Dale Rankin v. The Department of Business Regulation

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT
[FILED: August 4, 2023]
DALE RANKIN, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : C.A. No. PC-2020-02161
:
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS :
REGULATION, :
Defendant. :
DECISION
CRUISE, J. Before the Court for decision is the Department of Business Regulation’s (Defendant
or DBR) motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 8(a), and Rule 10(b) of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
Facts and Travel
On April 19, 2019, Dale Rankin (Plaintiff) applied to the DBR for a public adjuster’s
license (the Application) which the DBR granted (Plaintiff’s License). (Compl. 32.1) Sometime
thereafter, the DBR was notified that Plaintiff’s contractor’s registration had been revoked by the
Contractors’ Registration and Licensing Board in 2017, which prompted the DBR to review the
Application to see how Plaintiff had answered whether he was previously involved in an
1 The Complaint lacks pagination and does not include numbered paragraphs; therefore, any
citation to the Complaint is to the page number of the PDF document.
Additionally, filed with the Complaint are what appears to be written exhibits (although
not separately identified) which the Court is permitted to consider when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion because “documents attached to a complaint [are] deemed incorporated therein by
reference.” Bowen Court Associates v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 818 A.2d 721, 725 (R.I. 2003); see
also Super. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“[a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading
is part thereof for all purposes”).

2
administrative proceeding regarding a professional or occupational license. Id. In the Application,
Plaintiff had answered “no” to said question. Id. On April 29, 2019, the DBR issued (1) an
emergency order summarily suspending Plaintiff’s License, (2) an order to show cause why
Plaintiff’s License should not be revoked, (3) a notice of appointment of a hearing officer, and (4)
a notice of a pre-hearing conference to Plaintiff. Id. at 31. A hearing was held on November 18,
2019 and Plaintiff represented himself pro se at that hearing. Id. On February 3, 2020, the DBR
issued its decision revoking Plaintiff’s License pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 27-10-12(1) and 27-10-
12(3) (the Decision) because Plaintiff had failed to disclose his disciplinary history from the
Contractors’ Registration and Licensing Board upon submission of the Application. See id. at 42-
43.
On March 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pro se that is purportedly seeking an
administrative appeal of the Decision.2 Id. at 1-7. On April 17, 2020, the DBR filed the
Certification of Records in conformity with G.L. 1956 §§ 42-35-9(e) and 42-35-15(d). (Docket.)
On October 27, 2022, after nearly two and a half years of inactivity, Plaintiff filed a motion asking
the Court to overturn the Decision. Id.; see also Motion (Oct. 27, 2022). Defendant objected to
said motion on November 1, 2022, and in the objection, Defendant suggested that the Court set a
briefing schedule in the event that Plaintiff’s motion is actually an attempt to proceed with his
purported administrative appeal. Id.; see also Defendant Department of Business Regulation’s
Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. On November 7, 2022, a hearing was held on
Plaintiff’s motion and the Court (1) denied Plaintiff’s motion and (2) set a briefing schedule that
2 The Complaint does not include any reference to the Administrative Procedures Act codified at
chapter 35 of title 42, nor does Plaintiff assert that he is asking this Court to review the Decision.
See generally Compl.

3
instructed Plaintiff to file his memorandum on or before November 21, 2022 and Defendant to file
its memorandum on or before December 5, 2022. (Order (Nov. 29, 2022).)
Plaintiff has not filed his brief nor any other documents in support of his Complaint. See
generally Docket. On December 5, 2022, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Rules 12(b)(6), 8(a), and 10(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (Defendant’s
Motion) and submitted a memorandum of law in support thereof. Id. Defendant’s memorandum
also includes its arguments in support of its position with respect to the purported administrative
appeal. See generally Defendant Department of Business Regulation’s Memorandum of Law with
Respect to Plaintiff’s Purported Administrative Appeal (Def.’s Mem.). Plaintiff did not respond
to Defendant’s Motion. See generally Docket.
On May 9, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to assign the purported agency appeal for
decision. Id. Plaintiff, once again, did not file anything in response to the DBR’s motion to assign.
See generally id. The Court granted the motion to assign on May 15, 2023. Id. Neither party
requested oral argument on Defendant’s Motion or the purported administrative appeal.
II
Standard of Review
A
Rule 12(b)(6)
“‘The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.’” EDC
Investment, LLC v. UTGR, Inc., 275 A.3d 537, 542 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Pontarelli v. Rhode Island
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 176 A.3d 472, 476 (R.I. 2018)). In ruling
on a motion to dismiss, the trial justice is normally “confined to the four corners of the complaint
and must assume all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.” Narragansett

4
Electric Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 278 (R.I. 2011). “‘A motion to dismiss may be granted only
when it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief from
the defendant under any set of conceivable facts that could be proven in support of its claim.’”
Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017) (quoting
Tri-Town Construction Company, Inc. v. Commerce Park Associates 12, LLC, 139 A.3d 467, 478
(R.I. 2016)).
Rule 12(b)(6) “does not deal with the likelihood of success on the merits, but rather with
the viability of a plaintiff’s bare-bones allegations and claims as they are set forth in the
complaint.” Hyatt v. Village House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 823 (R.I. 2005).
However, when drafting a complaint in a civil action, the drafter is “not required to draft the
pleading with a high degree of factual specificity.” Id. at 824.
“That is not to say, however, that the drafter of a complaint has no
responsibilities with respect to providing some degree of clarity as
to what is alleged; due process considerations are implicated, and
we require that ‘the complaint give the opposing party fair and
adequate notice of the type of claim being asserted.’” Id. (quoting
Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 353 (R.I. 2002)).
B
Rule 8(a)
Under Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim for relief need be
only “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and
(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he or she deems himself entitled.” Haley v. Town
of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 848 (R.I. 1992); see also Super. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A plaintiff “is not
required to plead the ultimate facts that must be proven in order to succeed on the complaint . . .
[and] is also not obligated to set out the precise legal theory upon which his or her claim is based.”

5
Id. Instead, a complaint must “give the opposing party fair and adequate notice of the type of
claim being asserted.” Id.
C
Rule 10(b)
Under Rule 10(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]ll averments of claim
. . . shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as
practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by
number in all succeeding pleadings.” Super. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
III
Analysis
Defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 8(a)
and 10(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure because the Complaint fails to “establish
any appellate basis in the law upon which to review the Hearing Officer’s Decision.” (DBR’s
Mem. 4.) In support, Defendant submits that (1) Plaintiff failed to mention “any statutory basis
for his appeal, nor does he request any relief from the Court,” (2) the Complaint is not set out in
numbered paragraphs as required by Rule 10(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,
and (3) the Complaint does not set forth short and plain statements showing that Plaintiff is entitled
to relief, which is not in compliance with Superior Court Rule 8(a) of Civil Procedure. Id. at 4-5.
Defendant contends that the Complaint is “confusing and difficult to interpret” and, as such, it is
unclear what statutory authority Plaintiff is relying upon for his purported appeal. Id. at 5. In
addition, Plaintiff’s failure to submit any additional briefing has not provided any further
clarification to the allegations in the Complaint. Id.

6
The Court is mindful that Plaintiff is representing himself pro se, which is certainly his
right to do; although, by electing to do so, he has assumed a very difficult task. See Terzian v.
Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558 (R.I. 2018). Even though “pro se litigants are often granted greater
latitude by [a] court, they are not exempt from our rules.” Oliveira v. Levesque, 294 A.3d 994, 998
(R.I. 2023) (citing Terzian, 180 A.3d at 558-59); see also Bryant v. Wall, 896 A.2d 704, 709 (R.I.
2006) (“it would be improper for a hearing justice to set aside our rules of evidence and
procedure”). Furthermore, the Court “‘cannot and will not entirely overlook established rules of
procedure, adherence to which is necessary so that parties may know their rights, that the real issue
in controversy may be presented and determined, and that the business of the courts may be carried
on with reasonable dispatch.’” Oliveira, 294 A.3d at 998. (quoting Terzian, 180 A.3d at 559).
In this case, the Complaint is not broken down into separate counts, nor is the Complaint
comprised of any numbered paragraphs setting forth Plaintiff’s separate factual allegations which
does not comport with Rule 10(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally
Compl.; see also Super. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Instead, the Complaint is comprised of three, single-
spaced, and lengthy paragraphs that are nearly impossible to decipher to ascertain the relief
Plaintiff is seeking from the Court. See Compl. 1-7. While the Court is mindful that Plaintiff is a
pro se litigant, and that the task of drafting a complaint that comports with our Rules of Civil
Procedure is not necessarily an easy one, the Court is unable to discern the claims of relief Plaintiff
is asking for from the Court in the Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff does not include any factual
allegations in the Complaint as to why the Decision of the DBR is not in compliance with the
standards enumerated in § 42-35-15, nor does the Complaint include any statutory basis for this
Court’s review of the Decision or the relief Plaintiff is seeking pursuant to § 42-35-15. See
generally id.

7
Although Plaintiff is not required to draft the Complaint with a high degree of factual
specificity, Plaintiff is required to provide some degree of clarity in his allegations so that the DBR
has fair and adequate notice of the type of claims being asserted, which the Complaint simply does
not do. See Hyatt, 880 A.2d at 823; see also Super. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While pro se litigants are often
given some leeway with their adherence to the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
is not permitted to completely overlook our rules of evidence and procedure and unfairly benefit
the Plaintiff because “[b]oth sides have a legitimate expectation of a level playing field.” Jenkins
v. City of East Providence, 293 A.3d 1267, 1271 (R.I. 2023). Therefore, after reviewing the
Complaint and assuming all allegations set forth are true and resolving any doubts in Plaintiff’s
favor, it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff would be entitled to any relief from
Defendant under any set of conceivable facts that could be proven in support of Plaintiff’s claims.
See Chase, 160 A.3d at 973.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

8
RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT
Decision Addendum Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Dale Rankin v. The Department of Business Regulation
CASE NO: PC-2020-02161
COURT: Providence County Superior Court
DATE DECISION FILED: August 4, 2023
JUSTICE/MAGISTRATE: Cruise, J.
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Pro se, Dale Rankin, 10 Sadler Street, North
Providence, RI 02911
For Defendant: Sara Tindall-Woodman, Esq.