State v. Simpson

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State,       
Respondent,

v.

Willie James Simpson,       
Appellant.

Appeal From Lancaster County

J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-254

Heard June 19, 2002 – Filed April 3,
2003

REVERSED and REMANDED

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of 
Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor
W. Townes Jones, IV, of Greenwood, for respondent.

SHULER, J.:  Willie James Simpson
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a violent crime, and was sentenced to nine years imprisonment
for manslaughter and five years for the weapons charge.  Simpson appeals his
convictions, arguing the trial court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous. 
We reverse and remand for a new trial. 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 27, 1998, Anthony Sullivan
arrived at the All Good Club in Laurens County.  Willie James Simpson was one
of the club’s co-owners and operators.  According to witnesses, Sullivan argued
with the doorman upon entering the club and then again a few minutes later as
he exited.  Immediately thereafter, Sullivan retrieved a pistol, returned, and
kicked the club’s door in.  Apparently looking for someone, Sullivan screamed
at the patrons, who took cover.  Sullivan eventually went outside and fired
the weapon three times in the parking lot.    

Four days later, Sullivan appeared at
the club again and the doorman refused him entry.  A co-owner in the club, Robert
James Booker, came out and informed Sullivan he was not welcome on the premises. 
Simpson appeared and told Sullivan a warrant had been issued for his arrest. 
When Simpson asked him to leave, Sullivan shouted that he would “come back”
and shoot the club up again. 

Later that evening, Simpson left the
club to put his shotgun away in his pick-up truck.  While in the club’s parking
lot, Simpson observed Sullivan and Jimmy Lee Lindsay approach the club in Lindsay’s
truck.  The two drove by, then turned around and drove by again.  On the second
pass they yelled something at Simpson and Sullivan flashed a gun.  Albert Stokes,
a member of the club’s security team who was patrolling the lot at the time,
suggested that he and Simpson follow the men to see what they wanted. 

Simpson and Stokes began following Sullivan
and Lindsay, who twice pulled over to the side of the road.  After stopping
the second time, Lindsay exited the truck to speak with Stokes.  Sullivan remained
in the passenger seat and Simpson, armed with his shotgun, climbed into Lindsay’s
truck and told Sullivan to return to the club.  According to Simpson, Sullivan
attempted to pull the shotgun away from him.  Sullivan then got out and met
Simpson at the rear of the truck.  They argued, and Sullivan again grabbed the
shotgun.  As Simpson pulled it away, the gun discharged, fatally wounding Sullivan.  

Stokes and Simpson left the scene, though
Simpson turned himself in to police a short time later.  At that time, he gave
a statement recounting the evening’s events.  In the statement, Simpson claimed
he was unaware Sullivan had been shot and declared he had not intended to kill
him. 

At trial, Simpson requested jury instructions
on the law of involuntary manslaughter and the defenses of accident and self-defense. 
The trial court denied all three requests to charge.  The jury subsequently
convicted Simpson of voluntary manslaughter and unlawful possession of a firearm,
and was sentenced to nine years for voluntary manslaughter and five years for
the weapons charge.  This appeal followed. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.  General Intent Charge

Simpson contends the trial court erred
in combining a general charge on criminal intent, including a definition of
criminal negligence, with the jury instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
According to Simpson, this conflated charge created confusion as to the requisite
mental element required for conviction.  We agree. 

Immediately prior to defining murder
and voluntary manslaughter, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 

Now, with regard to the allegation of the commission of an
unlawful homicide by the defendant, I charge you that it is not necessary .
. . that a specific intent to kill be proven by the evidence in the case, but
there must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt at least a general criminal intent
. . . .  Criminal intent is a mental state of conscious wrongdoing, and criminal
intent may be established by the proof of criminal negligence.  That is a mental
state indicating the defendant’s reckless disregard for the safety or rights
of others.  (emphasis added)

The court repeated this portion of the charge when
the jury later asked for further instructions on the definitions of murder and
voluntary manslaughter.  At the same time, the court denied Simpson’s requests
for a charge on involuntary manslaughter. 

The mens rea [1] required for involuntary manslaughter is defined
by statute.  Section 16-3-60 specifically states that “[a] person charged with
the crime of involuntary manslaughter may be convicted only upon a showing of
criminal negligence,” which is defined as “the reckless disregard of
the safety of others.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-60 (2003) (emphasis added); see
State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 550, 446 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1994) (“‘[T]o
constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence,
statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others.’”) (citation
omitted).  Thus, the trial court clearly instructed the jury on the mental element
of involuntary manslaughter. 

Whether stated as reckless disregard
for others’ safety or criminal negligence, this element “signifies an indifference
to the consequences of one’s acts.  It denotes a conscious failure to exercise
due care or ordinary care or a conscious indifference to the rights and safety
of others or a reckless disregard thereof.”  State v. Rowell, 326 S.C.
313, 315, 487 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1997).

On the other hand, the reckless conduct
giving rise to an inference of malice in depraved or malignant heart murder
is of an entirely different magnitude.  See State v. Watson, 349
S.C. 372, 376 n.5, 563 S.E.2d 336, 338 n.5 (2002) (“[E]xtreme recklessness
can lead to an inference of malice.”) (emphasis added); State v. Mouzon,
231 S.C. 655, 663, 99 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1957) (holding malice may be inferred
“‘as when an act which imports danger to another is done so recklessly . . .
as to manifest depravity of mind and disregard of human life.’”) (citation omitted).

It is therefore readily apparent that
criminal negligence is a lesser mental state than that required to support a
conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and by analogy, murder.  See William
Shepard McAninch & W. Gaston Fairey, The Criminal Law of South Carolina
81-82 (3d ed. 1996) (“Obviously this degree of recklessness [for depraved heart
murder] must involve more egregious conduct than th[e] ‘reckless disregard of
the safety of others’ which is the statutory definition of the criminal negligence
predicate to an involuntary manslaughter prosecution.”).  Accordingly, while
the trial court correctly stated that a showing of criminal negligence or reckless
disregard may establish criminal intent, we believe it was confusing,
and therefore erroneous, to combine this definition with those of murder and
voluntary manslaughter, both of which require the higher level of culpability,
or mens rea, of malice.  

II.  Involuntary Manslaughter Charge

Simpson also asserts error in the trial
court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. 
Again, we agree.  

“A trial court should refuse to charge
a lesser-included offense only where there is no evidence the defendant committed
the lesser rather than the greater offense.”  State v. Chatman, 336 S.C.
149, 152, 519 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1999); see State v. Burriss, 334
S.C. 256, 265, 513 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1999) (reiterating that to justify eliminating
offense of involuntary manslaughter “it should very clearly appear that there
is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder”) (emphasis
in original).  In determining whether the evidence presented warrants a particular
manslaughter instruction, it must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
defendant.  State v. Gadsden, 314 S.C. 229, 233, 442 S.E.2d 594, 597
(1994). 

Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional
killing of another without malice while one is either:  1) engaged in the commission
of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to
cause death or great bodily harm, or 2) acting lawfully with reckless disregard
of the safety of others. Burriss, 334 S.C. at 264-65, 513 S.E.2d at 109. 
We believe the facts of this case fall within the latter definition of involuntary
manslaughter such that Simpson was entitled to have the jury instructed on this
offense. 

On direct examination, Simpson testified
he never intended to shoot Sullivan; to the contrary, he asserted he only wanted
to talk with him about not coming back to the club.  According to Simpson, he
carried the shotgun when  he approached Lindsay’s truck because he was afraid
Sullivan was “liable to start shooting” — both Simpson and Stokes stated that
Stokes observed a 9mm handgun in Sullivan’s waistband.  If this testimony is
believed, Simpson was acting lawfully if recklessly.  See Burriss,
334 S.C. at 260-61, 513 S.E.2d at 107 (stating principles of self-defense may
be relied upon in determining whether an accused was acting lawfully in the
context of involuntary manslaughter; court noted that in such a case it is the
right, not the law, of self-defense that is invoked).   

Moreover, Simpson’s testimony confirmed
his written statement that the shotgun discharged when Sullivan “grabbed” the
barrel and “pulled” it in an attempt to take it from him.  These facts, viewed
in a light most favorable to Simpson, warranted a charge from the trial court
on involuntary manslaughter.  See State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301,
306, 345 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1986) (finding evidence necessitated charge on involuntary
manslaughter where defendant testified armed robbery victim, “apparently thinking
[the defendant] was going to shoot him, grabbed the end of the barrel causing
[defendant’s] gun to fire”; court held defendant’s testimony “constituted a
sufficient ground for submitting the possible verdict of involuntary manslaughter
to the jury”); State v. White, 253 S.C. 475, 478, 171 S.E.2d 712, 714
(1969) (stating negligent handling of a loaded gun that results in death may
support involuntary manslaughter). 

We therefore reverse Simpson’s convictions
and remand for a new trial.  See Burriss, 334 S.C. at 263, 513
S.E.2d at 108 (“The trial court commits reversible error if it fails to give
a requested charge on an issue raised by the evidence.”).
[2]  

REVERSED and REMANDED.

CURETON and STILWELL, JJ., concur.
 

[1] “The state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction,
must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.”  Black’s Law Dictionary
999 (7th ed. 1999).

[2] Simpson’s remaining issue on appeal concerns whether
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that voluntary manslaughter
is the “intentional” killing of another.  Because we reverse, we decline to
reach this issue.