Evans v. Roper Hospital

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Finley C. Evans, Appellant,

v.

Roper Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Roper St. Francis Healthcare
and d/b/a Roper-St. Francis Home Health, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-211947

Appeal From Berkeley County
Stephanie P. McDonald, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-404
Heard October 10, 2013 – Filed October 30, 2013

AFFIRMED

Jordan Christopher Calloway, of McGowan, Hood &
Felder, LLC, of Rock Hill, and Christy Marie DeLuca, of
Christy DeLuca, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant.

Joseph John Tierney, Jr., Stephen Lynwood Brown,
Russell Grainger Hines, and Christine Kent Toporek, all
of Young Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to this court's appellate jurisdiction: Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR ("A notice
of appeal shall be served on all respondents within thirty (30) days after
receipt of written notice of entry of the order or judgment."); id. (providing
that when a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment has been made,
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from receipt of written notice of
entry of the order granting or denying the motion); Elam v. S.C. Dep't of
Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 21, 602 S.E.2d 772, 778 (2004) (holding that it is
proper to view a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e),
SCRCP, as "a vehicle to seek 'reconsideration' of issues and arguments"); id.
("A motion under Rule 59(e) long has been viewed as [a] 'motion for
reconsideration' despite the absence of those words from the rule.").

2. As to the directed verdict: Rule 50(a), SCRCP ("When upon a trial the case
presents only questions of law[,] the judge may direct a verdict."); Watson v.
Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 445, 699 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2010) ("[E]xpert
evidence is required where a factual issue must be resolved with scientific,
technical, or any other specialized knowledge."); Hoard ex rel. Hoard v.
Roper Hosp., Inc., 387 S.C. 539, 547, 694 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2010) ("'Negligence
is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be
deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence[,] the injury
would not have occurred or could have been avoided.'" (quoting Hughes v.
Children's Clinic, P. A., 269 S.C. 389, 398, 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977));
Guffey v. Columbia/Colleton Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 364 S.C. 158, 163, 612
S.E.2d 695, 697 (2005) (holding that this court will affirm a directed verdict
when there is no evidence on any one element of the alleged cause of
action); Melton v. Medtronic, Inc., 389 S.C. 641, 663, 698 S.E.2d 886, 898
(Ct. App. 2010) ("The application of the common knowledge exception in
proving negligence in a case involving medical malpractice depends on the
particular facts of the case." (citation omitted)); Carver v. Med. Soc. of S.C.,
286 S.C. 347, 350, 334 S.E.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Proof of
proximate cause must . . . be established by expert testimony where either
the origin of the injury is obscure and not readily apparent to a layperson or
where there are several equally probable causes of the condition." (citation
omitted)); id. ("When expert testimony is not relied upon to establish
proximate cause, the plaintiff must offer evidence that rises above mere
speculation or conjecture." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.

HUFF, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.