Christopher Thornton v. State of Rhode Island

Supreme Court
No. 2006-221-Appeal.
(WM 04-753)
Christopher Thornton 	:
v.
State of Rhode Island. 	:
NOTICE: 	This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

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Supreme Court
No. 2006-221-Appeal.
(WM 04-753)
Christopher Thornton 	:
v.
State of Rhode Island. 	:
Present: Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Robinson for the Court. 	The applicant, Christopher Thornton, appeals to this
Court from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 	On appeal, the applicant
contends that the hearing justice did not follow the procedural requirements set forth by this
Court in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on May 14, 2008, pursuant
to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal
should not be summarily decided. After considering the record, the memoranda submitted by the
parties, and the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown
and that the case should be decided at this time.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
On September 23, 1996, Mr. Thornton was indicted by a grand jury, which indictment
charged him with ten offenses stemming from an incident that occurred in June of 1996 at the

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home of a woman who had previously been his girlfriend.1 Following a jury trial, he was
convicted of the following offenses: felony assault with a dangerous weapon; felony assault
resulting in serious bodily injury; violation of a no-contact order; kidnapping his former
girlfriend; and intimidating a witness. 	This Court affirmed his conviction in State v. Thornton,
800 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 2002); that opinion contains a thorough recitation of the facts and
procedural history with respect to Mr. Thornton’s trial and eventual conviction.
On December 6, 2004, following this Court’s affirmance of his conviction, Mr. Thornton
filed a pro se application for postconviction relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1; in that
application, he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial error with respect to the waiver
of his constitutional rights, and error in his sentencing. 	Thereafter, on January 21, 2005, an
attorney was appointed to represent applicant in his postconviction relief action. On February 9,
2006, after conducting a review of Mr. Thornton’s application for postconviction relief, that
attorney filed a “no-merit” memorandum in accordance with what he believed was required
under Shatney;2 together with that memorandum, the attorney filed a motion to withdraw from
further representation of Mr. Thornton.
1 The grand jury’s indictment contained ten counts. 	Those counts were: (1) first-degree
sexual assault of his former girlfriend; (2) assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling; (3)
felony assault with a dangerous weapon; (4) assault with intent to murder his former girlfriend;
(5) felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury; (6) breaking and entering a dwelling without
consent; (7) violation of a no-contact order; (8) kidnapping his former girlfriend; (9) intimidating
a witness; and (10) kidnapping his daughter. This Court’s opinion concerning the original appeal
summarizes the results of the trial with respect to each count. State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016,
1021 (R.I. 2002).
2 In Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), this Court outlined a procedure whereby
court-appointed counsel, after reaching the conclusion that an application for postconviction
relief lacks merit, may seek to withdraw during a postconviction relief proceeding. 	A more
thorough discussion of this procedure appears in the Analysis section of this opinion, infra.

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A hearing was subsequently held on February 17, 2006 at which the hearing justice
expressed concern that the Shatney memorandum that applicant’s counsel had submitted did not
address “the specific grounds that Mr. Thornton believes, rightly or wrongly, should be grounds
for post-conviction relief * * *.” 	In particular, the hearing justice was concerned about two
issues that he believed counsel had not addressed in his “no-merit” memorandum. Those issues
were: (1) whether or not “Mr. Thornton should have been afforded some colloquy by the trial
justice relative to his * * * decision not to testify on his own behalf” and whether or not “there
was a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right;” and (2) the constitutional issues raised by Mr.
Thornton with respect to his sentencing. 	Although the hearing justice acknowledged that the
attorney did in fact address those issues orally in the course of the February 17 hearing, he
nevertheless directed the attorney to supplement his original memorandum by addressing the two
aforementioned issues in a written submission.3
On 	April 	19, 	2006, 	applicant’s 	court-appointed 	attorney 	filed 	a 	supplemental
memorandum, which specifically addressed the two issues pointed to by the hearing justice at the
3 At the February 17 hearing, Mr. Thornton himself submitted pro se to the Superior Court
hearing justice a supplemental memorandum in support of his application for postconviction
relief, in which memorandum he expanded on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and
judicial error.
The applicant’s supplemental memorandum asserted several claims of error that he
alleged were committed during the underlying criminal trial. Those claims were as follows: (1)
that the trial justice imposed an illegal sentence in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 7, of the Rhode Island
Constitution; (2) that applicant’s right to a trial by a jury of his peers was violated because there
were no African-Americans on the jury; (3) that applicant was “ineffective to give assistance to
himself;” (4) that applicant “was not adequately advised of his right to raise the issue of an
instruction on lesser-included offenses that should have been given to the jury;” (5) that standby
counsel had impermissible ex parte contacts with the trial justice outside of the presence of
applicant; (6) that the trial justice erred by conducting six conferences in chambers in order to
discuss applicant’s motion to conduct a hearing on the potential bias of certain jury members;
and (7) that standby counsel provided ineffective assistance.

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February 17 hearing. Subsequently, on April 21, 2006, applicant filed a pro se Motion to File an
Addendum and Memorandum of Law, which included further allegations concerning what, in his
view, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial error.
Thereafter, on May 19, 2006, a hearing was held before the same justice of the Superior
Court who had presided over the February 17 proceeding. 	During the hearing, counsel for Mr.
Thornton stated that he had found no merit in the issues which the court had directed him to
address; he further stated that he “st[ood] by [his] original recommendation to [the] Court that
under Shatney * * * [he] be permitted to withdraw from the case and that * * * Mr. Thornton
then [could] address the court and go forward on the hearing pro se.” 	For its part, the state
suggested that, because the majority of the allegations in applicant’s postconviction relief
application had been addressed by this Court in its decision affirming the conviction (State v.
Thornton, 	800 	A.2d 	1016 	(R.I. 	2002)), 	the 	Superior 	Court 	should, 	rather 	than 	“simply
discharging counsel and moving forward and allowing [applicant] to proceed pro se,” deny
postconviction relief for all but the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The hearing justice, after hearing from all of the parties (including Mr. Thornton),
reviewed the claims that applicant had raised in his initial postconviction relief application and in
his supplemental memorandum of February 17 and determined that applicant had not raised any
justiciable issues; accordingly, the hearing justice denied the application for postconviction relief
as to those claims. In doing so, the hearing justice stated:
“As 	to 	any 	issues 	raised 	and 	determined 	and 	reviewed 	by
[counsel], as to your stated grounds and application for post-
conviction relief that were raised in any of the pleadings before
this Court filed by you pro se, prior to the April 21, 2006 filing,
[counsel] has reviewed those * * * [and] has reported to the Court
on those, and has convinced the Court that the grounds stated in
any and all of those previous applications do not state grounds that

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are arguable and colorable for support of your application for post-
conviction relief.”
However, after referring to applicant’s postconviction relief application as a “moving target,” the
hearing justice again directed counsel to review applicant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel as set forth in his April 21, 2006 pro se memorandum. In so doing, the hearing justice
made it clear that any of the issues contained in applicant’s initial application and memorandum
of February 17 that had just been “referred to and just ruled upon are not going to be
reconsidered at any further hearings of the Court.” 	The hearing justice reiterated that he had
“resolved those issues * * * concluded those issues, and those issues do not form the legitimate
basis for a post-conviction remedy.” 	He further stated that he was “denying post-conviction
relief on those grounds.” 	Consequently, counsel filed a second supplemental memorandum on
June 5, 2006, addressing the specific claims set forth in applicant’s April 21 pro se memorandum
and once more concluding that the application for postconviction relief should be dismissed.
Thereafter, on June 9, 2006, a hearing was held before that same hearing justice; at that
hearing, the hearing justice found that the new issues raised by the applicant in his April 21 pro
se memorandum were barred because they “should have been, or could have been or in fact some
of them were raised in his direct appeal.”
Accordingly, an order denying Mr. Thornton’s application for postconviction relief was
entered on July 5, 2006; it is from that denial that applicant appeals.
On appeal, applicant raises numerous issues for this Court’s review; the crux of his
appeal, however, involves the appropriateness of the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. 	The applicant asserts “that the Superior Court proceedings in his post conviction [sic]
relief application were similar to what happened [to] Louis Shantey [sic] and require the same
relief provided to Mr. Shatney, i.e.[,] remand and appointment of new counsel.” 	The applicant

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also asserts that his court-appointed counsel did not follow the dictates outlined by this Court in
Shatney.
For its part, the state maintains that the strictures of Shatney did not require that the trial
justice permit further litigation of the postconviction relief application after he made the
determination, following the submission of memoranda by both appointed counsel and applicant
and oral argument with respect to same, that each of applicant’s contentions lacked merit.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to § 10-9.1-1, the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who
has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the
applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires
that, in the interest of justice, the conviction be vacated.4 Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855
(R.I. 2007). 	When this Court reviews a hearing justice’s determination with respect to an
application for postconviction relief, we will not disturb the findings of the hearing justice
“absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material
evidence.” State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 993 (R.I. 2002); see also Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d
82, 85 (R.I. 2007).
At the same time, however, “questions of fact concerning whether a defendant’s
constitutional rights have been infringed, and mixed questions of law and fact with constitutional
implications, are reviewed de novo.” 	Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Gonder, 935 A.2d at 85. Even when the de novo standard is applied to issues
of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and
4 A defendant who files an application for postconviction relief must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted. See, e.g., Gonder v. State, 935 A.2d
82, 84 n.1 (R.I. 2007); Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I. 2007); see also Estrada v.
Walker, 743 A.2d 1026, 1029 (R.I. 1999); Jacques v. State, 669 A.2d 1124, 1129 (R.I. 1995).

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inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review. 	See Gonder, 935
A.2d at 85; Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993; Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I. 2001).
Analysis
The applicant’s assertion that the hearing justice denied him the procedural protections
that this Court outlined in Shatney is wholly unavailing. 	In Shatney, this Court articulated the
standards that should govern the actions of appointed counsel who seek to withdraw from a
postconviction relief proceeding after reaching the conclusion that the postconviction relief
application is meritless. Shatney, 755 A.2d at 135. In such circumstances, this Court stated:
“[A]ppointed counsel must file with the court and serve upon the
applicant a motion to withdraw accompanied by a ‘no-merit’
memorandum that details the nature and extent of his or her review
of the case, lists each issue the applicant wished to raise, and
explains why in counsel’s professional opinion those issues and
any others that he or she may have investigated lacked merit. The
court then must conduct a hearing with the applicant present. 	If,
based upon its review of counsel’s assessment of the potential
grounds for seeking post-conviction relief and of any other issues
that the applicant wishes to raise, the court agrees that those
grounds appear to lack any arguable merit, then it shall permit
counsel to withdraw and advise the applicant that he or she shall be
required to proceed pro se, if he or she chooses to pursue the
application.” Id.
As was aptly noted by the state in its pre-brief to this Court, we encountered a similar set
of facts in the case of Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116 (R.I. 2004), when we considered the
argument of the applicant in that case that the hearing justice failed to follow the procedures
outlined in Shatney. 	Id. at 1122-23. 	In Brown, we concluded that “[t]he trial justice * * *
essentially followed [the Shatney] procedure because after hearing from [the applicant’s]
attorney, she afforded him an opportunity to speak on his own behalf and to dispute the points
made in his counsel’s no-merit memorandum.” 	Id. at 1123. 	We also noted that the hearing

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justice granted the applicant a second hearing on his motion for reconsideration, during which
hearing he was able to fully argue for postconviction relief. Id.
In the case at bar, we conclude that the hearing justice essentially complied with the
requirements of Shatney. First, in a commendable effort to ensure that counsel addressed each of
applicant’s contentions, the trial justice directed counsel to address specific issues and conducted
three separate hearings with both counsel and applicant present. 	Secondly, applicant was
permitted to submit to the court two pro se memoranda to supplement his application for
postconviction relief; both of those memoranda were referenced at oral argument and then
addressed by the hearing justice when he announced his decision. Thirdly, applicant was given
an opportunity to speak on his own behalf at all three hearings; and he was permitted to dispute
the arguments made in each of the no-merit memoranda, both at oral argument and in his
supplemental filings. Similarly to the applicant in Brown, applicant in the case at bar was able to
fully argue his case for postconviction relief and was not denied the procedural protections of
Shatney.
Because the trial justice, having reviewed the memoranda of applicant and his court-
appointed counsel and having heard oral argument with respect to same, determined that Mr.
Thornton’s application for postconviction relief was unavailing, it is our view that to permit the
applicant to proceed on a pro se basis in order to pursue his application would have been an
exercise in futility and an inefficient use of judicial resources. 	Accordingly, under the
circumstances presented herein, we conclude that the hearing justice properly denied the
applicant’s postconviction relief application and that he did not violate the essence of the
procedures outlined in Shatney. See Brown, 841 A.2d at 1122-23.

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Conclusion
For the reasons delineated in this opinion, the applicant’s appeal is denied and dismissed.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the papers in the case may be remanded to the
Superior Court.
Chief Justice Williams did not participate.

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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE: 	Christopher Thornton v. State of Rhode Island
DOCKET NO: 	2006-0221-A
COURT: 	Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED: 	June 13, 2008
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 	Superior 	County: Washington
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: 	Judge Allen P. Rubine
JUSTICES: 	Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: 	Chief Justice Frank J. Williams, for the Court
ATTORNEYS:
For Petitioner: Mark LaRoche, Esq.
ATTORNEYS:
For Respondent: 	Aaron Weisman, Esq.