Patel v. The Garrett Law Firm

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Anjay Patel, Mani Investments, LLC d/b/a Cornerstop
Stores, and Mani One, Inc., Appellants,

v.

The Garrett Law Firm, PC, Carson M. Henderson, Billy
J. Garrett, Jr., T. Scott Ward, One Stop Marina, Inc.,
Greenwood Realty, Inc., Renee Simchon, Defendants,

Of Whom The Garrett Law Firm, PC, Carson M.
Henderson, Billy J. Garrett, Jr. are Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2011-186586

Appeal From Greenwood County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-287
Heard June 5, 2013 – Filed June 26, 2013

AFFIRMED

John Clifford Strickland, A Business Law Firm, and
Thomas Alexander Belenchia, both of Spartanburg for
Appellants.
R. Davis Howser, Howser Newman & Besley, LLC, of
Columbia, and Andrew Elliott Haselden and Justin Paul
Novak, Howser Newman & Besley, LLC, both of
Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Anjay Patel, Mani Investments, LLC, and Mani One, Inc.
(collectively "the Appellants") appeal the circuit court's order granting summary
judgment on their legal malpractice claim in favor of The Garrett Law Firm, PC,
Carson M. Henderson, and Billy J. Garrett Jr. (collectively, "the Respondents").

To the extent the Appellants argue the Respondents proximately caused their
damages by negligently drafting the lease and option contracts, we find the
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars them from relitigating this issue. In the
previous lawsuit, Mani Investments claimed its damages were proximately caused
by the seller's breach of contract and the Respondents' negligent drafting of the
contracts. An order dismissed the breach of contract claim against the seller
because the court found Mani Investments' damages were caused by its failure to
exercise the option. Because the order dismissing that claim is final and decided
the issue of what caused the Appellants' damages, the Appellants cannot relitigate
the issue of proximate causation in their malpractice claim against the
Respondents. See Carolina Renewal, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 385 S.C. 550,
554, 684 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating collateral estoppel prevents
relitigation of an issue when it was "(1) actually litigated in the prior action; (2)
directly determined in the prior action; and (3) necessary to support the prior
judgment"); Carolina Renewal, 385 S.C. at 556, 684 S.E.2d at 783 (stating
collateral estoppel applies "regardless of whether . . . the causes of action in
successive lawsuits are the same"). Moreover, because Patel co-owned both Mani
Investments and Mani One, Patel had every opportunity to litigate the causation
issue both on his own behalf and on behalf of Mani One in the previous lawsuit.
See Snavely v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 379 S.C. 386, 398, 665 S.E.2d 222, 228 (Ct.
App. 2008) (holding mutuality of parties is not required when the party to be
estopped "had a full and fair opportunity to previously litigate the issues").
Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's granting of summary judgment because the
Appellants are barred from establishing the proximate cause element of their
malpractice claim. See Gauld v. O'Shaugnessy Realty Co., 380 S.C. 548, 559, 671
S.E.2d 79, 85 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating summary judgment is appropriate when the
non-moving party fails to establish an element of its case); Rydde v. Morris, 381
S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) (stating proximate cause is an element
in a legal malpractice claim).

To the extent the Appellants claim the Respondents breached a duty by not drafting
an owner finance agreement, we find the Appellants produced no evidence to
support this claim. At oral argument, Appellants' counsel relied on the commercial
purchase agreement and its expert's affidavit as evidence that the Respondents
breached a duty to the Appellants by drafting a lease with option contract. First,
the commercial purchase agreement gave the Respondents the option to draft an
"owner finance agreement" or "lease with option agreement, whichever document
[the bank] will approve," and the record fails to show whether the bank approved
financing for a purchase. There is also no evidence the Appellants told the
Respondents they wanted, or even expected, an owner finance agreement. Second,
the expert's affidavit does not support the idea that the Respondents breached a
duty by drafting a lease with option agreement. Thus, we affirm the court's
granting of summary judgment because the Appellants cannot establish a genuine
issue of fact exists as to the element of breach of duty. See S.C. Dep't of Labor,
Licensing, & Regulation v. Chastain, 392 S.C. 259, 262, 708 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ct.
App. 2011) (stating an appellate court may affirm a ruling for any grounds
appearing in the record); Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673
S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009) (stating to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the
non-moving party must submit a mere scintilla of evidence that shows a genuine
issue exists for trial); Gauld, 380 S.C. at 559, 671 S.E.2d at 85 (stating summary
judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party fails to establish an element of
its case); Rydde, 381 S.C. at 646, 675 S.E.2d at 433 (stating breach of duty is an
element in a legal malpractice claim).

Because we affirm on the basis that the Appellants cannot establish the elements of
proximate cause and breach of duty, we do not address the Appellants' other
arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598,
613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address
remaining issues on appeal when disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).

To the extent the Appellants still pursue their theories of equitable recovery, we
find summary judgment was appropriate because the Appellants' equitable claims
are based solely on their contractual relationship with the seller and are thus
irrelevant to the Appellants' malpractice claim against the Respondents.
For the reasons stated above, the circuit court's granting of summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.