State v. Shaw

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Mark Anthony Shaw,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Anderson County

John W. Kittredge, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-304

Submitted February 20, 2003 – Filed
May 1, 2003   

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson,
Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, of Columbia; Druanne Dykes White,
of Anderson; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Mark Anthony Shaw was indicted
on one count of grand larceny and one count of second degree burglary by the
Anderson County grand jury.  Following a jury trial, Shaw was found guilty of
second degree burglary and petit larceny and was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole on the burglary charge and ten years concurrent
on the petit larceny conviction. Shaw appeals arguing the trial court erred
in admitting his statement to the police because the evidence showed the statement
was induced by the officer’s implied promise of leniency.   Shaw also contends
that the trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion and allowing
the state to admit his prior burglary convictions when the uncontradicted evidence
was that the burglary occurred at night, and as a result, the prior convictions
were more prejudicial than probative.  

We affirm
[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: 
Issue one:  State v. McLeod, 303 S.C. 420, 423, 401 S.E.2d
175, 177 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Evans,
307 S.C. 477, 415 S.E.2d 816 (1992) (The trial court’s “determination of the
voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed unless so manifestly erroneous
as to show an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law.”); State
v. Franklin, 299 S.C. 133, 136,  382 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1989) (Any statement
given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence is admissible
in evidence.); State v. Peake, 291 S.C. 138, 139, 352 S.E.2d 487, 488
(1987)(“A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if
so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.”);  State
v. Creech, 314 S.C. 76, 84, 441 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing
State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986)(“In making the
determination, the trial judge should examine the totality of circumstances
surrounding the utterance to determine whether the state has met its burden
of proof so as to warrant admission of the confession.  Part of the State’s
burden during this hearing is to prove that the statement was voluntary and
taken in compliance with Miranda.”).  

Issue two: State v. Tucker,
319 S.C. 425, 428, 462 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1995) (The admission of evidence is
within the trial judge’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
abuse of that discretion.);  State v. Cheatham, 349 S.C. 101, 109-10,
561 S.E.2d 618, 623 (Ct. App. 2002) (In a prosecution for first degree burglary,
the defendant’s willingness to stipulate to one of two alternative elements
of the crime, namely, the element requiring that alleged entry occurred at nighttime,
does not preclude the State from offering evidence of an alternate element of
the crime, namely, that defendant had a record of two or more convictions of
burglary or housebreaking.); State v. Hamilton, 327 S.C. 440, 446-47,
486 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Ct. App. 1997) (Evidence of prior burglary or housebreaking
convictions are properly admitted for the limited purpose of establishing  the
elements of first-degree burglary.) 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., CURETON
and GOOLSBY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.