State v. Luis Roman

Supreme Court

No. 2024-78-C.A.
(P1/22-180AG)

State :

v. :

Luis Roman. :

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Supreme Court

No. 2024-78-C.A.
(P1/22-180AG)

State :

v. :

Luis Roman. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. The matter before the Court is an appeal

filed by the defendant, Luis Roman (defendant), of a Superior Court order denying

the defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court

Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant had been sentenced to a total of seventy

years with thirty years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions, with ten years

being nonparolable. The defendant waived prebriefing, and the matter was placed

on the full argument calendar. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order

of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

In the early morning hours of August 11, 2021, Officer Robert Savage (Officer

Savage) of the Providence Police Department encountered gunfire immediately

upon responding to a 911 call at a home on Canton Street in Providence, Rhode

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Island. A heavily intoxicated defendant fired numerous shots from an AR-15 ghost1

rifle at Officer Savage’s police cruiser, some striking the vehicle. The 911 call was

placed by defendant’s girlfriend, Stephanie Perez (Perez), whom defendant had

physically assaulted prior to the phone call. After fleeing, defendant was later found

hiding at his mother’s house, where he was arrested. On January 10, 2022, defendant

was indicted on ten charges related to the events of August 11. The charges included

assault with intent to murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, discharge of a

firearm while in commission of a crime of violence, two counts of possession of a

firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence, unlawful possession

of a stolen firearm, possession of a ghost gun, and three charges 2 relating to the

assault upon Perez. The state later notified defendant of the state’s intent to treat

defendant as a habitual offender.

At around 4:00 o’clock on the morning in question, defendant and Perez began

an argument, which quickly escalated to a violent encounter. The defendant

strangled Perez to the point where she could not breathe. As defendant disengaged

from Perez, she reached for her phone and dialed 911. Perez did not press the send

1
G.L. 1956 § 11-47-2(8) defines a “ghost gun” to be “a firearm, including a frame
or receiver, that lacks a unique serial number engraved or cased in metal alloy on the
frame or receiver by a licensed manufacturer, maker, or importer under federal law
* * *.”
2
The grand jury indicted defendant for assault by strangulation, and two counts of
assault with a dangerous weapon.
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button on her phone because she feared that defendant would make good on a prior

promise that he would rather shoot at police than go back to prison. 3 After this,

defendant retrieved his rifle and struck Perez three times with it. During the struggle,

the 911 call went through. The defendant then exited the home with the rifle to wait

for police.

Officer Savage responded to the call and immediately saw defendant holding

the rifle on the front porch of defendant’s dwelling. The defendant began firing at

Officer Savage’s car, causing him to reverse his vehicle. After firing thirteen shots,

two of which hit Officer Savage’s cruiser, defendant fled back to the home. He was

later apprehended at his mother’s home. A search of defendant’s residence resulted

in police recovering an AR-15 rifle, an extended magazine for the firearm, a stolen

pistol, and ammunition.

On January 17, 2023, defendant pled guilty to eight of the ten charges filed

against him, with the state dismissing the other two counts. As part of his plea,

defendant acknowledged that he was a habitual offender and that he had violated his

probation in two other cases. At the change-of-plea hearing, the sentencing justice

3
The defendant avers that he does not recall stating an intent to engage in a shootout
with police. At oral argument, defendant claimed that this statement could not have
formed intent to murder because he considered it to be more indicative of
suicide-by-police.
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agreed to sentence defendant to a term that could not exceed twenty years of

nonparolable time. A presentence report was prepared.

In his presentencing memorandum, defendant detailed his difficult upbringing

that led to legal troubles as a young person. The defendant’s criminal history

included a guilty plea for felony assault and discharging a firearm while committing

a crime of violence after he shot two bullets into a neighbor’s home. The defendant

also pled guilty to a drug-related offense that resulted in gun charges being

dismissed. The defendant was on probation from both cases on the date of the

incident. He appeared to have his life back on track when he met Perez, but things

changed. The defendant was informed that his eldest child was being abused by her

grandfather. Unable to cope with this in a healthy way, defendant reverted to

drinking alcohol. In an attempt to mitigate his actions, defendant offered the report

of a psychiatrist at sentencing, who diagnosed defendant with alcohol use disorder

and concluded that defendant was experiencing a blackout on the night in question.

In its presentencing memorandum, the state pointed to defendant’s extensive violent

criminal history, his abuse of alcohol, and his prohibition from possessing firearms.

At sentencing, the Superior Court imposed a sentence of seventy years with

thirty years to serve at the ACI. Ten of the thirty total years were to be nonparolable.

The sentencing justice recognized that defendant had a difficult life and that he had

taken steps to improve himself. However, the sentencing justice stated that

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defendant’s alcohol abuse on the night of the incident did not excuse his deliberate

decision to arm himself when he learned police would be arriving on the scene. The

sentencing justice also concluded that defendant must be held accountable for

targeting law enforcement. Following that rationale, the sentencing justice imposed

the sentence, one that fell below the cap defendant agreed to in the plea agreement.

Two months after sentencing, defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence

pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The

defendant argued that the sentencing justice did not sufficiently consider defendant’s

diminished capacity and other mitigating factors. The sentencing justice denied

defendant’s motion, noting defendant’s waiver of his right to file a Rule 35 motion

due to his guilty plea, and ultimately finding that defendant’s sentence was proper

considering the aggravating circumstances. The defendant timely filed the instant

appeal.

Standard of Review

“A motion to reduce a sentence under Rule 35 ‘is essentially a plea for

leniency.’” State v. Oliveira, 195 A.3d 1088, 1090 (R.I. 2018) (brackets omitted)

(quoting State v. Rivera, 64 A.3d 742, 745 (R.I. 2013)). “The motion is addressed

to the sound discretion of the trial justice, who may grant it if he or she decides on

reflection or on the basis of changed circumstances that the sentence originally

imposed was, for any reason, unduly severe.” Id. (quoting State v. Mlyniec, 78 A.3d

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769, 771 (R.I. 2013)). This Court has a “strong policy against interfering with a trial

justice’s discretion in sentencing matters,” and thus “our review of a trial justice’s

ruling on a Rule 35 motion is extremely limited * * *.” Rivera, 64 A.3d at 745

(quoting State v. Snell, 11 A.3d 97, 101 (R.I. 2011)). “Accordingly, we will interfere

with that discretion only in ‘rare instances when the trial justice has imposed a

sentence that is without justification and is grossly disparate from other sentences

generally imposed for similar offenses.’” Oliveira, 195 A.3d at 1090 (quoting

Rivera, 64 A.3d at 745). “The defendant has ‘the burden of showing that the

sentence imposed violated this standard.’” State v. Mendoza, 958 A.2d 1159, 1162

(R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Furtado, 774 A.2d 38, 39 (R.I. 2001)).

Discussion

The defendant first argues that his plea-agreement waiver of his right to file a

motion to reduce should not have been the sole reason to deny defendant’s motion.

Next, defendant takes issue with the sentencing justice’s consideration of a statement

concerning defendant’s purported intent to engage in a shootout with police over a

potential return to prison. He asserts that he has no recollection of stating these

words yet submits that the sentencing justice “put this false fact on the record at”

sentencing. Finally, defendant contends that the sentencing justice’s use of

defendant’s alleged statement amounted to a violation of due process.

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In its brief, the state argues that defendant’s guilty plea constitutes a waiver

of his right to file the motion to reduce the sentence. Further, the state submits that

the sentencing justice’s decision was correct because defendant’s motion lacked

merit. The state advances that it merely announced its intention to prove defendant’s

statement regarding a shootout with the police at trial and that the sentencing justice

did not impose the sentence as a result of this comment. Instead, the state points to

an abundance of evidence suggesting that defendant had the requisite intent to

support the sentence on the attempted-murder charge.

We must first note that defendant did not provide the Court with a transcript

of the hearing at which he entered his guilty plea. It was during this hearing that the

statement he challenges was purportedly made by the state, and this statement, he

alleges, was later relied on by the sentencing justice. Article I, Rule 11(a) of the

Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in part, “[p]romptly after

filing the notice of appeal the appellant shall comply with the provisions of Rule

10(b) or (c) and shall take any other action necessary to enable the clerk to assemble

and transmit the record.” DaSilva v. Smith, 325 A.3d 898, 898-99 (R.I. 2024) (mem.)

(quoting Small Business Loan Fund Corporation v. Gallant, 795 A.2d 531, 532 (R.I.

2002)). “In the absence of a transcript, this Court cannot determine how the trial

justice came to a decision or, in turn, whether the trial justice erred in coming to that

decision.” Id. at 899.

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Without the transcript, we are unable to fully determine what took place at the

change-of-plea hearing. Notwithstanding this failure, we have been clear that a

defendant bears a heavy burden in overcoming the determinations made on a motion

to reduce a sentence. Mendoza, 958 A.2d at 1162 (“This Court is ‘[loath] to interfere

with a trial justice’s discretionary resolution of a Rule 35 motion except in the rarest

of cases when the sentence is without justification.’”) (quoting State v. Smith, 676

A.2d 765, 767 (R.I. 1996)).

We are hard-pressed to conclude that the sentence was “without justification

and * * * grossly disparate from other sentences generally imposed for similar

offenses.” See Rivera, 64 A.3d at 745 (quoting Snell, 11 A.3d at 101). The defendant

claims that his due-process rights were violated, citing the sentencing justice’s

purported consideration of defendant’s preference for a shootout with police rather

than returning to prison. The defendant repeatedly notes in his brief that he does not

recall uttering these words, yet simultaneously labels any assertion that he made the

statement as “false.” However, we note that, in addition to the statement purportedly

being repeated by the state at the change-of-plea hearing, the statement also was in

a sentencing evaluation completed by defendant’s psychiatrist.

Whether or not he made the statement is of little moment; the sentence was

within the sentencing justice’s discretion, regardless of his purported remark. The

sentencing justice considered the mitigating factors that defendant presented to the

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Superior Court, including that defendant lived a “disjointed life” and that defendant

was abusing alcohol to cope with learning that his daughter was abused by her

grandfather. Notwithstanding these circumstances, defendant committed an

unprovoked attack on a police officer who was responding to an emergency call.

The defendant has a prior criminal history, including his involvement in another

shooting in which he nearly killed a neighbor.

Based upon the record before us, we are satisfied that the sentencing justice

fashioned a justified sentence based on the facts of this case. The sentencing justice

clearly took into account all of the evidence before him; indeed, he even sentenced

defendant to a term below the cap called for in the plea agreement. The record

reflects that defendant has a violent criminal history that culminated in a physical

altercation with his girlfriend and the attempted murder of a police officer. The

sentencing justice considered defendant’s drunken and fragile emotional state on the

day of the shooting and his troubled upbringing as part of the sentence and imposed

a penalty he deemed appropriate for this conduct.4 Therefore, we decline to disturb

the sentencing justice’s decision.

4
To the extent that defendant would like us to engage in a comparative sentence
analysis, we decline to do so. See State v. Chase, 9 A.3d 1248, 1255 (R.I. 2010)
(“This Court has recognized that a list of sentence comparisons is not adequate to
meet the heavy burden that a defendant must satisfy on a motion to reduce.”)
(quoting State v. Morris, 863 A.2d 1284, 1288-89 (R.I. 2004)).
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While we see no error in the Rule 35 determination, the Court has concerns

regarding the waiver contained in the plea form. When asked about the inclusion of

the Rule 35 waiver on the plea form at oral argument, the state noted that Rule 58 of

the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the use of forms found on

the Rhode Island Judiciary’s website. This Court does not view the fact that the

defendant placed a checkmark next to that particular provision on the plea form as

dispositive of the issue presented in this case.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

The papers may be returned to the Superior Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Luis Roman.

No. 2024-78-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/22-180AG)

Date Opinion Filed June 11, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Robert D. Krause

For State:

Brendan Patrick Sullivan
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:

Luis Roman, pro se