not
address a point which is manifestly without merit.").

As to Issue 2: Ellie, Inc., 358 S.C. at 99, 594 S.E.2d at 496 ("[W]here an issue is
not argued within the body of the brief but is only a short conclusory statement, it
is abandoned on appeal."); State v. Colf, 332 S.C. 313, 322, 504 S.E.2d 360, 364
(Ct. App. 1998) (finding a conclusory, two-paragraph argument that cited no

1
See S.C. Code § 33-31-620(a) (2006).
authority other than an evidentiary rule was abandoned), aff'd as modified, 337
S.C. 622, 525 S.E.2d 246 (2000); Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals
need not address a point which is manifestly without merit.").

As to Issue 3: O'Shea v. Lesser, 308 S.C. 10, 14, 416 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1992)
(explaining when the relief sought in an action for breach of restrictive covenants
is monetary in nature, a claim for breach of the covenants is legal); id. (stating "in
an action at law, tried without a jury, . . . we will not disturb findings of fact of the
[trial court] unless there is no evidence reasonably supporting the [trial court's]
findings"); McCall v. IKON, 363 S.C. 646, 652, 611 S.E.2d 315, 318 (Ct. App.
2005) ("[A] corporation may be known by several names in the transaction of its
general business.").

As to Issue 4: Seabrook Island Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Marshland Trust, Inc., 358
S.C. 655, 661, 596 S.E.2d 380, 382-83 (Ct. App. 2004) (explaining the
determination of the scope of restrictive covenants is an action in equity and will
be reviewed de novo); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-620(a) (2006) ("A member may
resign at any time.").

As to Issue 5: Mellen v. Lane, 377 S.C. 261, 275, 659 S.E.2d 236, 244 (Ct. App.
2008) (explaining an action in tort for damages is an action at law, and in an action
at law decided by a special referee, this court will correct any error of law); id.
(stating in reviewing an action at law, this court "must affirm the [referee's] factual
findings unless there is no evidence reasonably supporting them"); Murray v.
Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 140-41, 542 S.E.2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest or duty is qualifiedly privileged if made to a person
with a corresponding interest or duty even though it contains matter which, without
this privilege, would be actionable."); Snavely v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 379 S.C.
386, 396, 665 S.E.2d 222, 227 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Invasion of privacy consists of
the public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff, and the gravamen of the
tort is publicity as opposed to mere publication. The defendant must intentionally
reveal facts which are of no legitimate public interest, as there is no right of
privacy in public matters. In addition, the disclosure must be such as would be
highly offensive and likely to cause serious mental injury to a person of ordinary
sensibilities." (emphases added) (quoting McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627,
640, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437-38 (Ct. App. 1997))).

As to Issue 6: Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals need not address a
point which is manifestly without merit."); Ellie, Inc., 358 S.C. at 99, 594 S.E.2d at
496 ("[W]here an issue is not argued within the body of the brief but is only a short
conclusory statement, it is abandoned on appeal.").

As to Issue 7: Marshland Trust, 358 S.C. at 661, 596 S.E.2d at 382-83 (explaining
the determination of the scope of restrictive covenants is an action in equity and
will be reviewed de novo); Seabrook Island Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Berger, 365
S.C. 234, 239, 616 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Ct. App. 2005) ("'Restrictive covenants are
contractual in nature and bind the parties thereto in the same manner as any other
contract.'" (quoting Seabrook Island Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Pelzer, 292 S.C. 343,
347, 356 S.E.2d 411, 414 (Ct. App. 1987))).

As to Issue 8: Marshland Trust, 358 S.C. at 661, 596 S.E.2d at 382-83 (explaining
the determination of the scope of restrictive covenants is an action in equity and
will be reviewed de novo); Berger, 365 S.C. at 239, 616 S.E.2d at 434
("'Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and bind the parties thereto in the
same manner as any other contract.'" (quoting Pelzer, 292 S.C. at 347, 356 S.E.2d
at 414)); River Hills Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Amato, 326 S.C. 255, 260, 487
S.E.2d 179, 181 (1997) (holding the architectural review board of a subdivision did
not act unreasonably in disapproving modifications for aesthetic reasons).

As to Issue 9: Marshland Trust, 358 S.C. at 661, 596 S.E.2d at 382-83 (explaining
the determination of the scope of restrictive covenants is an action in equity and
will be reviewed de novo); S.C. Code Ann. § 30-7-10 (2007) (providing South
Carolina is a "race-notice" state); First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Shealy, 325
S.C. 351, 355, 479 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ct. App. 1996) ("It is a well established rule
of law that a deed is not legally effective until it has been delivered."); Williams v.
Lawrence, 194 S.C. 1, 6, 8 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1940) (explaining the recording of a
deed is prima facie evidence of delivery).

As to Issue 10: Marshland Trust, 358 S.C. at 661, 596 S.E.2d at 382-83
(explaining the determination of the scope of restrictive covenants is an action in
equity and will be reviewed de novo); Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 257,
754 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2014) ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be
given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their
execution. [T]he paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the parties as determined from the whole document." (alteration by
court) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

As to Issue 11: Town of Kingstree v. Chapman, 405 S.C. 282, 309, 747 S.E.2d
494, 508 (Ct. App. 2013) ("On the matter of dedication, this court makes findings
of fact in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence, and
the evidence must be strict, cogent, and convincing."); Boyd v. Bellsouth Tel. Tel.
Co., 369 S.C. 410, 418 n.3, 633 S.E.2d 136, 140 n.3 (2006) (explaining an implied
easement may arise when the claimant "has been in possession of both the
dominant and the alleged servient tenement, and while in this possession he creates
the easement, . . . and he afterwards sells a portion of the land over which the
alleged easement runs, [expressly] reserving the easement"); Tupper v. Dorchester
Cnty., 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997) ("[A]n appurtenant easement
inheres in the land, concerns the premises, has one terminus on the land of the
party claiming it, and is essentially necessary to the enjoyment thereof. It also
passes with the dominant estate upon conveyance." (citations omitted)); 23 Am.
Jur. 2d Dedication § 14 (2013) ("An owner of land subject to a right-of-way may
dedicate what it owns, at least where such dedication does not adversely affect the
rights of the dominant owner."); Id. at § 6 (2013) ("A dedicator of land to the
public may impose reasonable terms, restrictions, and limitations on which the land
is given.").

As to Issue 12: O'Shea, 308 S.C. at 14, 416 S.E.2d at 631 (explaining when the
relief sought in an action for breach of restrictive covenants is monetary in nature,
a claim for breach of the covenants is legal); id. (stating in an action at law tried
without a jury, "we will not disturb findings of fact of the [trial court] unless there
is no evidence reasonably supporting the [trial court's] findings"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 33-31-1602(c) (2006) (providing a member of a nonprofit corporation may
inspect and copy the membership list "only if: (1) the member's demand is made
in good faith and for a proper purpose; (2) the member describes with reasonable
particularity the purpose and the records the member desires to inspect; and (3) the
records are directly connected with this purpose").

As to Issue 13: O'Shea, 308 S.C. at 14, 416 S.E.2d at 631 (explaining when the
relief sought in an action for breach of restrictive covenants is monetary in nature,
a claim for breach of the covenants is legal); id. (stating in an action at law tried
without a jury, "we will not disturb findings of fact of the [trial court] unless there
is no evidence reasonably supporting the [trial court's] findings"); Berger, 365 S.C.
at 238-39, 616 S.E.2d at 434 ("[T]he authority to award attorney's fees can come
only from a statute or be provided for in the language of a contract." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 240, 616 S.E.2d at 434 ("Where there is a
contract, the award of attorney's fees is left to the discretion of the trial judge and
will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 239, 616 S.E.2d at 434 ("'Restrictive covenants are
contractual in nature and bind the parties thereto in the same manner as any other
contract.'" (quoting Pelzer, 292 S.C. at 347, 356 S.E.2d at 414)).

As to any remaining issues not included in Jarmuth's statement of issues: Rule
208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set
forth in the statement of the issues on appeal.").

AFFIRMED.2

HUFF, SHORT, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.