Clay v. Strother

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. 
IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Albert Clay,       
Respondent,

v.

Debbie Holmes Strother,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Jackson V. Gregory, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-129

Heard February 8, 2005 – Filed February
18, 2005

AFFIRMED

H. Fred Kuhn, Jr., of Beaufort, for Appellant.

James Arthur Brown, Jr., of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Debbie Strother appeals from
a verdict of $9,000 in favor of Albert Clay on his claim for malicious prosecution. 
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the authorities that follow.

As to Issue I regarding the denial of Strother’s
motions for a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, although
we question whether the issue is preserved, we conclude, in any event, that
the record supports the trial court’s ruling:  Rule 50(a), SCRCP (“A motion
for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.”); Rule 50(b),
SCRCP (providing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should
be made in accordance with the grounds of the motion for a directed verdict);
Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine Resources Dep’t, 328 S.C.
24, 34, 491 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1997) (holding issues not raised in a motion for
a directed verdict cannot be argued on appeal); Strange v. South Carolina
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30, 445 S.E.2d 439,
440 (1994) (“In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the trial court
is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and
to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one inference
or its inference is in doubt.  The trial court can only be reversed by this
Court when there is no evidence to support the ruling below.” (citations omitted));
McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 304 S.C. 21, 22, 402 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1991)
(“[W]here an accused establishes that charges were nolle prossed
for reasons which imply or are consistent with innocence, an action for malicious
prosecution may be maintained.”); Kinton v. Mobile Home Indus., Inc.,
274 S.C. 179, 182, 262 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1980) (observing “South Carolina has
long embraced the rule that a true bill of indictment is prima facie evidence
of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution,” but noting this presumption
may be overcome by sufficient evidence to the contrary).

As to Issue II regarding the cross-examination
of Clay about a prior offense, we find no abuse of discretion in this regard: 
Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE (“[E]vidence that a witness other than an accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused[.]”);
Rule 403, SCRE (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); Gamble
v. Int’l Paper Realty Corp., 323 S.C. 367, 373, 474 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1996)
(“The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion
of the trial court and absent clear abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.