City of Greenwood v. Whiteside

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

City of Greenwood,       
Respondent,

v.

Phillip W. Whiteside,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Greenwood County

Wyatt T. Saunders, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-545

Submitted October 1, 2004 – Filed October
27, 2004

AFFIRMED

Charles M. Watson, Jr., of Greenwood, for Appellant. 

Solicitor William Townes Jones, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Philip W. Whiteside appeals
the circuit court’s order upholding his conviction for violating a city noise
ordinance.  We affirm. [1]

FACTS

Whiteside served as president of his social
fraternity and lived in a house along with four of his fraternity brothers in
the City of Greenwood, South Carolina.  On the evening of February 12, 2003,
the brothers hosted a fraternity-sponsored house party and played music for
their guests on a stereo.  The stereo belonged to one of the four brothers who
shared the house with Whiteside, who was present at the party.  Police officers
testified they could hear music and loud voices coming from the house approximately
one and a half lots away. 

After determining the music was too loud, two police
officers went to the house and asked some party guests to speak with the person
in charge.  They summoned Whiteside, who came onto the porch and spoke with
the officers.  When asked by the officers, Whiteside affirmed he was in charge
of the house.  He was then issued a citation for violation of the city noise
ordinance. 

The municipal court denied Whiteside’s motion for
directed verdict and found him guilty of violating section 18-62 of the city
noise ordinance after determining there was “direct and circumstantial evidence
that indicated that [Whiteside] was in charge of the property in which the music
was being emitted.”  The court “advised [Whiteside] that not only was the charge
proper against him, but could also be brought against the other three persons
who reside at this location and were present on this evening when this charge
was made.” 

Whiteside appealed to the circuit court, arguing the
judge erred in declining to grant a directed verdict because there was no evidence
he either maintained or operated the stereo and therefore the ordinance was
inapplicable to him as a matter of law.  The circuit court disagreed and upheld
the conviction, finding Whiteside “was sufficiently in charge of the premises
at issue to be deemed criminally responsible for the violation of City Ordinance
18-62, even though there was no specific evidence admitted that [Whiteside]
personally operated the radio, or that the radio was his personal property.” 
The court determined that as fraternity president, Whiteside was in “a position
of special responsibility over the premises” and was “responsible for the consequence
of unreasonable noise arising from the music being played.” 

DISCUSSION

Whiteside contends the circuit court erred by affirming the
denial of his directed verdict motion arguing there was no evidence he owned
or operated the stereo.  He claims the circuit court improperly held him responsible,
as fraternity president, for the acts of his unidentified fraternity brother
and housemate who also attended the party and owned and operated the stereo. 
We disagree. 

“In criminal appeals from magistrate or municipal
court, the circuit court does not conduct a de novo review, but instead
reviews for preserved error raised to it by appropriate exception.  In reviewing
criminal cases, this court may review errors of law only.”  State v. Henderson,
347 S.C. 455, 457, 556 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 
On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, an appellate court shall view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.  State v. Walker,
349 S.C. 49, 53, 562 S.E.2d 313, 315 (2002).  This court will affirm the denial
of a directed verdict motion if there is any direct evidence or substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused. 
State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 653, 572 S.E.2d 267, 273 (2002). 

Section 18-62(a), Code of Ordinances for the City
of Greenwood, provides in relevant part,

It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to maintain
and operate . . . from any building, any public place or on any premises whatsoever
within the city, any radio or device of any kind which is designed to amplify,
or does in fact, amplify sound and/or music whereby the sound created therefrom
creates unreasonably loud excessive or disturbing noises[.] 

All parties acknowledge Whiteside neither
owned the stereo nor personally played the loud music heard by the officers. 
However, as the person who accepted responsibility over the house, Whiteside
co-hosted a party where the stereo located in the house living room was used
to play music for the entertainment of his guests.  When the officers arrived
to investigate the source of the loud noise and asked to speak with the person
in charge, guests summoned Whiteside to meet them.  Finally, in his conversation
with the officers, Whiteside acknowledged he was in charge of the house. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, we conclude there was substantial circumstantial evidence that Whiteside
was responsible for the maintenance and operation of the stereo during the party. 
As a result, his motion for directed verdict was properly denied.  State
v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 332-33, 468 S.E.2d 626, 629 (1996) (“In ruling
on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the existence
of evidence, not with its weight.  When [an appellate court] reviews the denial
of a motion for a directed verdict, it views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and if there is any direct or substantial
circumstantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused,
refusal by the trial judge to direct a verdict is not error.”) (internal citations
omitted). 

AFFIRMED.

STILWELL, BEATTY, and SHORT, JJ., concur.

[1]         We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule
215, SCACR.