Riemann v. Palmetto Gems

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Roger R. Riemann, Respondent,

v.

Palmetto Gems & Gemological Services, Inc. and
Thomas Shofner, in his individual capacity, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001745

Appeal From Lexington County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-107
Heard December 10, 2014 – Filed March 4, 2015

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Angus H. Macaulay and James Andrew Byars, both of
Nexsen Pruet, LLC, both of Columbia, for Appellants.

Eugene Hamilton Matthews, of Richardson Plowden &
Robinson, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Palmetto Gems & Gemological Services, Inc. and Thomas
Shofner (collectively "Appellants") appeal the circuit court's denial of their Motion
to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration of Roger
R. Riemann's claims. Appellants contend the circuit court erred in (1) failing to
enforce the parties' agreement to arbitrate all disputes regarding the arbitrability of
particular claims and (2) finding claims under the South Carolina Payment of
Wages Act1 to be unarbitrable as a matter of law. We reverse the order of the
circuit court denying Appellants' motion to compel arbitration of Riemann's claims
and remand for an order consistent with this opinion, pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to enforce the parties' agreement
to arbitrate all disputes regarding the arbitrability of particular claims, we find the
arbitration clause of the parties' agreement clearly and unmistakably provided that
questions of arbitrability were to be decided by the arbitrator. See First Options of
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) ("Courts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]'
evidence that they did so." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); id. at 943
("[T]he question 'who has the primary power to decide arbitrability' turns upon
what the parties agreed about that matter."); id. ("Did the parties agree to submit
the arbitrability question itself to arbitration? If so, then the court's standard for
reviewing the arbitrator's decision about that matter should not differ from the
standard courts apply when they review any other matter that parties have agreed
to arbitrate." (citations omitted)); id. ("If, on the other hand, the parties did not
agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then the court should
decide that question just as it would decide any other question that the parties did
not submit to arbitration, namely, independently."); id. ("These two answers flow
inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the
parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes–but only those disputes–that the parties
have agreed to submit to arbitration." (citations omitted)); id. at 944-46 (noting the
determination of arbitrability is for the arbitrator if the contract, when viewed in
light of the ordinary state rules of contract construction, clearly and unmistakably
evinces an intent for the arbitrator to make the decision).

2. As to all other issues: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding that an appellate court need not
review remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is
dispositive).

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's denial of the motion to compel
arbitration is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for an order consistent
with this opinion.

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (Supp. 2014).
FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.