Huggins v. Ericson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT
AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Jean Huggins and David Lindsay, as Personal Representative of the Estate
of John C. Lindsay, Jr., deceased, Appellant,

v.

Bruce A. Ericson and South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Appeal From Marlboro County

 John M. Milling, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-345

Submitted May 12, 2004 – Filed May 25,
2004

AFFIRMED

Arthur K. Aiken and Howard Hammer, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

Louis D. Nettles, of Florence and T. Eugene Allen, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  John C. Lindsay, Jr.
died as a result of an accident that occurred when his motorcycle collided with
a truck driven by Bruce A. Ericson. Lindsay’s estate sought to stack the additional
underinsured motorist coverage from Lindsay’s Farm Bureau insurance policies
covering two other vehicles he owned.  Each of the Farm Bureau policies provided
$250,000 in underinsured motorist coverage.  Farm Bureau paid Lindsay’s estate
$100,000 under each policy, totaling $200,000.  The personal representative
of Lindsay’s estate brought a declaratory judgment seeking a determination that
Farm Bureau was liable for the full amount of the underinsured motorist coverage
on each policy, totaling $500,000.  The circuit court granted summary judgment
in favor of Farm Bureau, finding the available underinsured motorist coverage
on each policy was limited to the amount of coverage Lindsay carried on the
vehicle involved in the accident, in this case $100,000.

Lindsay’s estate appeals arguing that the
available underinsured motorist coverage was not so limited because of ambiguities
in the Farm Bureau policy or, alternatively, because Lindsay bargained for additional
coverage.  We affirm [1] pursuant
to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160
(2002 and Supp. 2003); Lanham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina,
349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002) (finding that a grant of summary
judgment will be affirmed on appeal when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law); South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mooneyham, 304 S.C.
442, 446, 405 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1991) (“[W]e interpret the pertinent language
of the statute as setting a cap on the amount which can be stacked; the amount
of coverage which may be stacked from policies on vehicles not involved in an
accident is limited to an amount no greater than the coverage on the vehicle
involved in the accident.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Howard, 288
S.C. 5, 12, 339 S.E.2d 501, 504 (1985) (“Pertinent provisions of the uninsured
motorist statutes which are absent from the policy language prevail as much
as if expressly incorporated in the policy.”); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Gunning, 340 S.C. 526, 529, 532 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ct. App. 2000) (“[Section
38-77-160] applies to every policy as if embodied therein, and inconsistent
policy provisions are void.”).

AFFIRMED

HEARN, C.J., STILWELL, J., and CURETON,
AJ., concur.

[1] We affirm this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.