Capital Bank v. Moore

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Capital Bank, N.A., Respondent,

v.

Charles A. Moore a/k/a Charles A. B. Moore, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-001516

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-152
Submitted January 1, 2015 – Filed March 18, 2015

AFFIRMED

John R. Cantrell, Jr., of Cantrell Legal, PC, of Goose
Creek, for Appellant.

Robert A. Kerr, Jr., Christopher Tradd Colwell, and
Lesley Anne Firestone, all of Moore & Van Allen,
PLLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Charles A. Moore appeals the trial court's order granting partial
summary judgment to Capital Bank, N.A. (Capital Bank) in its collection action
against Moore, arguing the trial court erred by (1) basing its ruling on incompetent
and inadmissible evidence and (2) granting summary judgment before Moore had a
full and fair opportunity to complete discovery. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issue one, we find the affidavit submitted in support of Capital Bank's
summary judgment motion sufficiently demonstrated the affiant's personal
knowledge; the trial court did not err in considering the affidavit and its attached
exhibits; and this evidence was sufficient to support a grant of partial summary
judgment regarding Moore's liability. See Busillo v. City of N. Charleston, 404
S.C. 604, 610, 745 S.E.2d 142, 146 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The admission of evidence is
within the discretion of the trial court, and the court's decision will not be reversed
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); Rule 56(e), SCRCP ("Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith."); Englert, Inc. v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 315 S.C. 300,
304, 433 S.E.2d 871, 874 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding an affiant's status as vice-
president of the general contractor alone did not make him competent to testify
regarding job specifications where the affidavit did not also demonstrate that he
had personal knowledge of the job specifications at issue); Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Draper, 405 S.C. 214, 219, 746 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Ct. App. 2013) ("When
reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same
standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment
is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Sides v. Greenville Hosp. Sys.,
362 S.C. 250, 255, 607 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Once the moving party
carries its initial burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific facts
that show there is a genuine issue of fact remaining for trial."); Jackson v.
Bermuda Sands, Inc., 383 S.C. 11, 17, 677 S.E.2d 612, 616 (Ct. App. 2009)
("[A]ssertions as to liability must be more than mere bald allegations made by the
non-moving party in order to create a genuine issue of material fact.").

2. As to issue two, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery because the record does
not demonstrate that further discovery would have contributed to the resolution of
the issue of Moore's liability. See Bayle v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 344 S.C. 115,
128, 542 S.E.2d 736, 742 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The rulings of a trial [court] in matters
involving discovery will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an
abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial [court's]
ruling is based upon an error of law or, when based on factual conclusions, is
without evidentiary support."); Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101,
112, 410 S.E.2d 537, 543 (1991) ("[S]ummary judgment must not be granted until
the opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery.");
George v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 344 S.C. 582, 594, 545 S.E.2d 500, 506
(2001) (stating it is not premature for the trial court to grant summary judgment
where the party had a full and fair opportunity to develop the record on an issue
but failed to do so); Bayle, 344 S.C. at 128-29, 542 S.E.2d at 743 (stating that in
considering whether summary judgment was prematurely granted, the court should
consider whether the record in the case demonstrates further discovery would have
contributed to the resolution of the issues involved); Baughman, 306 S.C. at 112,
410 S.E.2d at 544 (stating the person asserting the need for further discovery must
demonstrate the likelihood that further discovery will uncover additional relevant
evidence).

AFFIRMED.1

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.