Hickey v. Resolution Management

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Terrence J. Hickey, Appellant/Respondent,

v.

Resolution Management Consultants, Inc., Gerard P.
O'Keefe, Jeffrey B. Kozek, and Thomas Cummings,
Defendants,

Of whom Resolution Management Consultants, Inc. is
Respondent/Appellant,

And Gerard P. O'Keefe and Jeffrey B. Kozek are
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2010-152087

Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-657
Heard May 22, 2012 – Filed December 12, 2012

AFFIRMED

Stanley E. Barnett, Smith, Bundy, Bybee, & Barnett, PC,
of Mount Pleasant, for Appellant/Respondent.
John J. Pringle, Jr., Ellis, Lawhorne & Sims, PA, of
Columbia, and John T. Lay, Jr., Gallivan, White & Boyd,
PA, of Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant and
Respondent Jeffery B. Kozek.

Julius H. Hines, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice,
LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent Gerard P. O'Keefe.

PER CURIAM: This cross-appeal arises out of a trial in which a jury returned a
verdict in favor of Terrence Hickey against Resolution Management Consultants,
Inc. (RMC) for malicious prosecution. RMC argues the trial court erred in only
partially granting its motion for directed verdict. Hickey argues the trial court
erred in directing a verdict for Gerard O'Keefe, Jeffrey Kozek, and Thomas
Cummings on his claim for malicious prosecution, and in directing a verdict for all
the defendants on his civil conspiracy claim. We find support in the record for
each of those decisions, and therefore we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1),
SCACR, and the following authorities: Martasin v. Hilton Head Health Sys., L.P.,
364 S.C. 430, 440, 613 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 2005) (reversing directed verdict
for two defendants where "a reasonable jury could have found" for the plaintiff
against them); 364 S.C. at 442, 613 S.E.2d at 802 (affirming directed verdict for
another defendant where there was "no evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could conclude the alleged negligent acts or omissions . . . proximately caused Mr.
Martisan's death"); Goodwin v. Kennedy, 347 S.C. 30, 38, 552 S.E.2d 319, 323 (Ct.
App. 2001) (stating, on review of denial of directed verdict, that "we must
determine whether a verdict for a party opposing the motion would be reasonably
possible under the facts as liberally construed in his favor" (citation omitted)); see
also Gadson ex rel. Gadson v. ECO Servs. of S.C., Inc., 374 S.C. 171, 175-76, 648
S.E.2d 585, 588 (2007) (stating, "When reviewing the denial of a motion for
directed verdict . . . , this Court applies the same standard as the trial court" and,
"The motion[] should be denied when either the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.