William Bronson v. Cray Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

William Bronson, Appellant,

v.

Cray, Inc. and York County, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000548

Appeal From York County
Daniel Dewitt Hall, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-237
Submitted June 5, 2023 – Filed June 14, 2023

AFFIRMED

Daniel Dominic D'Agostino, of D'Agostino Law Firm, of
York, for Appellant.

Daniel Joseph Ballou, of Morton & Gettys, LLC, of Rock
Hill, for Respondent Cray, Inc.

Laura Dover, of York, for Respondent York County.

PER CURIAM: William Bronson appeals the dismissal of his complaint pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, against Cray, Inc. and York County (collectively,
Respondents). On appeal, Bronson argues the circuit court erred by (1) dismissing
his case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and (2) determining York County complied
with the law. We affirm.

Cray, Inc. failed to timely pay its 2018 property taxes to York County. As a result,
York County commenced collection procedures, which resulted in a tax sale of the
property to Bronson on November 4, 2019. On September 21, 2020, York County,
pursuant to section 12-51-120 of the South Carolina Code (2014) mailed to Cray,
Inc. notice of the end of the twelve-month redemption period, which was set to end
on November 4, 2020. Subsequently, the legislature enacted Act 174 of 2020,
which took effect on September 30, 2020. Section 3 of Act 174 extended the
redemption period for real property sold at a delinquent tax sale in 2019 that had
not yet been redeemed by an additional twelve months, which invalidated Cray,
Inc.'s November 4, 2020 end redemption date. When our supreme court found Act
174 of 2020 unconstitutional on June 30, 2021, 1 it nullified the additional
redemption period provided by Section 3. York County was therefore statutorily
required to mail notice regarding the end of the redemption period before it could
issue a tax title to Bronson. However, Cray, Inc. redeemed the property before
York County mailed the notice. Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable
to Bronson, we hold the circuit court did not err by finding Bronson failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because York County could not have
issued the tax title to Bronson without first mailing notice of the end of the
redemption period to Cray, Inc. See Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675
S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) ("On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), [SCRCP,] an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the
trial court."); Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007)
(stating that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the facts alleged and
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would not entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory);
King v. James, 388 S.C. 16, 25, 694 S.E.2d 35, 39 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Tax sales
must be conducted in strict compliance with statutory requirements." (quoting In
Re Ryan Investment Co., 335 S.C. 392, 395, 517 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1999))); In re
Ryan Inv. Co., Inc., 335 S.C. at 395, 517 S.E.2d at 693 ("Even actual notice is
insufficient to uphold a tax sale absent strict compliance with statutory
requirements."); King, 388 S.C. at 25, 694 S.E.2d at 39-40 ("[A]ll requirements of
the law leading up to tax sales which are intended for the protection of the taxpayer
against surprise or the sacrifice of his property are to be regarded [as] mandatory
and are to be strictly enforced." (quoting Donohue v. Ward, 298 S.C. 75, 83, 378
S.E.2d 261, 265 (Ct. App. 1989))); Good v. Kennedy, 291 S.C. 204, 207, 352

1
See Mercury Funding, LLC v. Chesney, 433 S.C. 591, 861 S.E.2d 35 (2021).
S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he general law is that where a statute
requires as a condition precedent to foreclosing a taxpayer's rights in property sold
for taxes that he be given notice of his right to redeem, such a requirement is
'generally regarded as jurisdictional, and therefore, the owner's right of redemption
cannot be cut off unless the required notice is given.'" (quoting 72 Am.Jur.2d State
and Local Taxation Section 1010 (1974))); White v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co.,
360 S.C. 366, 373, 601 S.E.2d 342, 346 (2004) ("Life goes on while judicial or
legislative processes run their course. In the meantime, parties must arrange and
conduct their business affairs under the law as it presently exists, regardless of a
belief or hope the law will later be changed or invalidated."); § 12-51-120
("Neither more than forty-five days nor less than twenty days before the end of the
redemption period for real estate sold for taxes, the person officially charged with
the collection of delinquent taxes shall mail a notice . . . to the defaulting taxpayer
. . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 12-51-130 (2014) ("Upon failure of the defaulting
taxpayer . . . to redeem realty within the time period allowed for redemption, the
person officially charged with the collection of delinquent taxes, within thirty days
or as soon after that as possible, shall make a tax title to the purchaser or the
purchaser's assignee.").

AFFIRMED. 2

KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.