William Boggs v. Johnston Asphalt, LLC

Supreme Court

No. 2024-91-Appeal.
(KC 17-1266)

William Boggs :

v. :

Johnston Asphalt, LLC. :

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Supreme Court

No. 2024-91-Appeal.
(KC 17-1266)

William Boggs :

v. :

Johnston Asphalt, LLC. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, William Boggs, appeals from

the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Johnston Asphalt, LLC

(Johnston Asphalt). The judgment granting the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment was entered on February 27, 2024 in Kent County Superior Court. The

plaintiff timely appealed, arguing that there remained genuine issues of material fact

and that summary judgment was therefore improperly granted. The plaintiff

specifically contends that Johnston Asphalt owed a “third-party duty of care” to him

and that it is liable for the negligent maintenance of the vehicle that caused him

injury.

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the

parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be

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summarily decided. After considering the written and oral submissions of the parties

and after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown

and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument.

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the February 27, 2024 judgment of

the Superior Court.

I

Facts and Travel

The underlying facts of this case are largely drawn from plaintiff’s complaint,

which was filed on December 14, 2017; and, except for some factual aspects relative

to plaintiff’s claim about potential third-party liability stemming from his contention

about piercing the corporate veil, the pertinent facts are undisputed. In his

complaint, plaintiff alleges that, on August 9, 2016, in the course of his employment

with All States Asphalt, Inc. (All States), while he was involved in the process of

“transferring liquid asphalt from a tanker truck to a distribution truck” in

Framingham, Massachusetts, he was “sprayed” with liquid asphalt, resulting in

burns to his face and body and causing “disfigure[ement] and permanent injuries.”

As a result of that unfortunate event, plaintiff was transported to Brigham and

Women’s Hospital in Boston, where he was treated for his injuries.

On August 11, 2016, All States submitted a workers’ compensation claim with

respect to the August 9 incident. The claim was “accepted as compensable,” and

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plaintiff was compensated for the medical expenses and lost wages which resulted

from the August 9 incident. All States is not a defendant in this action.

The plaintiff’s complaint asserted that Johnston Asphalt “was negligent in

failing to properly repair, maintain, warn, and/or inspect the distribution truck” and

that, as a result of Johnston Asphalt’s negligence, plaintiff was injured, causing him

to incur medical expenses and suffer lost earning capacity.

In its answer to plaintiff’s complaint, Johnston Asphalt contended, inter alia,

that it was not legally responsible for the actions or inactions that caused plaintiff’s

injuries. It additionally asserted that, by virtue of the provisions of the Workers’

Compensation Act, specifically G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20, plaintiff was barred from

obtaining the relief that he sought in his complaint.

On October 5, 2023, Johnston Asphalt filed a motion for summary judgment.

In the memorandum filed in support thereof, it stated:

“Johnston Asphalt is a Rhode Island limited liability
company whose sole member, at the time of [plaintiff’s]
injury, was non-party All States Asphalt, Inc., * * * a
foreign corporation registered to do business in Rhode
Island. * * * Johnston Asphalt and All States are separate
entities, and employees of one are not simultaneously
employed by the other.”

Johnston Asphalt further stated that it leased to All States a space in property owned

by Johnston Asphalt, which space All States used as a repair shop. Johnston Asphalt

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added that one Michael Kelly was the sole full-time employee in that repair shop,

and it also stated:

“Kelly’s sole duty is as a mechanic servicing All States
vehicles that are brought to the [All States] Repair Shop
by All States employees. * * * Kelly is not employed by
Johnston Asphalt.”

Johnston Asphalt also indicated that Mr. Kelly’s status as an employee of All States

was confirmed by Craig Reed, the Chief Financial Officer of All States, when his

deposition was taken by plaintiff.

In moving for summary judgment, Johnston Asphalt argued (1) that plaintiff

would not be able to prove either that Johnston Asphalt owed any duty to plaintiff

to keep the truck which caused the injury free of defects or that Johnston Asphalt

was responsible for or exercised control over the truck; (2) that, even if Johnston

Asphalt had such a duty, plaintiff would not be able to prove that it breached the

duty; and (3) that plaintiff had not “put forward any evidence of a causal relationship

between his injuries [and] a supposed defect on [the truck].” Additionally, Johnston

Asphalt contended that it could not be held vicariously liable for any negligence on

the part of All States since All States was “statutorily immune” by virtue of the

Workers’ Compensation Act. The plaintiff filed an objection to Johnston Asphalt’s

motion for summary judgment.

On February 12, 2024, a hearing was held on Johnston Asphalt’s motion for

summary judgment, at which time Johnston Asphalt emphasized that it did not owe
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a duty in tort to plaintiff and that the truck involved in the August 9, 2016 incident

was “owned, operated, serviced, maintained, inspected and used exclusively * * *

by the plaintiff’s employer, All States Asphalt.” Johnston Asphalt further contended

that the “only relationship” between the two companies was that All States leased a

space in property owned by Johnston Asphalt. It added that no employee of Johnston

Asphalt has ever worked on trucks owned by All States and that maintenance of the

truck was carried out by employees of All States.

At the February 12 hearing, plaintiff pointed to a copy of a single piece of

mail1 that was sent by a representative of All States to Mr. Kelly at Johnston

Asphalt’s address; plaintiff contended that that item “create[ed] a question of fact as

to whether or not Mr. Kelly was an employee of [All States] or Johnston Asphalt.”

The plaintiff also contended that “the corporate veil should be shed” because

Johnston Asphalt did not “maintain[] corporate appearances.”

At a subsequent hearing on February 16, 2024, the hearing justice granted

Johnston Asphalt’s motion for summary judgment, noting that there was no evidence

that Johnston Asphalt “worked on” the truck and that the “evidence established that

the only person who worked on the truck was a Mr. Michael Kelly who was an

1
It is not entirely clear from the photographic exhibit in the record whether the
item mailed to Mr. Kelly was a letter or a package, but that ambiguity has no bearing
on the issues before us.

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employee of All States.” The hearing justice held that there were “no genuine issues

of material fact,” and he concluded that it was “clear that Johnston Asphalt owed no

duty to plaintiff under the facts and circumstances of this case.”

On February 27, 2024, there was an additional hearing to further address the

significance of the single piece of mail that was sent by a representative of All States

to Mr. Kelly at Johnston Asphalt’s address. The hearing justice noted that no

evidence had been presented indicating that the sender of the piece of mail believed

that Mr. Kelly was an employee of Johnston Asphalt, and he stated that there was no

evidence that Mr. Kelly had “anything to do with Johnston Asphalt.” Accordingly,

the hearing justice reaffirmed his decision to grant summary judgment in favor of

Johnston Asphalt. The plaintiff thereafter timely appealed.

II

Issues on Appeal

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred in granting

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argues that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Johnston Asphalt owed a duty to

plaintiff.

The plaintiff also contends (somewhat opaquely) that, since, according to him,

Johnston Asphalt and All States are owned by the same person, the trial court should

have pierced the corporate veil so as to reach the owner of those two entities. (It

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should be noted that said owner was not named as a defendant in this action.) In

addition, plaintiff also contends, even more opaquely, that the corporate veil of

Johnston Asphalt should be pierced because its “corporate organizational formation

* * * strips away the immunity sought for the negligent acts of its workers * * *.”

III

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo and applies

the same standards as the motion justice.” McAdam v. Grzelczyk, 911 A.2d 255, 259

(R.I. 2006) (quoting Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240, 1241 (R.I. 2006)). And

it is well established that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when, after viewing

the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no

genuine issue of material fact is evident from the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, and the

motion justice finds that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”

Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc., 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted). We have further stated that “summary judgment should enter

‘against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to the party’s case * * *.’” Lavoie v. North East Knitting Inc.,

918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986)). And we have also pointed out that “complete failure of proof concerning

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an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

Further, since this a negligence action, we are aware of the general principle

that “issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but

should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.” Gliottone v. Ethier, 870 A.2d

1022, 1028 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Rogers v. Peabody Coal Co., 342 F.2d 749, 751

(6th Cir. 1965)). Significantly, however, that principle is subject to an important

exception to the effect that “in the absence of a duty, ‘the trier of fact has nothing to

consider and a motion for summary judgment must be granted.’” Holley, 968 A.2d

at 274 (quoting Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987));

see also Ouch v. Khea, 963 A.2d 630, 633 (R.I. 2009). And it is a basic principle

that “[w]hether a defendant is under a legal duty in a given case is a question of law.”

Holley, 968 A.2d at 274.

IV

Analysis

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred in granting

Johnston Asphalt’s motion for summary judgment and that there are genuine issues

of material fact concerning whether Johnston Asphalt owed plaintiff a duty. He

contends that, if Mr. Kelly worked on the vehicle involved in the August 9, 2016

incident, Johnston Asphalt would have owed plaintiff a duty of care. The plaintiff

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contends that there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Kelly was

an employee of Johnston Asphalt. The plaintiff contends that the above-referenced

piece of mail addressed to Mr. Kelly at Johnston Asphalt’s address constituted

evidence that Johnston Asphalt and All States were not sufficiently separate business

entities and had a “lack of true corporate formality.” Additionally, plaintiff argues

that “genuine issues of material fact exist to establish * * * unity of interest as a basis

to pierce the corporate veil of Johnston Asphalt * * *.”

Johnston Asphalt contends that it did not owe plaintiff a duty of care. It states

that the “uncontradicted evidence” demonstrates that Johnston Asphalt was not the

owner of the vehicle at issue, and it further states that there was no evidence

presented that any employee of Johnston Asphalt ever repaired the truck. Johnston

Asphalt asserts that plaintiff’s claim was based on inadmissible hearsay and

speculation, and it notes that plaintiff failed to depose “[any] fact witnesses at

all * * *.”

In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party

must prove “by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact

and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions

or mere legal opinions.” Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 82

A.3d 527, 532 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Daniels v. Fluette, 64 A.3d 302, 304 (R.I. 2013)).

It is an affirmative duty of the party opposing summary judgment “to produce

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specific evidence demonstrating that summary judgment should be denied.” Estate

of Cassiere v. Cassiere, 246 A.3d 391, 397 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Brochu v. Santis,

939 A.2d 449, 452 (R.I. 2008)).

The plaintiff has not submitted any competent evidence to demonstrate that a

material issue of fact existed as to whether Mr. Kelly was an employee of Johnston

Asphalt when he performed maintenance on the vehicle at issue. The plaintiff points

to a single piece of mail having been sent to Mr. Kelly at Johnston Asphalt’s address

as evidence of his employment by the latter entity, but plaintiff did not submit any

evidence indicating that the sender of that piece of mail had reason to believe that

Mr. Kelly was an employee of Johnston Asphalt. The proffered evidence falls short

of demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact related to Mr. Kelly’s

employment.

With respect to motions for summary judgment, this Court has specifically

stated that “the party who opposes the motion carries the burden of proving by

competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest

on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.” Young

v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 557 (R.I. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

It is thus our view that the hearing justice did not err in finding that plaintiff

did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there were genuine issues of

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material fact as to the ownership and repair of the truck or as to the employer of Mr.

Kelly. Without evidence that Johnston Asphalt owned the truck or that Mr. Kelly

worked on the truck as an employee of Johnston Asphalt, the hearing justice

determined that Johnston Asphalt “owed no duty” to plaintiff. In reviewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, we do not

discern any genuine issues of material fact relative to plaintiff’s contention that

Johnston Asphalt owed him any duty in tort. Accordingly, the hearing justice did

not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. See Ouch, 963 A.2d at

633 (“Only when a party properly overcomes the duty hurdle in a negligence action

is he or she entitled to a factual determination on each of the remaining elements:

breach, causation, and damages.”); see also Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1252

(R.I. 2012) (“Even in the face of tragic consequences, liability for alleged negligent

conduct cannot attach to a defendant absent a recognized duty of care.”).

Finally, in view of the hearing justice’s well-reasoned conclusion that

Johnston Asphalt owed no duty to the plaintiff, coupled with the fact that All States

is statutorily immune, we perceive no error in the hearing justice’s conclusion that

there was no basis for resorting to the remedy of piercing the corporate veil. 2 It is

2
We would add that, even assuming arguendo that the corporate veil were to
be pierced to the extent that the owner of both Johnston Asphalt and All States was
to be treated as the employer of the plaintiff, G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20 of the Workers’
Compensation Act would still bar the plaintiff from obtaining compensation in
addition to that which he received pursuant to said Act.
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clear from the record that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating

a need for piercing the corporate veil. See Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 49 (R.I.

1999) (“The burden of proof in corporate-veil-piercing cases rests upon the party

asking the court to disregard the corporate entity and impose liability on some other

party.”).

V

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The record may be returned to that tribunal.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case William Boggs v. Johnston Asphalt, LLC

No. 2024-91-Appeal.
Case Number
(KC 17-1266)

Date Opinion Filed May 22, 2025

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III

Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen

For Plaintiff:

Timothy J. Robenhymer, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Matthew T. Oliverio, Esq.