State v. Twyman

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Leslie Twyman, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-191186

Appeal From Colleton County
Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-325
Heard June 6, 2013 – Filed July 17, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, all of
Columbia; Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Leslie Twyman appeals his conviction for criminal sexual
conduct (CSC) third degree1, arguing the trial court erred in denying his directed
verdict motion. He contends (1) the State failed to prove he did not use forcible
penetration and (2) the victim was not mentally incapacitated, as required by the
statute. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict in
Twyman's favor because he could not be guilty of third-degree CSC when the State
alleged he used force: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648
(2006) (stating in reviewing the denial of a directed verdict motion, the appellate
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State); State v.
Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 477-78 (2004) (stating when ruling on
a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or
nonexistence of evidence, not its weight); State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642,
576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003) (stating on the other hand, a defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged);
State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 555, 564 S.E.2d 87, 92 (2002) (stating the appellate
court may reverse the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if
no evidence supports the judge's ruling); State v. Brown, 360 S.C. 581, 588, 602
S.E. 2d 392, 396 (2004) (stating aggravated force occurs when "the defendant
over[comes] the victim through the use of physical force, physical violence of a
high and aggravated nature, or the threat of the use of a deadly weapon"); State v.
Hamilton, 276 S.C 173, 178, 276 S.E. 2d 784, 786 (1981) (stating force and
coercion "mean to make a person . . . follow a prescribed and dictated course; . . .
to inflict or impose: force one's will on someone"); State v. McFadden, 342 S.C.
629, 632, 539 S.E.2d 387, 389 (2000), (stating third-degree CSC is not a lesser
included offense of first-degree CSC) overruled on other grounds by State v.
Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005).

2. As to whether the victim was not mentally incapacitated as defined by the
statute: Weston, 367 S.C. at 292, 625 S.E.2d at 648 (stating in reviewing the denial
of a directed verdict motion, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State); Cherry, 361 S.C. at 593, 606 S.E.2d at 477-78 (stating
when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the
existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight); McKnight, 352 S.C. at 642,

1
Twyman was also convicted of first-degree CSC but does not appeal that
conviction.
576 S.E.2d at 171 (stating on the other hand, a defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged); Gaster,
349 S.C. at 555, 564 S.E.2d at 92 (stating the appellate court may reverse the trial
court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if no evidence supports the
judge's ruling); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-651(e) (Supp. 2012) (defining a person as
mentally defective if he or she is "suffer[ing] from a mental disease or defect
which renders the person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the
nature of his or her conduct").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.