Philippe L. de Vries v. Anthony L. Gaudiana, Jr.

Supreme Court

No. 2023-98-Appeal.
No. 2023-109-Appeal.
(P 22-2656M)

Philippe L. de Vries :

v. :

Anthony L. Gaudiana, Jr. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court

No. 2023-98-Appeal.
No. 2023-109-Appeal.
(P 22-2656M)

Philippe L. de Vries :

v. :

Anthony L. Gaudiana, Jr. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. In these consolidated appeals, the

petitioner, Philippe L. de Vries, appeals from a final order of the Family Court

granting the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent, Anthony L. Gaudiana, Jr.

The petitioner contends that the hearing justice erred in ruling that the Rhode Island

Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (specifically G.L. 1956 § 15-8.1-501) superseded the

petitioner’s common law claims for parentage and in dismissing his miscellaneous

petition “on the basis of res judicata.” The respondent cross-appeals from the entry

of an order denying his motion for attorneys’ fees. He asserts that the hearing justice

erred in ruling that his motion for attorneys’ fees was not timely and that the hearing

justice failed to conduct a hearing on his motion for attorneys’ fees. For the reasons

set forth herein, we affirm the orders of the Family Court.

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Facts

The instant case commenced on June 9, 2022, when petitioner filed a

miscellaneous petition in the Family Court concerning a child whose parents are

respondent and the late Christine Hasselbrock.1 The petitioner first met Ms.

Hasselbrock in 1998 at Brown University, where he was working on a research

project and where Ms. Hasselbrock was “employed as a temporary clerical worker

on the project.” The petitioner was twenty-five years older than Ms. Hasselbrock

and upon becoming “casual acquaintances,” he began to provide financial assistance

to her as well as serving “as a mentor and surrogate parent” to her for twenty-three

years. 2 The petitioner had a “platonic relationship” with Ms. Hasselbrock, and she

“often described [him] as her ‘Uncle’ to acquaintances.”

1
The facts are derived from the miscellaneous petition filed by petitioner on June 9,
2022, as is appropriate when ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(c). We note that although respondent’s motion was styled as a
motion to dismiss, it was heard after respondent had filed his answer and the
pleadings had closed; respondent’s motion is thus more appropriately considered a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. Nevertheless, when filed by a defendant,
“the same test is applicable to both[,]” Chariho Regional School District v. Gist, 91
A.3d 783, 787 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Collins v. Fairways Condominiums Association,
592 A.2d 147, 148 (R.I. 1991)); therefore, we “assume the allegations in the petition
are true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lacera v.
Department of Children, Youth, and Families, 272 A.3d 1064, 1067 (R.I. 2022).
2
The petitioner alleged that he made tuition payments so that Ms. Hasselbrock
would be able “to get a GED, attend a secretarial school, a CNA course, and classes
at CCRI.” The petitioner further alleged that he provided Ms. Hasselbrock with a
cell phone and a car, that he paid her healthcare expenses because she lacked health
insurance, and that he provided assistance with issues involving her landlord and
roommates.
-2-
In 2013 petitioner, who resided in New Hampshire, purchased a house in

Scituate, Rhode Island (the Scituate house), so that Ms. Hasselbrock would “have a

place to live.” The petitioner allowed Ms. Hasselbrock to live in the house “rent free

and [he] paid her utilities.” In 2015 Ms. Hasselbrock informed petitioner that “she

was pregnant as a result of a relationship with [respondent] * * *.” Ms. Hasselbrock

informed petitioner that respondent did not have a full-time job, that he had two

children from a previous marriage, and that he was not able to financially support

the child. On June 14, 2015, Ms. Hasselbrock gave birth to a son, the child at issue

in this case, and did not put respondent’s name on the birth certificate. Upon the

birth of the child, petitioner “provided sufficient resources” to Ms. Hasselbrock—

providing for diapers, a car seat, cribs, and formula, as well as funding for childhood

development programs. The petitioner prohibited respondent from living at the

Scituate house; nevertheless, on several of petitioner’s visits, he discovered that

respondent was on the property.

The petitioner regularly visited Ms. Hasselbrock and her son at the Scituate

house and stayed there overnight. The petitioner read books to the child, played with

him, and went on outings with him. He occasionally called the child and spoke with

Ms. Hasselbrock daily. The petitioner celebrated some holidays and birthdays with

Ms. Hasselbrock and the child. As the child grew older, petitioner “continued to

-3-
purchase provisions” for Ms. Hasselbrock and paid the child’s tuition at a private

school.

Around March 2018, Ms. Hasselbrock was diagnosed with stage IV lung

cancer. The petitioner paid for her medical expenses, drove her to doctors’

appointments, and communicated with her doctors. On February 1, 2021, he moved

to Little Compton, Rhode Island, to be closer to Ms. Hasselbrock and the child.

Sadly, Ms. Hasselbrock passed away on February 19, 2021.

When petitioner visited the Scituate house after Ms. Hasselbrock’s death, he

discovered that respondent had created a bedroom in the basement, added a “gun

firing range” on the property, “removed many items from the house that did not

belong to him,” and made other alterations to the house. The respondent “changed

the combination to the front door lock on [petitioner’s] house, replaced the garage

door opener so that [petitioner] could not enter the house and would not allow

[petitioner] to enter the house without 48 hour written notice.” On April 22, 2021,

petitioner evicted respondent, and consequently the child, from the Scituate house.

The respondent has not allowed petitioner to see the child since that time.

Travel

In October 2021, petitioner filed a prior action, an amended verified petition

that asserted several claims including a statutory claim to be declared a de facto

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parent of the child pursuant to § 15-8.1-501.3 The amended verified petition also

asserted several related common law claims including a claim for declaratory relief

stating that petitioner was the child’s de facto parent under the common law. On

January 26, 2022, the first hearing justice ruled on respondent’s motion to dismiss

the first action. She questioned whether petitioner had standing to bring the action,

as he had never resided with the child.4 Ultimately, she concluded that petitioner’s

verified petition should be dismissed due to lack of standing. The first hearing

3
The travel of the first action is derived from allegations contained in petitioner’s
miscellaneous petition in the present case as well as the transcript of the first hearing
justice’s bench decision disposing of the first action, which was referenced in
respondent’s amended answer and attached as an exhibit to petitioner’s opposition
to the motion to dismiss the present case. The second hearing justice relied upon
this bench decision in dismissing the case based upon res judicata. While ordinarily
a court may not consider documents outside of the pleadings when ruling on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, there is “a narrow exception for documents
the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records;
for documents central to plaintiffs’ claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to
in the complaint.” Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 160 A.3d
970, 973 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Alternative Energy Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)). We are satisfied that the transcript
of the first hearing justice’s bench decision in the first action is a document
“susceptible to judicial notice” such that it falls under the “official public records”
exception to the aforementioned rule. Goodrow v. Bank of America, N.A., 184 A.3d
1121, 1126 (R.I. 2018). The second hearing justice could therefore consider the
bench decision on respondent’s motion to dismiss.
4
Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-8.1-502(c), the Family Court must determine whether
the person seeking to be adjudicated a de facto parent has standing to proceed with
the action by presenting a prima facie case in his or her pleadings based on the
criteria for de facto parentage set forth under § 15-8.1-501(a). Pursuant to
§ 15-8.1-501(a)(1)(i), a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that he or she “resided with the child as a regular member of the child’s household
for a significant period of time[.]”
-5-
justice added that her role was limited to ruling only upon the statutory de facto

parentage claim under § 15-8.1-501. The first hearing justice indicated that, if there

were an alternative theory that petitioner would like to advance with respect to his

verified petition, then that “would be heard on the miscellaneous calendar.”

Specifically, the first hearing justice stated:

“[A]nything else that would be among the other common
law claims that you have described, you are certainly not
precluded from pursuing them. It’s just that I have not
been given that assignment, and it is the Chief [Judge] who
assigns the category of cases that each of us hear. So of
course you’re not precluded. I think that you are well able
* * * to proceed elsewhere on those common law claims,
and of course you have every right to do so. * * * He’s not
precluded from proceeding on the miscellaneous calendar
if you feel that he has bona fide claims under the common
law * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the first hearing justice dismissed the amended verified petition and directed

petitioner to refile his common law claims.

On June 9, 2022, petitioner filed the present action in Family Court, entitled

“Miscellaneous Petition for Declaratory and Other Relief.” 5 In the new

miscellaneous petition, petitioner requested a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to

the common law of Rhode Island, he was a “de facto parent, an unrelated caregiver,

a de facto grandparent, and/or a de facto relative of [the child].” Alternatively,

5
The June 2022 action entitled “Miscellaneous Petition for Declaratory and Other
Relief” is a completely separate action from the amended verified petition filed in
October of 2021.
-6-
petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that he stood “in loco parentis or in loco

grandparentis to” the child or, that he was a parent by estoppel of the child. The

petitioner further sought visitation with the child, appointment of a guardian ad

litem, and a request for a referral to DCYF with respect to respondent’s conduct.6

The respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The respondent

contended that petitioner did not have standing to bring the action and that the

Family Court did not have jurisdiction over the claims set forth in the miscellaneous

petition. The respondent further contended (1) that the “new Uniform Parentage Act

supersedes, and occupies the entire space with regard to de facto parenthood in

Rhode Island”; and (2) that “petitioner does not allege to meet the criteria necessary

to be considered a ‘common law de facto parent.’” 7

On November 10, 2022, the second hearing justice issued a decision on the

motion to dismiss without hearing oral argument. He noted that the first hearing

justice had dismissed petitioner’s UPA claim but that she had not decided

6
The petitioner’s requests for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and for a
referral to DCYF are not the subject of the present appeal because petitioner has
offered no argument challenging the dismissal of those claims. See McGarry v.
Pielech, 108 A.3d 998, 1005 (R.I. 2015) (holding that “failure to raise and develop
[an issue] in its briefs constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal”).
7
In his motion to dismiss, respondent also referenced correspondence from the
“child’s therapist,” which indicated in part that the child “does not want to see the
[petitioner].” The second hearing justice did not rely upon this correspondence in
granting respondent’s motion to dismiss. Because it is a document that falls outside
of the pleadings, we also disregard it, relying solely on the allegations in petitioner’s
miscellaneous petition. See, e.g., Goodrow, 184 A.3d at 1126.
-7-
petitioner’s common law claims. He further stated he was treating respondent’s

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, he clarified

that the documents he had reviewed consisted of the pleadings and “what ha[d]

already been decided by [the first hearing justice].”

Turning to the merits, the second hearing justice determined that he was

“unable to find that the common law right would [supersede] the Parentage Act” as

it pertains to de facto parentage. Specifically, he found that the “Parentage Act is

the controlling law of the land in the State of Rhode Island as it pertains to petitions

* * * claiming that a party is, in fact, a de facto parent.” Regarding petitioner’s other

claims, the second hearing justice was “unable to determine that the plaintiff is

claiming any right that is not contemplated by the [UPA].” He reasoned that,

because the claims in the case before him were the same as those alleged in the

previous case and because the “controversy before [the court] falls under the Act,”

the claims should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata. The second hearing

justice further concluded that he would not entertain the other counts in petitioner’s

miscellaneous petition given that he did not feel they were proper claims. He

therefore found that there were no justiciable issues before him and determined that

issuing declaratory relief would thus be improper.

Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. In the motion,

respondent asserted that petitioner’s two actions were filed solely to harass

-8-
respondent and to hurt him financially. He alleged that the “frivolous Complaints

and Motions” had caused him to incur $7,500 in attorneys’ fees. On February 22,

2023, a decision was issued on respondent’s motion for attorneys’ fees. With respect

to that motion, the second hearing justice stated:

“Okay, let’s first -- let me address the issue of attorney’s
fees. I think the appropriate time to file that motion would
have been before the hearing. I’ve completed the hearing,
and I’ve made a ruling on the hearing; and this case is
closed and no further issues. So, I’m not going to hear a
motion on attorney’s fees based on that.”

He later clarified his ruling, stating that “there was no evidence elicited during the

trial for attorney’s fees. So, that issue should have and could have been dealt with

then, and it wasn’t; therefore, the [Family] Court won’t entertain it now.”

Subsequently, an order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss and an order

denying respondent’s motion for attorneys’ fees were entered, and the parties filed

timely notices of appeal.

Standards of Review

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Rule 12(c) of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure

provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay

the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 8 R. Dom. Rel. P. 12(c).

8
As stated supra, respondent’s motion is more appropriately considered a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, while the second hearing justice appeared
-9-
When filed by a defendant, a Rule 12(c) motion is “tantamount to a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, and the same test is applicable to both.” 9 Crenshaw v. State, 227 A.3d 67,

71 (R.I. 2020) (deletion omitted) (quoting Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire

Insurance Company, 160 A.3d 970, 973 (R.I. 2017)). “In reviewing a hearing

justice’s decision with respect to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court

examines the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, assumes them to be

true, and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Palazzo v. Alves,

944 A.2d 144, 149 (R.I. 2008). Testing the sufficiency of the complaint is the sole

function of a motion to dismiss; therefore, granting a motion to dismiss is

“appropriate ‘when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not

be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in

support of the plaintiff’s claim.’” Id. at 149-50 (quoting Ellis v. Rhode Island Public

to state that he would treat the motion as one for summary judgment, he explicitly
clarified that he had reviewed the pleadings and the first hearing justice’s decision.
Accordingly, the second hearing justice limited his review to the pleadings and
documents that fell within the narrow, official public records exception to the
general rule that documents outside the pleadings are not to be considered on a Rule
12(c) motion. See Goodrow, 184 A.3d at 1126. As such, there was no need to
convert the motion to one for summary judgment.
9
Although we have only previously interpreted Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure, the relevant language of Rules 12(b) and 12(c) of the Rules
of Domestic Relations Procedure is identical to the corresponding rules of civil
procedure. We, thus, apply the same standard to both. See Lacera, 272 A.3d at 1067
(applying the same standard for reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion filed under the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure to a 12(b)(6) motion filed under the Rules of
Domestic Relations Procedure).
- 10 -
Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055, 1057 (R.I. 1991)). However, we review questions

of law—such as issues of statutory interpretation and of justiciability—de novo.

Lacera v. Department of Children, Youth, and Families, 272 A.3d 1064, 1067 (R.I.

2022) (noting that issues of justiciability are reviewed de novo); Epic Enterprises

LLC v. 10 Brown & Howard Wharf Condominium Association, 253 A.3d 383, 387

(R.I. 2021) (noting that issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo).

Moreover, “in reviewing the trial justice’s legal determinations, this Court has a

prerogative to affirm a determination of a trial justice on grounds different from

those enunciated in his or her decision * * *.” Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v.

Kenyon, 312 A.3d 475, 480 (R.I. 2024) (quoting Miller v. Metropolitan Property

and Casualty Insurance Co., 111 A.3d 332, 339 (R.I. 2015)).

Attorneys’ Fees

“[T]he issue of whether there exists a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees

generally is legal in nature, and therefore our review of such a ruling is de novo.”

Danforth v. More, 129 A.3d 63, 72 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d

1, 8 (R.I. 2015)). However, “[i]f it is determined that there is an adequate legal basis

for such an award, then we review a trial justice’s decision awarding or denying

attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.” Id.

- 11 -
Analysis

The petitioner first contends that the second hearing justice erred “when he

dismissed the [miscellaneous petition] on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata

and ruling that it prevented him from hearing [petitioner’s] re-pled common law

claims ‘in that they’ve already been decided by [the first hearing justice].’”

Specifically, petitioner argues that the first hearing justice’s “dismissal of the first

action could not have involved the several common law claims which [the first

hearing justice] expressly did not rule on.”

The petitioner’s arguments highlight the problematic and disconcerting travel

of this case. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss petitioner’s initial verified

petition, the first hearing justice expressly stated that she was confined to hear

petitioner’s statutory de facto parentage claim under § 15-8.1-501 by virtue of the

assignment she had been given by the Chief Judge. Therefore, as a result of what

she characterized as a “cameo assignment,” the first hearing justice expressly told

the parties that any alternative theories that petitioner might wish to advance with

respect to his verified petition “would be heard on the miscellaneous calendar.” She

thus directed the closure of the case and instructed petitioner to refile.

While we recognize that G.L. 1956 § 8-10-14 gives the Chief Judge of the

Family Court “supervision and control of the calendars and of the assignment of the

justices[,]” each justice of the Family Court is vested with the authority

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“to hear and determine all petitions for * * * support and
custody of children * * * all motions for allowance for
support and educational costs of children attending high
school at the time of their eighteenth (18th) birthday and
up to ninety (90) days after high school graduation, but in
no case beyond their nineteenth (19th) birthday;
enforcement of any order or decree granting alimony
and/or child support, and/or custody and/or visitation of
any court of competent jurisdiction of another state;
modification of any order or decree granting alimony
and/or custody and/or visitation of any court of competent
jurisdiction of another state on the ground that there has
been a change of circumstances; modification of any order
or decree granting child support of any court of competent
jurisdiction of another state * * *; complaints for support
of parents and children * * *.” Section 8-10-3(a).

Therefore, no assignment to a specific calendar can divest a Family Court

justice of the authority to hear additional related claims contained within the same

petition, whether based on statute or common law, that fall under the jurisdiction of

the court. This Court has continuously directed that the bifurcation of certain matters

in the Family Court shall cease, see, e.g., Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 228

(R.I. 2006); Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 1094 n.2 (R.I. 2005), as it

unfairly requires the parties to engage in a substantial amount of duplicative

litigation and has an unnecessary negative impact upon the court’s time and

resources. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable under these

circumstances and we proceed to address petitioner’s claims.

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The UPA and Common Law Claims

On the merits, petitioner contends that the UPA does not supersede his

common law claims. He specifically states that “[a] simple reading of the Act clearly

demonstrates that the General Assembly did not intend for § 501 to extinguish

common law de facto parentage and the other common law claims [petitioner] pled

in his verified complaint.”

This Court has previously stated that “[l]egislative enactments will ‘be

construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made

that purpose clear.’” State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 814 (R.I. 2007) (brackets

omitted) (quoting Knowles v. Ponton, 96 R.I. 156, 159, 190 A.2d 4, 6 (1963)); see

also Souza v. O’Hara, 121 R.I. 88, 91, 395 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1978) (emphasizing

the “well-established principle that the abrogation of a common-law right by statute

requires that the legislative intent to do so be clearly expressed”); Town of North

Kingstown v. North Kingstown Teachers Association, 110 R.I. 698, 703 n.5, 297

A.2d 342, 344 n.5 (1972) (“In this state we follow the rule that statutes in derogation

of the common law should be strictly construed.”). We have also emphatically stated

that “it will be presumed [that] the [L]egislature intended to make only such

alteration in the common law as the language of the statute naturally and necessarily

indicates.” Hoffman v. Louis D. Miller & Co., 83 R.I. 284, 288-89, 115 A.2d 689,

691 (1955). In addition, when a “statute is in derogation of the common law * * *

- 14 -
[it] must be understood as affecting no change in that law beyond what is clearly

indicated in express terms or by necessary implication.” Da Costa v. Rose, 70 R.I.

163, 168, 37 A.2d 794, 797 (1944).

In 2020 the General Assembly enacted the UPA, which deals with the

“adjudication and determination of parentage in the state of Rhode Island.” Section

15-8.1-103(a). Section 15-8.1-103(c) of the UPA, which explicitly delineates the

Act’s scope, provides: “This chapter does not create, enlarge, or diminish parental

rights or responsibilities under other laws of the state of Rhode Island or the

equitable powers of the courts, except as provided in this chapter.” (Emphasis

added.)

The petitioner understandably directs our attention to the UPA’s use of the

word “diminish,” arguing that the statute thereby “clearly indicates that existing

rights were not supplanted or extinguished by the enactment of the [UPA].” The

petitioner further avers that nothing in the UPA specifies that the General Assembly

“intended that it would replace or repeal other long existing common law remedies

for establishing parental and related rights.” However, in so stating, petitioner

overlooks § 15-8.1-103(c)’s concluding language: “except as provided in this

chapter.” The just-quoted definitive language makes it clear that the General

Assembly intended for certain provisions in the statute at issue to supersede some

portions of the common law.

- 15 -
Section 15-8.1-501 quite clearly supersedes any common law de facto

parentage claim that petitioner has advanced. Section 15-8.1-501(a)(1) provides:

“In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of an
individual who claims to be a de facto parent of the child,
if there is only one other individual who is a parent or has
a claim to parentage of the child, the court shall adjudicate
the individual who claims to be a de facto parent to be a
parent of the child if the individual demonstrates by clear
and convincing evidence that:

“(i) The individual resided with the child as a
regular member of the child’s household for a
significant period of time;

“(ii) The individual engaged in consistent
caretaking of the child;

“(iii) The individual undertook full and permanent
responsibilities of a parent of the child without
expectation of financial compensation;

“(iv) The individual held out the child as the
person’s child;

“(v) The individual established a bonded and
dependent relationship with the child which is
parental in nature;

“(vi) The individual and another parent of the child
fostered or supported the bonded and dependent
relationship required under subsection (a)(1)(v) of
this section; and

“(vii) Continuing the relationship between the
individual and the child is in the best interests of the
child.”

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This statutory provision leaves this Court with no doubt that it was intended to

supersede common law de facto parentage claims.10 The explicit and unequivocally

specific nature of the statute plainly reveals that, by necessary implication, the UPA

does supersede common law de facto parentage claims. Moreover, while petitioner

requests to be declared a “parent by [estoppel],” the estoppel doctrine “does not serve

to create a right that does not otherwise exist by reason of [petitioner’s] alleged

parental relationship with the child * * *.” Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968

(R.I. 2000). Therefore, if petitioner’s de facto parentage claim was not superseded

by the UPA, he could have used the estoppel doctrine to prevent respondent from

denying the alleged father-child relationship between petitioner and the child, but he

cannot assert “parent by [estoppel]” as an independent cause of action. See id.

Although it is our view that the UPA supersedes common law de facto

parentage claims, we are also of the opinion that the UPA does not explicitly

abrogate all common law claims relative to parentage (in the broad sense of that

term). See Da Costa, 70 R.I. at 168, 37 A.2d at 797 (stating that if a “statute is in

derogation of the common law * * * [it] must be understood as affecting no change

in that law beyond what is clearly indicated in express terms or by necessary

implication”). In addition to his common law de facto parentage claim, petitioner

10
It should be noted that Article 5 of G.L. 1956 chapter 8.1 of title 15 is entitled “De
Facto Parentage.”
- 17 -
has set forth several other common law claims. The petitioner is further requesting

(1) declaratory relief proclaiming him an “unrelated caregiver,” “de facto

grandparent,” or “de facto relative,” of the child or one who stands “in loco

grandparentis” to the child; and (2) visitation with the child based on his

“grandparent-like or relative-like relationship with [the child] * * *.” These

particular common law claims have neither been formally recognized nor rejected

by this Court.

Even if this Court were to recognize a claim for “de facto grandparent” or “in

loco grandparentis” we are nevertheless confronted with the fact, as acknowledged

in the miscellaneous petition, that respondent, the child’s father, has maintained from

the inception of this case that he does not wish for the child to have any contact or

relationship with petitioner. This Court has stated that “an important presumption

exists that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.” Keenan v. Somberg,

792 A.2d 47, 50 (R.I. 2002). So long as a parent is fit, there is “no reason for the

State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability

of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s

children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (plurality opinion).

Therefore, “[w]e have held * * * that ‘a party who seeks visitation with a child must

overcome the otherwise applicable presumption in favor of honoring a fit custodial

parent’s determination not to allow such visitation.’” MacTavish-Thurber v. Gauvin,

- 18 -
202 A.3d 232, 239 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1254

(R.I. 2009)). To do so, a party seeking visitation as a grandparent must either

establish that the parent is unfit or establish by clear and convincing evidence that

the parent’s decision to refuse grandparent visitation was unreasonable. Id. at

239-40; see also G.L. 1956 § 15-5-24.3(a) (setting forth the requirements for

grandparent visitation).

After a careful review of the miscellaneous petition filed by petitioner, and

after reading it as favorably to petitioner as possible, it is our conclusion that the

petition is devoid of any actual factual allegation that respondent is a custodial parent

who lacks the basic capacity to make decisions in the best interests of his child.11

Moreover, the miscellaneous petition is devoid of factual allegations attacking the

reasonableness of respondent’s decision to deny petitioner visitation. Instead, the

factual allegations in the miscellaneous petition—i.e., that depriving the child of a

relationship with petitioner has violated Ms. Hasselbrock’s wishes, taken the child

away from his home and his community, and contravened the child’s wishes—all

touch on factors a court might consider if it were determining whether visitation with

11
We are aware that petitioner, in his miscellaneous petition, has made a general
request for a DCYF referral regarding respondent. However, that request by
petitioner is bereft of any specific, fact-based allegations of parental unfitness
sufficient to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Rules of Domestic
Relations Procedure. Further, as noted supra, petitioner has failed to advance any
arguments on appeal challenging the dismissal of his request for a DCYF referral.
- 19 -
petitioner was in the child’s best interests. See Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909,

913-14 (R.I. 1990) (outlining the factors a court must consider in weighing the best

interests of a child). However, even taking the allegations of petitioner’s

miscellaneous petition as true, petitioner has been unable to clear the threshold

hurdle of alleging that respondent is unfit or that his decision to deny visitation was

unreasonable in order to overcome the legal presumption that respondent’s decision

to deny visitation was in the child’s best interests, which in turn might permit

petitioner to litigate his alternative common law claims for grandparent visitation.12

MacTavish-Thurber, 202 A.3d at 239-40. Thus, it is our view that he is not presently

entitled to pursue those common law claims.

The petitioner’s only remaining claims are his request for a declaratory

judgment proclaiming him an “unrelated caregiver” or a “de facto relative” of the

child and his claim for visitation based upon those statuses. However, even

assuming without deciding that such claims were recognized under Rhode Island

law and that petitioner’s claims were meritorious, this Court is of the opinion that

petitioner lacks standing to pursue such claims.

Standing may be raised by this Court sua sponte. In re 38 Studios Grand

Jury, 225 A.3d 224, 232 (R.I. 2020). Even when seeking declaratory relief, a

12
It shall be borne in mind that this Court has never recognized or rejected the
viability of petitioner’s alternative claims of “de facto grandparent” or “in loco
grandparentis”—nor are we taking either step today.
- 20 -
plaintiff’s claim must be justiciable; thus, the plaintiff must have “standing to

pursue the action and some legal hypothesis which will entitle the plaintiff to real

and articulable relief.” Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008) (quoting

McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 226 (R.I. 2005)). “A plaintiff has standing

where that plaintiff has alleged ‘injury in fact, economic or otherwise.’” Lacera,

272 A.3d at 1068 (quoting Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317). In the instant case,

petitioner’s purported standing to seek declaratory relief and visitation stems from

respondent denying petitioner visitation with the child. However, “visitation rights

may be granted to relatives other than parents only when specifically authorized

by statute.” In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359, 1360 (R.I. 1983); see also Gushlaw v.

Rohrbaugh, 673 A.2d 63, 64 (R.I. 1996) (holding that a child’s grandparents lacked

standing to seek visitation with their grandchild when they did not strictly meet the

requirements of the grandparent visitation statute).

The petitioner has failed to direct the Court to a single statute that would

grant him the legal right to seek visitation with the child even if he were declared

an “unrelated caregiver” or a “de facto relative” of the child. The petitioner

contends that this Court recognized his “unrelated caregiver” claim in Rubano, but

he takes a quote from Rubano out of context. When this Court recognized that an

“unrelated caregiver can develop a parent-like relationship with the child that could

be substantial enough to warrant legal recognition of certain parental rights and

- 21 -
responsibilities,” the aforementioned “unrelated caregiver” was in reference to a

de facto parent. See Rubano, 759 A.2d at 975. Therefore, in Rubano, we did not

recognize an “unrelated caregiver[’s]” claim to parental rights; instead, we

recognized the right of a de facto parent to establish parental rights to a child

despite the person’s lack of a biological relationship with the child. Id. However,

as explained supra, petitioner’s common law de facto parentage claim was

superseded by the UPA. Without statutory authority to seek visitation, petitioner

has no legally protected interest through which he can maintain his “unrelated

caregiver” and “de facto relative” claims for visitation. In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d at

1360. Moreover, because petitioner is seeking to be declared an “unrelated

caregiver” or a “de facto relative” specifically so that he can seek visitation, he also

lacks a legally protected interest in maintaining his declaratory judgment claim to

be proclaimed as such. 13 See Lacera, 272 A.3d at 1069 (holding that a grandparent

lacked standing to seek declaratory relief related to his biological grandchild when

the termination of his son’s parental rights in the child deprived him of a legally

13
The petitioner clarified in his objection to respondent’s motion to dismiss that if
“one or all of the common law claim[s]” for declaratory relief were granted, then he
would be “entitled to visitation under [G.L. 1956] § 15-5-16(d)(1) and/or [§]
15-5-24.3[,]” the statutes authorizing parent and grandparent visitation respectively.
Notably, he failed to cite to any statute that authorized “unrelated caregiver[s]” or
“de facto relative[s]” to seek visitation.
- 22 -
protected interest in obtaining declaratory relief). Therefore, this Court affirms the

dismissal of those claims due to petitioner’s lack of standing.

Attorneys’ Fees

With respect to the respondent’s cross-appeal concerning his desire to be

awarded attorneys’ fees, we would simply comment that we perceive absolutely no

basis in the record for such an award in this case. While it is regrettable that no

hearing was conducted in the Family Court regarding the respondent’s motion for

such fees, we do not believe that any purpose would be served by remanding this

matter to the Family Court for such a hearing. The petitioner has engaged in no

frivolous or otherwise improper conduct by coming to court to litigate several claims

premised on a recent statute and on several common law theories upon which this

Court has never passed. The American Rule equally applies in such

circumstances. See Shine, 119 A.3d at 8 (noting this Court’s staunch adherence to

the American rule); Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 2007) (reaffirming

the “Court’s staunch adherence to the ‘American rule’ that requires each litigant to

pay its own attorney’s fees absent statutory authority or contractual liability”).

Therefore, we affirm the Family Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the orders of the Family

Court. The papers shall be returned to the Family Court.

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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Philippe L. de Vries v. Anthony L. Gaudiana, Jr.

No. 2023-98-Appeal. (P 22-2656M)
Case Number
No. 2023-109-Appeal.

Date Opinion Filed August 1, 2024

Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal Providence County Family Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Merola

For Petitioner:

David J. Strachman, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Respondent:

Edward C. Roy, Jr., Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)