State v. Townsend

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Thomas
Townsend, Appellant.

Appeal From Orangeburg County

 Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2007-UP-387

Submitted September 1, 2007 – Filed
September 24, 2007  

APPEAL DISMISSED

Aileen P. Clare, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,  all
of Columbia; Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent.

PER
CURIAM:  Thomas Townsend pled guilty to driving under the influence, second
offense.  He was sentenced to one year imprisonment and a fine of $2,100,
suspended on time served plus three years’ probation and payment of $1,000.  The
trial judge also imposed the following probation conditions: (1) substance
abuse counseling; (2) random drug and alcohol testing—to include drug testing
at least once a month; (3) attendance of at least three Alcohol Anonymous
meetings per week; (4) intensive outpatient drug treatment if needed; and (5)
anger management counseling.  On appeal, Townsend argues the trial judge abused
her discretion by ordering the additional probation conditions.  We disagree. 
It is well within the authority of the trial judge to impose probation
conditions.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-430 (Supp. 2005)
(listing thirteen conditions of probation and stating “[t]he court may impose
by order duly entered and may at any time modify the conditions of probation
and may include among them” the listed conditions or others not prohibited by
this section); see also State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 410, 326
S.E.2d 410, 411 (1985) (holding trial courts are “allowed a wide, but not
unlimited, discretion in imposing conditions of suspension or probation and they
cannot impose conditions which are illegal and void as against public
policy”).  The conditions imposed in this case are not unreasonable or against
public policy.

After
a thorough review of the record and counsel’s brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams, 305 S.C.
116, 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss[1] Townsend’s appeal and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved.

APPEAL
DISMISSED.

HEARN, C.J.,
HUFF and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.