State v. Robert Raso

Supreme Court
No. 2022-196-C.A. (P1/90-248A)
No. 2022-197-C.A. (P1/90-247A)
No. 2022-198-C.A. (P1/90-246A)
No. 2022-199-C.A. (P1/90-250A)
No. 2022-208-C.A. (P1/89-1667A)
No. 2022-209-C.A. (P1/89-941A)
No. 2022-210-C.A. (P1/87-2828A)
No. 2022-211-C.A. (P1/87-482A)

State :

v. :

Robert Raso. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2022-196-C.A. (P1/90-248A)
No. 2022-197-C.A. (P1/90-247A)
No. 2022-198-C.A. (P1/90-246A)
No. 2022-199-C.A. (P1/90-250A)
No. 2022-208-C.A. (P1/89-1667A)
No. 2022-209-C.A. (P1/89-941A)
No. 2022-210-C.A. (P1/87-2828A)
No. 2022-211-C.A. (P1/87-482A)

State :

v. :

Robert Raso. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. When a defendant is sentenced to

imprisonment for violating a suspended or a probationary sentence, G.L. 1956

§ 12-19-18 allows a motion to terminate the sentence of imprisonment under certain

circumstances. The defendant contends that these consolidated appeals implicate

one of those circumstances—when the criminal charge supporting the violation

“fails to proceed in District or Superior Court under circumstances where the state

is indicating a lack of probable cause, or circumstances where the state or its agents

-1-
believe there is doubt about the culpability of the accused.” Section 12-19-18(b)(5).1

For the reasons discussed, we conclude that this provision is not triggered under the

present circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s order denying

the motion to terminate imprisonment.

Facts and Travel

In 1990, Robert Raso (Raso or defendant) pled nolo contendere to twenty-six

criminal charges, including second-degree sexual assault, felony assault, arson,

assault with intent to commit murder, and various robberies. On the arson and eight

robbery convictions—which comprised eight different Superior Court cases—

defendant was sentenced to forty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with

twelve years to serve and twenty-eight years suspended with probation,

concurrently. As time passed, Raso was eventually released from the ACI and began

serving his probationary sentence.

1
At oral argument, the defendant argued that these consolidated appeals were not
limited to G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18(b)(5) but also encompassed the other provisions of
subdivision (b). The record is clear that, during the motion-to-terminate proceeding,
the defendant twice advised the Superior Court that the motion to terminate was
brought pursuant to § 12-19-18(b)(5) only, and the Superior Court’s decision
denying the motion to terminate was understandably limited to § 12-19-18(b)(5)
only. Accordingly, the defendant’s invitation that this Court consider
§ 12-19-18(b)(1)-(4) is waived and we have no occasion to consider it. See, e.g.,
State v. Tavares, 312 A.3d 449, 458 (R.I. 2024) (“As we have said on innumerable
occasions, a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if
it was not raised before the trial court.”) (quoting State v. Barros, 148 A.3d 168, 172
(R.I. 2016)).

-2-
On March 8, 2011, the state filed a probation-violation report pursuant to Rule

32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that Raso violated

the terms and conditions of probation. The Rule 32(f) probation-violation report

was filed in the eight cases that comprised the arson and the eight robbery

convictions only. Two weeks later, a probation-violation hearing commenced.2 It

lasted five days during which thirteen witnesses testified. Because the events that

preceded the finding that defendant violated the terms and conditions of probation—

as well as this Court’s affirmance of that determination—are germane to the matter

currently before this Court, we recount the necessary details. See State v. Raso, 80

A.3d 33 (R.I. 2013). The facts are troubling.

The Probation-Violation Hearing

The state’s probation-violation report was based upon the allegations that

defendant had sexually assaulted his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, whom we

previously referred to by the fictitious name Natalie. Raso, 80 A.3d at 34-35. The

most recent allegation of sexual abuse occurred on March 6, 2011, two days before

the probation-violation report was filed. Id. at 35. During the probation-violation

hearing, Natalie testified that around midnight on March 6, 2011, she awoke and

discovered that defendant had climbed into her bed. Id. Natalie recounted “that

defendant removed her pajama bottoms and touched her chest and her vagina with

2
The probation-violation hearing was combined with a bail hearing.
-3-
his hands and his mouth.” Id. During her testimony, Natalie also related that

defendant’s sexual misconduct began when she was “nine or ten” and occurred on

“more than ten” occasions. Id.

On March 10, 2011, under duress from members of her family, including her

mother, Natalie recanted the allegations of sexual abuse and testified during the

probation-violation hearing concerning the circumstances surrounding this brief

repudiation. Raso, 80 A.3d at 36. Natalie explained that on March 10, 2011, she was

brought to the basement of her mother’s friend’s home (Heather Burlingame) and

interrogated for more than three and a half hours by her uncle (Ian Sateikis),

Burlingame, and her mother (Penelope Edwards), who at the time was married to

defendant. Id. We previously described the ordeal perpetrated upon

fourteen-year-old Natalie a mere four days after the latest incident of sexual abuse:

“Throughout a more than three-hour barrage of questions
and accusations that she was lying, during which her
mother told her that she was ‘a f * * * ing liar’ and that
defendant would ‘die in jail,’ Natalie maintained that her
stepfather had molested her. Natalie recalled that
Burlingame told her that Natalie herself could be
prosecuted. Eventually, however, Natalie told her mother
‘it wasn’t true.’ She testified that she did so because her
mother did not believe her, and that once she recanted, the
questioning stopped.” Id.

The next day, Natalie provided a statement to the Burrillville Police Department

stating, “it wasn’t true.” Id. Natalie testified that she provided this statement

“[b]ecause [she] wanted it to be over.” Id.
-4-
During Natalie’s probation-violation testimony, the trial justice (first trial

justice) granted a request for a short recess. Raso, 80 A.3d at 35 n.6. When testimony

resumed, the first trial justice noted:

“I think it’s important that the record reflect, as it certainly
can’t when it doesn’t reflect with words, the difficulty with
which this witness had prior to the recess in giving her
testimony. There were long pauses between the answers
and, in addition, she was extremely tearful and shaking
* * *. [T]his witness, albeit 14 years old, does not present
as someone who, of that age, who may be able to handle
everything that comes their way and appeared to me to be
suffering unreasonable and unnecessary emotional harm
in giving this testimony * * *.” Id.

Sateikis also testified concerning the evening of March 10, 2011, when he

brought Natalie to Burlingame’s home. Raso, 80 A.3d at 36. He explained that

Edwards gave him a digital recorder for the interrogation, but rather than placing

the recorder in plain view, Sateikis secreted the device in his sweatshirt pocket. Id.

A half-hour into the grilling—and while the recorder remained hidden—Sateikis

began recording. Id. at 36-37. After two hours, Sateikis left the basement and

returned upstairs to talk to Edwards, advising her, “I don’t think we’re going to get

anything.” Id. at 37. Thereafter, Edwards began questioning Natalie for “45

minutes, half an hour,” a process Sateikis likened to “[s]ort of like an interrogation

style.” Id. Sateikis added that “Natalie’s demeanor was silent at first, but that she

started ‘getting more frustrated,’ ‘more upset’ and that she was crying and her voice

was ‘shaky.’” Id.
-5-
Throughout this barrage, Natalie steadfastly maintained that defendant had

sexually assaulted her until Edwards declared that she wanted to speak with Natalie

alone; accordingly, Sateikis and Burlingame—as well as two additional friends of

Edwards who had joined the fray—departed the basement. Raso, 80 A.3d at 37.

About twenty or thirty minutes later, Edwards emerged from the basement with her

arm around Natalie and announced that “[Natalie] told the truth, that she lied.”3 Id.

The more than three-hour basement interrogation was over.

Ann Murphy, a child protective investigator for the Department of Children,

Youth, and Families, also testified that on March 6, 2011, she received a call

concerning Natalie and initiated an investigation. Raso, 80 A.3d at 37-38. Murphy

recalled that when she confronted Natalie concerning allegations that defendant had

sexually abused her, Natalie “began crying ‘very hard,’ and, in answer to direct

questions, affirmed that her stepfather, defendant, had touched her without her

consent and that the last time this had occurred was the previous night.” Id. at 38.

Murphy added that according to Natalie, the sexual misconduct occurred “about

3
Sateikis testified that on March 15, 2011, he went to the Burrillville Police
Department and provided a statement expressing regret concerning the manner in
which Natalie was interrogated. See State v. Raso, 80 A.3d 33, 37 (R.I. 2013).
Sateikis related that after leaving the police station, he spoke to Natalie and
apologized. Id. He also recounted that Natalie conveyed that she recanted because
“she thought it would be over faster and her mom wouldn’t believe her anyway.”
Id.

-6-
once a week over four years” and included penile penetration of Natalie’s mouth

and vagina, as well as defendant engaging in cunnilingus. Id.

Notably, Murphy testified that the following day—after police had removed

the sheets from Natalie’s bed—Edwards telephoned her and advised that

defendant’s hair might be found on the sheets because he had slept there Friday

night, March 4, 2011. Raso, 80 A.3d at 38. Murphy explained that the next day,

March 8, 2011, Edwards again contacted her and warned that if sperm was found

on Natalie’s sheets, “it could be because defendant had ‘done something with

himself on the bed.’” Id.

Cara Lupino, the supervisor of the forensic biology lab at the Department of

Health, testified that a comforter taken from Natalie’s room tested positive for

seminal fluid and contained sperm cells and that a sheet taken from Natalie’s bed

revealed seminal fluid but contained no sperm cells. Raso, 80 A.3d at 39. Lupino

indicated that the statistical possibility that the DNA retrieved from the comforter

belonged to someone other than Raso was “in the U.S. Caucasian population it is

seen in 1 in every 9.37 times 10 to the 16 people which is approximately 93

quintillion people.” Id. at 39 n.13.

Edwards and defendant also testified during the probation-violation hearing.

Raso, 80 A.3d at 40-41. Edwards explained that on the evenings when Natalie was

not home, she and defendant would sleep in Natalie’s bed because it was larger than

-7-
their own bed. Id. at 40. Edwards detailed that on Friday, March 4, 2011, Natalie

slept at a friend’s house and that she and defendant slept in Natalie’s bed. Id. She

further explained that while in Natalie’s bed, she and defendant began to “fool

around” but were interrupted by their four-year-old daughter, whom we previously

referred to by the fictitious name Katy. Id. According to Edwards, she left Natalie’s

bed and informed defendant, “I’m going back to bed with [Katy], take care of it

yourself if you need to, sorry.” Id.

Finally, defendant testified that he and Edwards had intimate relations in

Natalie’s bed between two and four times a month. Raso, 80 A.3d at 41. Raso

averred that he and Edwards started becoming intimate in Natalie’s bed on Friday

evening, March 4, 2011, but were interrupted and he later “pleasured himself.” Id.

Raso denied the allegations of sexual abuse, stating that he had “‘never, never ever’

done anything sexually inappropriate with Natalie.” Id. When questioned during

the probation-violation hearing if he had been convicted of second-degree sexual

assault, defendant responded, “I pled guilty to a large assortment of charges as a

plea agreement.” Id. Upon further being asked, “I want to know simply did you lie

to the Judge when you pled guilty?” defendant admitted, “Yes, I lied to the Judge.”

Id.

At the conclusion of the probation-violation hearing, the first trial justice

found that defendant violated the terms and conditions of probation and minced no

-8-
words. Raso, 80 A.3d at 41. She observed that Raso had a five-day hearing, which

the first trial justice described as “one of [the] most gut-wrenching sagas that I have

heard in my eighteen years on the bench.” The first trial justice added that the

five-day probation-violation hearing “lasted longer than many criminal trials” and

that thirteen witnesses testified, including five called by the defense.

Having carefully listened to the testimony and observed the witnesses, the

first trial justice made clear credibility findings. She concluded that Natalie’s

in-court and sworn testimony “never wavered,” “was fraught with pain and

anguish,” and “was credible and convincing.” On the other hand, the first trial

justice rejected defendant’s testimony, finding that not only did he have “every

incentive to lie in this proceeding, not the least of which is the 28 years in prison

that he is facing if [Natalie] is believed,” but that “he did lie [about committing the

prior sexual assault].” The first trial justice added, “Mr. Raso, you lied to me about

having lied before and regardless, if you lie to the [c]ourt then, then you cannot be

believed.”

The first trial justice continued her evaluation, stating that defendant’s

testimony “radiates control of your victim and manipulation.” Critically, the first

trial justice declared that she was “not only reasonably satisfied that [defendant]

sexually assaulted [Natalie] on March 6, 2011 and over the course of the four years

-9-
before that, I am near certain of it * * *.”4 (Emphasis added.) She revoked the

suspended sentences and ordered Raso to serve twenty-five years in each of the

eight cases referenced in the probation-violation report, concurrently. Raso

appealed the probation-violation determination to this Court, which we affirmed.

Raso, 80 A.3d at 44.

4
The first trial justice also addressed the March 10, 2011 basement interrogation of
Natalie, describing it as “a perverted, misguided effort to investigate the alleged
crime or perhaps more accurately to secure what they believed to be the truth, that
[Natalie] had lied about the molestations by the defendant and must admit that she
lied.” The first trial justice concluded that she

“does not accept as true [Natalie’s] recantation or her
statement to the police that immediately followed it
denying the defendant’s sexual assaults of her. That
recantation, in this [c]ourt’s view, was coerced and
involuntary. Her recantation came only after she was
convinced that she would not be released from the
basement interrogation room until she said it didn’t
happen, even if it did, and no one can really claim[]
otherwise who has not listened to the audiotape. By then
her mother had punished her for days by taking away her
cellphone and computer and keeping her out of school and
subjected [Natalie] to the most horrendous interrogation
imaginable, especially for a child who just disclosed
sexual abuse. Mother did all this contrary to the expressed
instructions of DCYF to support her until she could speak
to the police and undergo counselling.”

Similarly, we observed, “[i]t is difficult to conjure a more coercive environment than
this—a fourteen-year-old child subjected to several hours of pleading, mocking,
screaming, and threats from her mother, her uncle, and three other adults who, all
the while, claimed to love and support her.” Raso, 80 A.3d at 43. Years after our
initial observation, we remain appalled by this conduct.

- 10 -
The Motion-to-Terminate Hearing

In March 2011, a criminal complaint was filed in District Court charging

Raso with one count of first-degree sexual assault relating to the events of March

6, 2011. As discussed, the first-degree sexual assault charge served as the basis for

the determination that Raso had violated the terms and conditions of probation.

With respect to the charge of first-degree sexual assault, on September 13, 2011,

defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for a speedy trial.5 The state

subsequently filed a notice dismissing the charge of first-degree sexual assault,

pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. In

relevant part, the notice of dismissal advised that “the [s]tate is moving for dismissal

without prejudice in recognition that six months has elapsed from the time of * * *

defendant’s arraignment in District Court on March 7, 2011.” The Rule 48(a) notice

of dismissal added that “[n]othing herein should be interpreted as suggesting a lack

of probable cause to believe that * * * defendant committed these offenses or that

the [s]tate in any way believes there is a doubt about * * * defendant’s culpability.”

The following day, the first-degree sexual assault case was closed.

5
The motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-13-6, which provides
that “[e]very person who shall be imprisoned upon suspicion of having committed
an offense for which bail may be denied pursuant to the provisions of R.I. Const.,
Art. I, Sec. IX shall be bailed or discharged if not indicted or charged by information
within six (6) months after the commitment.”

- 11 -
In due course, defendant filed a motion to terminate the twenty-five-year

sentence he received as a result of being declared a probation violator. A three-day

hearing ensued before a trial justice (second trial justice) in the Superior Court.

During the motion-to-terminate hearing, the prosecutor assigned to the

probation-violation hearing—and who was among the signatories to the Rule 48(a)

notice of dismissal—testified. The prosecutor revealed that he did not believe the

recantation but rather credited Natalie’s original allegation that she had been

sexually assaulted by defendant. The prosecutor further testified that the charge of

first-degree sexual assault was not presented to the grand jury because the Office of

the Attorney General was “satisfied with the sentence that we received from [the

first trial justice] on the [probation] violation.” When asked about the timing of the

determination to file the Rule 48(a) notice of dismissal, the prosecutor elucidated

that he “was considering that from the day [defendant] was sentenced * * * when

he was sentenced on the violation, that was in my mind. So I started considering

that the moment [the first trial justice] gave him 25 years.”

The prosecutor further described that in considering whether to file a notice

of dismissal, he relied upon the first trial justice’s finding that she was “not only

reasonably satisfied that [defendant] sexually assaulted [Natalie] on March 6, 2011

and over the course of the four years before that, I am near certain of it * * *.”

(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor also testified that Natalie’s biological father,

- 12 -
who was “pretty emotional” during the probation-violation hearing, emphatically

declared that his daughter would not testify at another hearing. In this respect, the

prosecutor related that when Natalie was taking the witness stand during the

probation-violation hearing, it was his hope that “we would get a good result and

this would be the last time she would have to go through what she did.”

In sum, the prosecutor testified that the reason for the Rule 48(a) notice of

dismissal was dual: The state was satisfied with the twenty-five-year sentence

imposed upon defendant and the state wanted to spare Natalie from the emotional

trauma caused by testifying at another hearing or trial. The prosecutor affirmed that

the language contained within the Rule 48(a) notice of dismissal expressing that

dismissal should not be interpreted as suggesting a lack of probable cause was true

and accurate, both at the time he signed the notice of dismissal and at the time of

his testimony.

At the conclusion of the three-day motion-to-terminate hearing, the second

trial justice issued a bench decision and denied the motion to terminate the sentence

of imprisonment. In so doing, the second trial justice firmly announced that “there’s

no issue and no doubt as to probable cause or the culpability of the defendant.” On

- 13 -
May 17, 2019, defendant filed a notice of appeal in all eight cases.6 We

consolidated the appeals.

Standard of Review

“It is well established that the factual findings of a hearing justice sitting

without a jury are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed unless the record

shows that the findings clearly are wrong or the hearing justice overlooked or

misconceived material evidence.” State v. Murray, 216 A.3d 1234, 1240 (R.I. 2019)

(brackets omitted) (quoting Kilmartin v. Barbuto, 158 A.3d 735, 746-47 (R.I.

2017)). “This Court reviews ‘questions of statutory interpretation de novo.’” Id. at

1240-41 (quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)).

Discussion

On appeal, Raso challenges the second trial justice’s decision to deny the

motion to terminate his sentence. Despite its plain language, he contends that the

clear intent of § 12-19-18(b)(5) is that if a criminal prosecution is not pursued—for

any reason—a defendant “may not continue to be incarcerated on the basis that a

[trial] justice was ‘reasonably satisfied’ [that the defendant] committed that new

6
At the time defendant’s notices of appeal were filed, an order memorializing the
denial of the motion to terminate imprisonment had not formally entered.
Subsequently, this Court remanded the eight consolidated cases to the Superior
Court for entry of an order denying the motion to terminate, which the Superior
Court executed. “This Court has consistently considered a notice of appeal filed
prior to the entry of the judgment or order appealed from to be timely.” State v.
Murray, 216 A.3d 1234, 1239 n.5 (R.I. 2019).
- 14 -
offense.” According to defendant, the state cannot circumvent § 12-19-18(b)(5) by

filing a Rule 48(a) notice of dismissal and declaring that the dismissal was “not for

lack of probable cause.” The defendant’s arguments are without merit.

We begin by rejecting the premise of defendant’s expansive argument that

§ 12-19-18(b)(5) contains a “catch-all” intended to prohibit a probation-revocation

hearing from replacing the more rigorous scrutiny of a criminal trial during which

the state must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As this Court

previously recognized, in the case of a deferred sentence or a suspended sentence,

“the guilt of the convicted accused has been established * * *.” State v. Plante, 109

R.I. 371, 377, 285 A.2d 395, 398 (1972). However, “as an act of grace, one is given

a sentence, the execution of which is suspended * * *.” Id.

In this matter, defendant was afforded the full panoply of due-process rights

with respect to the arson and eight robbery charges and he pled nolo contendere; he

was sentenced to forty years at the ACI, with twelve years to serve and twenty-eight

years suspended with probation, concurrently. The twenty-eight-year probationary

sentence permitted Raso to continue serving his sentence outside the prison walls

but conditioned this act of grace on defendant’s promise to keep the peace and be

on good behavior while on probation. See Plante, 109 R.I. at 378, 285 A.2d at 398.

The events of March 6, 2011, clearly demonstrated that defendant breached that

promise and, after finding that defendant violated the terms and conditions of

- 15 -
probation, the first trial justice revoked twenty-five years of the previously

suspended twenty-eight-year sentence.

Raso also suggests that § 12-19-18(b)(5) is ambiguous and evinces the

General Assembly’s intent that a defendant may not continue to be imprisoned when

the basis for incarceration is conduct that was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt

during a criminal trial. Contra § 12-19-18(c) (“This section * * * shall not alter the

ability of the court to revoke a suspended sentence or probationary period for an

allegation of conduct that does not rise to the level of criminal conduct.”). We have

previously rejected this argument.

In State v. White, 37 A.3d 120 (R.I. 2012) (mem.), a criminal information

was filed but later dismissed pursuant to Rule 48(a). White, 37 A.3d at 121. The

defendant asserted that because the state dismissed the underlying criminal charge,

which was the predicate for the finding of violation, his incarceration must

terminate. Id. at 122. We rejected this argument and declared § 12-19-18

“unambiguous as it applies to deferred sentence agreements.” Id. We explained that

“[b]y its clear language, relief is available when ‘the grand jury has failed to return

any indictment or an information has not been filed on the charge which was

specifically alleged to have constituted the violation of the deferred sentence

* * *.’” Id. (quoting § 12-19-18).7 Because the state filed a criminal information,

7
This provision is at present codified in § 12-19-18(a).
- 16 -
we concluded that the plain language of § 12-19-18 did not provide the defendant

relief. Id.

Here, Raso similarly ignores the plain and unambiguous language of

§ 12-19-18(b)(5), which provides:

“Whenever any person, after an evidentiary hearing, has
been sentenced to imprisonment for violation of a
suspended sentence or probationary period by reason of
the alleged commission of a felony or misdemeanor said
sentence of imprisonment shall, on a motion made to the
court on behalf of the person so sentenced, be quashed,
and imprisonment shall be terminated when any of the
following occur on the charge which was specifically
alleged to have constituted the violation:

“* * *

“(5) The charge fails to proceed in District or Superior
Court under circumstances where the state is indicating a
lack of probable cause, or circumstances where the state
or its agents believe there is doubt about the culpability of
the accused.” (Emphasis added.)

“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court

interprets the statute literally and gives the words their plain and ordinary meanings.”

White, 37 A.3d at 122. “In the absence of any ambiguity, this Court need not engage

in statutory construction, and must apply the statute as written.” Id. Applying these

well-established rules of statutory construction, we are satisfied that there is no

indication that the first-degree sexual assault charge failed to proceed in District

Court or Superior Court “under circumstances where the state is indicating a lack of

- 17 -
probable cause, or circumstances where the state or its agents believe there is doubt

about the culpability of the accused.” Section 12-19-18(b)(5). Our precedent

supports this conclusion.

In Murray, the state filed a probation-violation report alleging that the

defendant violated his probation based upon his involvement in a domestic-violence

incident. Murray, 216 A.3d at 1236. After a hearing, the trial justice declared that

the defendant violated his probation and ordered that he serve thirteen years of a

previously suspended sentence. Id. at 1237. The state subsequently dismissed the

domestic-violence charges pursuant to Rule 48(a), and the defendant responded by

filing a motion to terminate incarceration pursuant to § 12-19-18(b)(5), arguing that

the dismissal was due to a lack of probable cause. Id. at 1237-38. The Rule 48(a)

notice of dismissal indicated: “The state is dismissing these charges in the interest

of sparing the victim any further trauma from repeated court appearances. This

dismissal shall in no way be construed to imply that the state indicates a lack of

probable cause or any doubt of the culpability of the defendant.” Id. at 1238

(brackets omitted).

We rejected the defendant’s argument that the circumstances presented in

Murray required the termination of his imprisonment. Murray, 216 A.3d at 1241.

In particular, this Court explained that the Rule 48(a) notice of dismissal indicated

that the reason for the dismissal was to spare the complaining witness further trauma

- 18 -
and that the dismissal was not due to a “‘lack of probable cause’ or any ‘doubt about

the culpability about the accused[.]’” Id. at 1241-42 (quoting § 12-19-18(b)(5)).

Significantly, we also observed that the trial justice determined that the prosecutor

“credibly affirmed those statements as contained in the Rule 48(a) dismissal” and

that “[t]here [was] no indication in the record that this is a case that failed to proceed

because of lack of probable cause.” Id. at 1242.

In the case at bar, there was a full, lengthy probation-violation hearing, and

subsequently a three-day hearing on the motion-to-terminate, during which

defendant’s culpability in horrific acts of sexual abuse was established to the

satisfaction of two seasoned trial justices. The prosecutor testified that the Rule

48(a) notice of dismissal was motivated by a desire to spare Natalie from additional

trauma associated with recounting the childhood sexual abuse perpetrated upon her

by defendant, as well as the state’s satisfaction with the imposition of the

twenty-five-year sentence. The record amply supports these considerations, all of

which are embraced in the law.

For example, the first trial justice observed that Natalie “appeared to me to

be suffering unreasonable and unnecessary emotional harm in giving this

testimony,” Raso, 80 A.3d at 35 n.6; the prosecutor expressed during the

probation-violation hearing that he was hopeful that this would be the last time

Natalie had to testify; and Natalie’s biological father conveyed his emphatic desire

- 19 -
that his daughter not testify again. The record is also undisputed that prior to the

probation-violation hearing, the state offered a plea agreement that was

significantly less than the twenty-five-year sentence imposed. Having offered

significantly less time to serve in a plea agreement, the state’s assertion that it was

satisfied with the twenty-five-year sentence is not surprising.

Finally, and importantly, consistent with the evidentiary hearing afforded the

defendant in Murray, Raso was also provided an evidentiary hearing, during which

he was permitted to test the prosecutor’s grounds for the Rule 48(a) notice of

dismissal. This procedure satisfies fundamental due-process principles and the

second trial justice “credibly found there’s no issue and no doubt as to probable

cause or the culpability of the defendant.” We accord this credibility determination

great weight, see Murray, 216 A.3d at 1240; and having carefully reviewed the

record, we are satisfied that “[t]here is no indication in the record that this is a case

that failed to proceed because of lack of probable cause,” id. at 1242, or “doubt

about the culpability of the accused,” § 12-19-18(b)(5).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed. The papers

in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.

- 20 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Robert L. Raso.

2022-196-C.A. (P1/90-248A)
2022-197-C.A. (P1/90-247A)
2022-198-C.A. (P1/90-246A)
2022-199-C.A. (P1/90-250A)
Case Number
2022-208-C.A. (P1/89-1667A)
2022-209-C.A. (P1/89-941A)
2022-210-C.A. (P1/87-2828A)
2022-211-C.A. (P1/87-482A)

Date Opinion Filed June 12, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice William E. Carnes, Jr.

For State:

Lindsay Grizzard
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:

Carl J. Ricci, Esq.