State v. Blythe

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Randy Blythe, Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2011-184308

Appeal From Pickens County
G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-098
Heard February 5, 2013 – Filed March 13, 2013

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Breen Richard Stevens, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor W. Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Randy Blythe, Jr., was convicted of and sentenced for
distribution of a cocaine base and distribution of a cocaine base within a half-mile
of a school or public park. He appeals, arguing the trial court erred in admitting a
statement he gave while in custody but prior to the reading of his Miranda1 rights.
We disagree.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held:

[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say,
the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than
the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that
the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect
in custody with an added measure of protection against
coercive police practices, without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice
that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke
an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held
accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words
or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only
to words or actions on the part of police officers that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980)
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted); accord State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 416-
17, 405 S.E.2d 377, 381-82 (1991); State v. Franklin, 299 S.C. 133, 135-36, 382
S.E.2d 911, 912-13 (1989); State v. Brown, 389 S.C. 84, 92, 697 S.E.2d 622, 627
(Ct. App. 2010).

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
Blythe claims his statement was involuntary because it was obtained during a
custodial interrogation that occurred before the police provided him with Miranda
warnings. The dispositive issue involved in this appeal, therefore, is whether
Blythe was subjected to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the
incriminating statement. If he was not, his Fifth Amendment rights and his right to
receive Miranda warning were not implicated. United States v. Kimbrough, 477
F.3d 144, 147 (4th Cir. 2007).

We affirm the admission of Blythe's statement, because the trial court properly
found the preponderance of the evidence indicated no interrogation occurred and
Blythe gave the statement voluntarily. First, Blythe presented the only evidence of
express questioning, and the State successfully rebutted his testimony. At the time
of the statement, Blythe was in custody for an unrelated charge and had not been
advised of his Miranda rights. Although he testified in some detail concerning his
interrogation by either four or five officers who "pull[ed] him out of [his] cell" and
asked him numerous questions about his drug connections, other testimony called
into question key aspects of his account. Blythe identified three of his
interrogators. However, one testified he was out of the office on medical leave at
the time of Blythe's statement, and another denied questioning Blythe about
anything between the early 1990s and 2009. Lieutenant Lovell described meeting
Blythe in the booking area after Officer Mills relayed Blythe's request that they
meet. Lieutenant Lovell testified only he and Officer Mills had accompanied
Blythe into the interview room, but they never asked him a question. They had
escorted him from the public booking area into a private interview room,2 asked no
questions, and simply allowed him to talk. Finally, Lieutenant Lovell explained he
was not interested in talking with Blythe because the police "had a good case on
him." During trial, Officer Mills testified consistently with Lieutenant Lovell's
account. In view of the inconsistencies in Blythe's testimony, on the one hand, and
the consistent testimony of the police officers, on the other, the trial court did not
err in finding a preponderance of the evidence indicated Blythe gave his statement
voluntarily and not in response to an interrogation.

Second, the evidence does not support Blythe's contention he was subjected to the
"functional equivalent" of an interrogation. A court analyzing whether police

2
Lieutenant Lovell recalled matching the serial numbers of the bills provided to
the confidential informant to buy the drugs to the serial numbers of bills recovered
from Blythe's car in front of Blythe before they entered the interview room.
behavior constituted the functional equivalent of an interrogation "focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1690. Blythe argues Lieutenant Lovell
matched the serial numbers on the recovered money in front of him in an effort to
pressure him into confessing. He also complains Lieutenant Lovell's testimony
that he "really wasn't interested" in talking with Blythe but "would listen to what
[Blythe] had to say" amounted to using reverse psychology to elicit an
incriminating response. However, Blythe's pretrial testimony failed to establish
any awareness of such subtleties. At the hearing, Blythe flatly denied seeing the
money after his arrest. Moreover, he described a wholly different interrogation
scenario in which four or five police officers "pulled [him] out of [his] cell" and
questioned him about drug dealers and users. The evidence presented supported
the trial court's finding Blythe's statement did not result from any behavior by
Lieutenant Lovell. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting Blythe's
statement.

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., GEATHERS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.