State v. Williams

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Douglas Antonio Williams,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

Joseph J. Watson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-559

Submitted July 15, 2003 – Filed September
26, 2003   

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda H. Haile, of Columbia, for Appellant

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles
H. Richardson, of Columbia, Solicitor Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent(s).

PER CURIAM: Douglas Antonio Williams appeals his convictions
for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (PWID) and resisting
arrest.  He contends the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of identical
prior convictions in order to impeach his credibility as a witness at trial. 
We reverse and remand.

FACTS

On the afternoon of September 23, 2000, Corporal
J. M. Aiken, employed with the Greenville City Police Department, drove to his
assigned patrol area.  As Aiken was driving, he saw Williams and two other individuals
standing outside an apartment complex.  Aiken exited his vehicle and began to
patrol the area on foot.  While walking toward Williams, Aiken saw Williams
toss a blue-colored item to the ground.  Aiken then motioned for Williams
to come talk to him.  Because he was familiar with Williams, Aiken asked him
if he had any outstanding warrants.  Williams denied there were any warrants
for his arrest.  Aiken placed Williams in the patrol car while he checked his
record.  During this time, Aiken retrieved the object that he saw Williams throw
on the ground.  Based on his investigation, Aiken believed it was crack cocaine.

After discovering the crack cocaine,
Aiken returned to his vehicle and informed Williams that he was under arrest. 
Williams denied the drugs belonged to him.  Aiken instructed Williams to turn
around and place his hands behind his back.  A struggle then ensued with Williams
kicking Aiken and the door of the patrol car.  Aiken sprayed Williams with mace
in an attempt to subdue him.  Williams escaped and fled on foot.  In an effort
to locate Williams, Aiken went to Williams’s grandfather’s home.  Aiken asked
Williams’s grandfather to have Williams turn himself in.  A few days later,
Williams turned himself in at the request of his grandfather.

Further investigation of the substance
Aiken retrieved at the scene revealed it to be 2.52 grams of crack cocaine.
 A Greenville County grand jury indicted Williams for one count of PWID
crack cocaine and one count of resisting arrest.  

At trial, Linda Moss testified for the defense. 
Moss, Williams’s friend, was standing next to Williams and Thomas Shell at the
time of the incident.  Moss denied anyone approached Williams that afternoon
to purchase drugs.  Moss testified she did not see Williams with crack
cocaine on that day.

Williams also testified in his own defense.  Prior
to his testimony, the judge held an in camera hearing concerning
the admissibility of Williams’s prior convictions. Williams had been convicted
in 1997 for distribution of crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine
within a half-mile of a school.  Williams had also pleaded guilty to a charge
of possession of crack cocaine in 1998.  Counsel for Williams objected to the
admission of the prior convictions on the ground they were prejudicial given
they were closely related to the drug charge for which Williams was being tried. 
After hearing arguments from counsel and considering the applicable case law
and evidentiary rules, the judge permitted the State to impeach Williams with
the prior convictions.  The judge reasoned:

Then reviewing this matter under the cases that I have mentioned,
specifically taking into consideration the value of - - the impeachment value
of the prior crimes that the State is offering, taking into consideration the
point in time of the convictions and the witness’ subsequent history, taking
into consideration the similarity between the past crimes and the charged crimes,
taking into consideration the importance of the Defendant’s testimony, and finally
the centrality of the credibility issue, and considering the applicable rules,
403 and 609(a)(1), I will allow the State to impeach the Defendant on these
prior convictions.

 He also stated his ruling was “based in part on
the fact that at this time nobody has denied or testified that the Defendant
did not possess the drugs and did not throw them down.” Williams’s counsel disputed
this conclusion, apparently relying on Moss’s testimony.  The judge further
found that credibility was a central issue in the case.  He concluded the probative
value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.  

After this ruling, Williams decided
to testify.  During his testimony, Williams stated he was present with
Thomas Shell and Linda Moss at the time Corporal Aiken approached them.  Williams,
however, testified Shell threw down the bag containing crack cocaine.  He
denied he ever possessed the crack cocaine.  He admitted that he fought with
Aiken.  On direct and cross-examination Williams acknowledged his prior
convictions.   Immediately following the cross-examination testimony, the judge
gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the convictions.

The jury convicted Williams of PWID
crack cocaine and resisting arrest.  The trial judge sentenced Williams to twenty-five
years imprisonment and payment of a $50,000 fine for PWID crack cocaine and
a year imprisonment for resisting arrest.  The sentences were to be served concurrently. 
Williams appeals.

DISCUSSION

Williams argues the trial judge erred
in admitting into evidence his prior convictions.  Because the prior drug convictions
were identical to the current PWID charge, he contends the admission of this
evidence was extremely prejudicial.  He further contends the admission of this
evidence was prejudicial given his credibility was crucial to his defense. 
Additionally, he asserts the prior convictions suggested to the jury that he
had the propensity to commit drug offenses. 

The admission of evidence is within
the trial judge’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse
of that discretion.  State v. Tucker, 319 S.C. 425, 428, 462 S.E.2d 263,
265 (1995).  

Rule 609 of the South Carolina Rules
of Evidence governs the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions to impeach
a witness’s credibility.  Applicable to the instant case is Rule 609(a)(1),
SCRE.  This rule provides a “two-part test for determining whether a defendant’s
prior convictions can be used to impeach him:  (1) the prior crime must have
been punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, and (2) the
court must determine that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the accused.”  Green v. State, 338 S.C. 428,
432, 527 S.E.2d 98, 100 (2000). 

Our Supreme Court has found that similar
prior convictions are not necessarily inadmissible in all cases.  Green,
338 S.C. at 433, 527 S.E.2d at 101.  However, the Court has instructed trial
judges to “weigh the probative value of the prior convictions against their
prejudicial effect to the accused and determine, in their discretion, whether
to admit the evidence.”  Id.  In order to make this determination, our
Supreme Court has outlined the following factors to be considered:

1.  The impeachment value of the prior crime. 

2. The point in time of the conviction and the witness’s
subsequent history. 

3. The similarity between
the past crime and the charged crime. 

4. The importance of the defendant’s testimony. 

5. The centrality of the credibility issue. 

State v. Colf, 337 S.C. 622, 627, 525 S.E.2d 246,
248 (2000). 

Applying these factors to the instant case, we find the
trial judge erred in admitting Williams’s prior drug convictions.  The prior
convictions were of limited impeachment value.  See State v. Dunlap,
353 S.C. 539, 542, 579 S.E.2d 318, 320 (2003) (finding relative lack of probative
value of violations of narcotics laws “should figure prominently in the weighing
of prejudice, pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1), when determining whether to permit
a criminal defendant’s impeachment by such conduct”); State v. Cheeseboro,
346 S.C. 526, 543, 552 S.E.2d 300, 309 (2001) (holding narcotics offenses are
generally not considered probative of truthfulness).  The State impeached Williams
with convictions that were four and five years old.  Because the prior drug
offenses were similar to the current PWID offense, the prejudicial effect of
their admission was heightened.  See Dunlap, 353 S.C. at 542,
579 S.E.2d at 320 (stating “when the prior offense is similar to the offense
for which the defendant is on trial, the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant
from impeachment by that prior offense weighs against its admission”).  Williams’s
testimony was crucial to his defense due to the limited number of witnesses
to the incident.  William’s credibility was also critical given the competing
testimony of Aiken. 

Finally, we reject the State’s contention
that the admission of Williams’s prior convictions constituted harmless error. 
First, the judge’s limiting instruction was not sufficient to cure the error. 
See Green, 338 S.C. at 434, 527 S.E.2d at 101 (“The jury, despite
limiting instructions, can hardly avoid drawing the inference that the past
conviction suggests some probability that defendant committed the similar offense
for which he is currently charged.”(quoting United States v. Beahm, 664
F.2d 414, 418-19 (4th Cir. 1981))).  Secondly, there was not overwhelming evidence
of Williams’s guilt given the conflicting testimony of Aiken, Williams, and
Moss.  See State v. Berry, 332 S.C. 214, 221-22, 503 S.E.2d 770,
774 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding improper admission of prior bad act evidence was
not harmless error where evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and credibility
was crucial to the defense case); see also State v. Reeves, 301
S.C. 191, 194, 391 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1990) (“Error which substantially damages
the defendant’s credibility cannot be held harmless where such credibility is
essential to his defense.”).  

Accordingly, we reverse Williams’s convictions
and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HEARN, C.J., CONNOR and ANDERSON,
JJ., concur.