Currow v. Glaze

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS

PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT
AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Marion Ann Currow, Personal Representative For The Estate Of James Marion
Glaze, Appellant,

v.

Evelyn M. Glaze, Respondent.

Appeal From Charleston County

 Frances  P. Segars-Andrews, Family
Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-019

Submitted January 1, 2005 – Filed January
13, 2005

AFFIRMED

Cynthia Barrier Castengera, of Newland and David Dusty Rhoades, of Charleston,
for Appellant.

Evelyn M. Glaze, of Charleston, Pro Se Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Marion Ann Currow, as Personal Representative for the Estate
of James Marion Glaze (Husband), appeals the decision of the family court reaffirming
its order that Husband maintain life insurance on his ex-wife, Evelyn M. Glaze
(Wife), as security for alimony.  We affirm. [1]  

FACTS

This domestic relations action was originally heard before the family court
in 2001.  The family court’s 2001 order, among other things, granted the parties
a divorce, awarded alimony to the Wife, and  required Husband to maintain a
life insurance policy naming Wife as the beneficiary.   Husband appealed, and
this Court, in Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-258 (filed April 8, 2003), remanded
the case to the family court.  We held the court failed to indicate the basis
for its requirement that husband maintain a life insurance policy naming Wife
as the beneficiary.  Further, the family court had failed to consider the statutory
factors for ordering life insurance as security for alimony.

Accordingly, in September of 2003, the family court issued an order from the
hearing on remand, addressing the statutory factors.  The court reaffirmed its
2001 order establishing security for alimony in the form of life insurance. 
Subsequently, in October of 2003, Wooten v. Wooten, 356 S.C. 473, 589
S.E.2d 769 (Ct. App. 2003) cert. granted June 24, 2004, was published. 
Wooten established that “a compelling reason must exist to warrant the
maintenance of life insurance by the supporting spouse.”  356 S.C. at 476, 589
S.E.2d at 770-71 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Wooten court
further ruled the sole fact that a former spouse would benefit financially from
life insurance in the event of the payor’s death did not  establish a compelling
reason for requiring life insurance as security for alimony.  Id. at
478, 589 S.E.2d at 771-72.  Based on the intervening release of Wooten,
Husband filed a Rule 59(e) motion, which was denied.  He now appeals, contending
the family court on remand erred in its analysis and application of the statutory
factors set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(D) (Supp 2003).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.       Analysis of § 20-3-130(D)

S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(D) (Supp. 2003) provides:

In making an award of alimony or separate maintenance and support,
the court may make provision for security for the payment of the support including,
but not limited to, requiring the posting of money, property, and bonds and
may require a spouse, with due consideration of [1] the cost of premiums,
[2] insurance plans carried by the parties during marriage, [3] insurability
of the payor spouse, [4] the probable economic condition of the supported
spouse upon the death of the payor spouse, and [5] any other factors
the court may deem relevant, to carry and maintain life insurance so as to assure
support of a spouse beyond the death of the payor spouse.

(Alterations added). 

On remand, the family court examined each of these factors.  The first factor
is the cost of premiums.  The court found that Husband, who by that time was
deceased, had carried the policy in question for years.  The court opined that
the premiums up until his death “were not considerable nor were they a new expense
related to the issuance of this court’s order.” 

The second factor looks to insurance plans carried by the parties during marriage. 
The court noted that the Husband carried the policy in question during the marriage,
and therefore, it was not a new burden. 

The third factor, that of insurability of the payor spouse, “was questionable
as both the [Husband] and the [Wife] were in demonstrably poor health.”  However,
because the policy was already in place, the insurability of the payor spouse
was not an issue. 

The fourth factor is the probable economic condition of the supported spouse
upon the death of the payor spouse.  The record reveals that both Husband and
Wife were in poor economic condition.  Unfortunately, Husband died; it was found
that the economic condition of the Wife upon Husband’s death was poor. 

Finally, the statute provides that the court consider any other factors which
the court deems may be relevant.  Here, the family court found that the alimony
awarded to Wife would have been a nullity without the insurance policy as appropriate
security. 

As instructed, the family court examined the factors established
by our legislature and codified in § 20-3-130(D).  We find no abuse of discretion. 

II.      Compelling Reason Standard/Wooten

Husband contends that Wooten requires reversal of the family
court.  We disagree.  In its November 2003 order denying Husband’s Rule 59(e)
motion, the court acknowledged that it had “specifically considered the case
of Wooten v. Wooten.”  The citation of Wooten v. Wooten in the
Rule 59(e) order clearly reveals that the family court judge undertook an analysis
of Wooten concerning the compelling reasons test.  Based on the economic
considerations and the age of the parties as discussed by the family court in
connection with its analysis of § 20-3-130(D), we conclude there was a sufficiently
compelling reason to require security for alimony in this case. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the order of the
family court is

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, STILWELL, and SHORT, JJ.,
concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.