Shelly Faulling v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Shelly Faulling, Petitioner,
v.
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2025-000344
Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Trial Judge
Kristi F. Curtis, Post-Conviction Relief Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-451
Submitted September 1, 2026 – Filed October 14, 2026
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals David
Alexander, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Assistant Attorney General Danielle Dixon, of Columbia,
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from an order partially
granting and partially denying his application for post-conviction relief (PCR).
The PCR court found Petitioner was entitled to a belated review of his direct
appeal issue pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974).

However, the PCR court found Petitioner was not entitled to relief on any other
ground.
Because there is sufficient evidence to support the PCR court's finding that
Petitioner did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a direct appeal, we
grant certiorari on Petitioner's PCR question one and proceed with a review of
Petitioner's direct appeal pursuant to Davis v. State, 288 S.C. 290, 342 S.E.2d 60
(1986). We deny certiorari on Petitioner's remaining PCR questions.
On appeal, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in (1) trying him in his absence
while he was being held in custody in the county jail, (2) denying his motion for
continuance due to his absence, and (3) making an unconstitutional comment on
the facts by instructing the jury that possession of more than one gram of
methamphetamine raises the inference of an intent to distribute. We reverse and
remand for a new trial pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
We hold the trial court erred when it failed to make findings of fact on the record
that Petitioner received notice of his right to be present and was warned he could
be tried in his absence after trial counsel moved for a continuance due to
Petitioner's absence. See State v. Ravenell, 387 S.C. 449, 454, 692 S.E.2d 554, 557
(Ct. App. 2010) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law
only."); id. ("An appellate court is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous."). Trial counsel moved for a continuance based on
Petitioner's absence, and the State additionally indicated the trial court must "make
a finding of fact on the record that [Petitioner] received notice of his right to be
present" and "that he could be tried in his absence should he fail to appear";
however, the trial court simply stated it denied Petitioner's motion. Therefore,
because trial counsel moved for a continuance based on Petitioner's absence and
the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact on the record, we hold
the trial court reversibly erred and that Petitioner is entitled to a new trial on this
basis. See State v. Fairey, 374 S.C. 92, 99, 646 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Ct. App. 2007)
("Although the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the right of an
accused to be present at every stage of his trial, this right may be waived.");
Ravenell, 387 S.C. at 455, 692 S.E.2d at 557-58 ("A trial [court] must determine a
criminal defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial in order to try
the defendant in his absence."); id. at 456, 692 S.E.2d at 558 ("The [court] must
make findings of fact on the record that the defendant (1) received notice of his
right to be present and (2) was warned he would be tried in his absence should he
fail to attend." (emphasis added)); see also State v. Wrapp, 421 S.C. 531, 536, 808
S.E.2d 821, 823 (Ct. App. 2017) (determining the trial court erred in trying the

defendant in his absence without making specific factual findings that the
defendant received notice of his right to be present and would be tried in absence
should he fail to appear, and finding the issue was preserved "although trial
counsel did not specifically object to the [trial] court's failure to make these factual
findings" because "he moved for a continuance and objected to the trial proceeding
due to the lack of adequate notice to [the defendant]").1
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 2
WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.
1 Because we hold Petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the basis of the trial court's
failure to make the requisite findings of fact on the record prior to holding a trial in
Petitioner's absence, we need not address whether the trial court erred in denying
Petitioner's motion for a continuance or included an unconstitutional comment on
the facts in its jury instruction. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court
does not need to address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is
dispositive of the appeal).
2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.