Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.

454 	May 18, 2021 	No. 19
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION
TESORO LOGISTICS
NORTHWEST PIPELINE LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Defendant.
(TC 5252 (Control); TC 5771;
TC 5292; TC 5313; TC 5350; TC 5395)
On Defendant Department of Revenue’s (department’s) motion for reconsider-
ation, the department argued that, under ORS 308.142(1)(b), any increase in the
Oregon-allocated value of the worldwide valuation unit constituted “new prop-
erty” that should have been included in the maximum assessed value of the prop-
erty at issue; the word “value” in the statute is equivalent to the word “property.”
Plaintiff, in response, asserted that only the addition of property with an Oregon
situs constituted “property” or “new property” for Measure 50 purposes. After
considering, the text, context, and limited legislative history of ORS 308.142(1)(b),
the court concluded that the unit of property for Measure 50 purposes consists
only of the property—real property, tangible personal property, or intangible
property—sitused in Oregon. Plaintiff did not add any Oregon-sitused new prop-
erty or new improvements as of the tax year at issue; therefore as concluded in
the original decision, ORS 308.162(1) precluded revaluation of the MAV.
Oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
was held remotely on May 12, 2021.
Cynthia M. Fraser, Foster Garvey PC, Portland, filed the
response and argued the cause for Plaintiff.
Marilyn J. Harbur, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Salem, filed the motion and argued
the cause for Defendant.
Decision rendered May 18, 2021.
ROBERT T. MANICKE, Judge.
Defendant Department of Revenue (the depart-
ment) has filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the
court to reconsider or clarify its Order Granting Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 19,
2021. Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline, LLC I v. Dept.

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	455
of Rev., 24 OTR 439 (2021). Plaintiff (taxpayer) resists the
department’s Motion for Reconsideration and asks the court
to make a factual finding that no adjustments are required
to the MAV for tax year 2014-15 as determined in the court’s
order.1
The order determines that “[s]ubject to any adjust-
ments that may be required for new property or new improve-
ments, the MAV of the Property in Plaintiff’s account [for tax
year 2014-15] is $10,786,200.” Tesoro I, 24 OTR at 453. The
department asserts that, as adjusted under the order, the
MAV is $45,839,200. 2 Taxpayer asserts that no adjustments
are required and that the MAV, therefore, is $10,786,200.
The department’s motion, and particularly its reply
brief, brings into sharper focus the department’s reliance on
its interpretation of ORS 308.142(1)(b):3
“For purposes of determining whether the assessed value
of property exceeds the property’s maximum assessed
value permitted under section 11, Article XI of the Oregon
Constitution:
“(1) 	‘Property’ means:
“(a) 	All property included within a single property tax
account; or
“(b) 	In the case of property that is centrally assessed
under ORS 308.505 to 308.665, the total statewide value of
all property assessed to a company or utility that is subject
to ORS 308.505 to 308.665.”
(Emphasis added.) The department asserts that, when
applying the order, this definition causes any increase in
the Oregon-allocated value of the worldwide valuation unit,
compared to the RMV assigned to Chevron’s account for tax
year 2013-14, to be “new property” that must be added to the
Property’s MAV. The department argues that this allocated
share of value was never part of Chevron’s account for tax
1 This order uses abbreviations and other defined terms in the court’s order
of February 19, 2021, Tesoro I, 24 OTR 439 (2021).
2 As noted below, this is an increase compared to the MAV the department
sought on summary judgment: $38,723,000.
3 Unless otherwise noted, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised
Statutes (ORS) are to 2013.

456 Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.
year 2013-14 and thus was not carried over (“changed”) to
taxpayer’s account under ORS 308.162(1). Therefore, accord-
ing to the department, even if ORS 308.162(1) had the “clear
practical effect”4 of preserving the 2013-14 MAV because
taxpayer acquired the entire centrally assessed “unit of
property” from Chevron, the fact that the Oregon share of
taxpayer’s valuation unit was worth more than the Oregon
share of Chevron’s valuation unit in the prior year required
the department to add additional new property to the
MAV, over and above the 2013-14 MAV applied to Chevron’s
account.
The department’s argument on summary judgment
was based on this same interpretation of the definition of
“property” under ORS 308.142(1)(b). Tesoro I, 24 OTR at 449.
However, the department reads the order as now requiring
the amount of the MAV increase to be recalculated in a manner
that raises the total MAV of the Property from $38,723,000,
as the department originally sought, to $45,839,200. 5 The
department also continues to maintain its original position
“that a new account was created for Tesoro’s property [and
that] this property value had no prior MAV.” Therefore, the
court reads the department’s Motion for Reconsideration as
seeking one of two alternatives: either a complete correction
of the order that sets the Property’s MAV at $38,723,000
based on the department’s original legal theory and compu-
tation, or a clarification that the MAV is $45,839,200 based
on the department’s understanding and application of the
4 DISH Network Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 364 Or 254, 285 n 32, 434 P3d 379
(2019).
5 The department’s original calculation treated the entire Property in tax-
payer’s account for tax year 2014-15 as “new property,” rejecting the notion that
ORS 308.162(1) required that the 2013-14 MAV be carried over to taxpayer’s
account. Because the parties stipulated that the Property had a 2014-15 RMV
of $38,723,000, and the changed property ratio under ORS 308.153(1)(b) was 1.0,
the department originally assigned the Property a 2014-15 MAV of $38,723,000
($38,723,000 x 1.0 = $38,723,000).
On reconsideration, the department reads the court’s order as requiring
taxpayer to (1) carry over the MAV assigned to Chevron for tax year 2013-14
($10,786,200) and (2) add to that MAV a “new property” value consisting of (a) the
Property’s RMV for tax year 2014-15 ($38,723,000), less (b) the amount shown as
the RMV in Chevron’s account for tax year 2013-14 ($3,670,000) multiplied by the
changed property ration of 1.0. The department thus asserts that the Property’s
2014-15 MAV is $45,839,200 ($10,786,200 + (($38,723,000 - $3,670,000) x 1.0)).
Id.

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	457
order. Both alternatives rely on the department’s interpre-
tation of ORS 308.142(1)(b).
Taxpayer contests the department’s premise, assert -
ing that only the addition of property with a situs in Oregon
could constitute “property” or “new property” for Measure
50 purposes. With its response on reconsideration, taxpayer
submitted a declaration, which the department has not con-
tested, alleging that the only property with a situs in Oregon
are lines of pipe that were included in Chevron’s account
for tax year 2013-14, and that the “control center improve-
ments” that taxpayer made after the acquisition and before
the January 1, 2014, assessment date were improvements to
property in Utah.6 Because taxpayer added no property with
a situs in Oregon, taxpayer argues that there is no basis to
change the MAV carried over from Chevron’s account. For
the reasons discussed below, the court agrees with taxpayer.
The court believes that a focused analysis of ORS
308.142(1)(b), applying the framework in State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (courts to inter-
pret statutes based on text, context, and legislative history,
with potential resort to general maxims), will address the
department’s argument on reconsideration and clarify the
court’s order. The court will grant the department’s motion
and will modify and adhere to its February 19, 2021 order,
as shown at the end of this order.
6 These facts provided by taxpayer’s declaration on reconsideration fully
resolve the only factual issue left open in the court’s order regarding tax year
2014-15. The department mentions two other facts in its reply brief on reconsid-
eration, but the department has not asserted in briefing or in oral argument that
any genuine issue of material fact remains. First, the department describes dif-
ferences in the ways Chevron and taxpayer expressed the computations required
in their respective annual statements, but those computations have to do with
value. Nothing in the department’s discussion alleges that taxpayer added lines
of pipe or other real property or personal property (tangible or intangible) sitused
in Oregon. Nor does the department allege that either company reported incor-
rectly. At oral argument, the department’s counsel stated that the department
“has no reason to believe” that Chevron did not report its Oregon system value
as “they believed it was.” Second, the department’s Motion for Reconsideration
asserts that taxpayer failed to provide documents showing how taxpayer allo-
cated its purchase price among the items it acquired from Chevron. However,
taxpayer’s declaration on reconsideration identifies where in the public record the
purchase price allocation is located, and the department’s reply does not contest
that the allocation information is available to it. The court finds that there is no
dispute of material fact.

458 Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.
In its reply on reconsideration, discussing ORS
308.142(1)(b), the department emphasizes the word “value”:
“The ‘property’ assessed in Oregon is an allocated percentage
of the system value[;]” “[t]he Oregon property is the Oregon
allocated value” (emphases added). In essence, the depart-
ment argues that the dollar amount of value that results
from allocating a portion of the value of the worldwide valu-
ation unit to Oregon under ORS 308.550 is the “unit of prop-
erty” that has a MAV under the opening sentence of Measure
50. See Or Const, Art XI, § 11(1)(a) (“[E]ach unit of property
in this state shall have a maximum assessed value * * *.”).
Starting with the statutory text, the court looks
to contemporaneous dictionary definitions to find the plain
meanings of the relevant terms in ORS 308.142(1)(b): “value,”
“property,” and “means.” See OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, 356
Or 577, 589, 341 P3d 701 (2014) (courts “assume that the leg-
islature intended words of common usage to be given their
ordinary meanings”; referring to dictionaries to discover
plain meaning). Webster’s defines “value” in relevant part as
follows:
“1 a : the amount of a commodity, service, or medium of
exchange that is the equivalent of something else : a fair
return in goods, services, or money <the method of mer-
chandising is to give the buyer good [value] at the right
price –Wall Street Jour.> * * * b : valuable consideration
<for [value] received> <a holder or purchaser for [value]
2 : the monetary worth of something : marketable price usu.
In terms of a medium of exchange <his holdings increase
in [value]>[.]”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2530 (unabridged ed
1993) (italics and boldface in original). The definition that
the court finds most closely on point states that “value” is the
“amount of a * * * medium of exchange that is the equivalent
of something else.” Id. (emphasis added). By this definition,
value cannot be property, because property is “something
else.” Rather, “value” is an amount in dollars (the “medium”)
that can be “exchange[d]” for property.
The plain meaning of “property,” on the other hand,
is, in relevant part:

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	459
“2 a : something that is or may be owned or possessed
: wealth, goods; specif : a piece of real estate <the house . . .
surrounded by the [property] –G.G. Weigend> b : the
exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing
: a valuable right or interest primarily a source or element
of wealth : ownership * * * c : something to which a person
has a legal title : an estate in tangible assets (as lands,
goods, money) or intangible rights (as copyrights, patents)
in which or to which a person has a right protected by law[.]”
Id. at 1818 (italics and boldface in original). As “something that
is or may be owned or possessed,” or something in which a person
may have “a valuable right or interest,” property is indeed “some-
thing else” that may be associated with a value in money but is
not identical to its value in money. The court concludes that the
terms “value” and “property” are fundamentally different.
The court therefore examines the term “means” to
ascertain the degree of relationship that the legislature could
have intended when it wrote that “ ‘[p]roperty’ means * * * the
total statewide value of all property” assessed to a centrally
assessed company. Webster’s defines the verb “mean” as:
“1 : to have in the mind esp. as a purpose or intention
: purpose , design, intend <houses are meant for use>
<[mean]s to make it difficult for you> <meant to come home
early> 2 : to serve or intend to convey, show, or indicate
: signify, denote , express <what do you [mean] by such con-
duct> <those words [mean] nothing to me> 3 : to have sig-
nificance or importance to the extent or degree of : count for
<health [mean]s everything> <a happy home [mean]s much
to a child> <music [mean]s little to me> <success without
recognition [mean]s nothing to him> <her happiness meant
the world to him>[.]”
Id. at 1398 (italics and boldface in original). The court is
struck by the absence of a definition that forces the reader
to equate “value” with “property,” as the department sug-
gests. By using the transitive verb “means,” the legislature
intended the term “property” to “convey, show or indicate”
something. These terms may, but do not necessarily always,
imply a complete overlap between the subject (property) and
the object (value of property).
Based on these definitions, the court concludes that
the legislature may have intended ORS 308.142(1)(b) as

460 Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.
something other than a direction to mechanically substitute
the word “value” each time the word “property” appears in
the Measure 50 statutes.7
The court proceeds to statutory context. Within the
same 1997 law implementing Measure 50, the legislature
adopted not only ORS 308.142(2)(b), but also a second defi-
nition of “property” that was codified as an amendment to
one of the central assessment statutes. The court reprints
both:
7 The contemporaneous technical definitions are not materially different.
See EAN Holdings, LLC v. Dept. of Rev., 24 OTR 200, 203 (2020) (“If the court
discovers a technical meaning that differs from the plain meaning, the court
will examine usage in context to determine whether the legislature intended
to use the term in that different, technical sense.” (citing DCBS v. Muliro, 359
Or 736, 745-46, 380 P3d 270 (2016))). Although Black’s has multiple entries
for different types of value and property, the technical definitions of the gen-
eral terms “value” and “property” are substantially the same as their plain
meanings:
“Value. The utility of an object in satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs
or desires of human beings, called by economists ‘value in use,’ or its worth
consisting in the power of purchasing other objects, called ‘value in exchange.’
* * * Also the estimated or appraised worth of any object or property, calculated
in money. To estimate the worth of; to rate at a certain price; to appraise; or
to place a certain estimate of worth on in a scale of values.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1551 (6th ed 1990) (emphasis added).
“Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which
belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights
which are guaranteed and protected by the government. * * * The term is
said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifi-
cally, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to
dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
every one else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of
use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or
subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.
The highest right a man can have to anything; being used to refer to that
right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way
depends on another man’s courtesy.
“The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of
ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisi-
ble, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes
to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and
interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises,
and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one’s property
rights by actionable wrong. * * *
“Property embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership,
whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial, or a private ownership.”
Id. at 1216 (emphasis added). Black’s does not have an entry for the verb form of
“mean.”

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	461
ORS 308.142(1),
Oregon Laws 1997,
chapter 541, section 7
ORS 308.510(5),
Oregon Laws 1997,
chapter 541, section 203
For purposes of determining
whether the assessed value
of property exceeds the prop-
erty’s 	maximum 	assessed
value permitted under section
11, Article XI of the Oregon
Constitution:
(1) 	“Property” means:
(a) 	All 	property 	included
within a single property tax
account; or
(b) 	In the case of property
that 	is 	centrally 	assessed
under ORS 308.505 to 308.665,
the total statewide value of all
property assessed to a com-
pany or utility that is subject
to ORS 308.505 to 308.665.
For purposes of determining
the maximum assessed value
of 	property 	under 	section
11, Article XI of the Oregon
Constitution, “property” means
all property assessed to each
company 	that 	is 	subject 	to
assessment under ORS 308.505
to 308.665.
This second definition, in ORS 308.510(5), is virtu-
ally identical to the definition in ORS 308.142(1)(b), except
that ORS 308.510(5) cannot be read to define “property” as
“value.” It does not mention value, except within the phrase
“maximum assessed value.” The 1997 legislature added the
definition in ORS 308.510(5) at the end of the statute that
generally defined “property,” real and personal property,
and the “use” of property, for purposes of central assess-
ment. See Or Laws, ch 541, § 203 (amending ORS 305.510).8
The placement of ORS 308.510(5) suggests that its function
is to alert or remind the reader that the Measure 50 stat-
utes, codified apart from the central assessment statutes,
add an overlying regime that limits the growth of property
values and requires its own special-purpose definition for
the determination of MAV. The court sees no indication in
the text that the legislature intended ORS 308.510(5) and
8 In 2009 the legislature, among other changes, moved the general defini-
tion of “property” for central assessment purposes from ORS 308.510(1) to ORS
308.505, which contains other general definitions. Or Laws 2009, ch 128, § 3.

462 Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.
ORS 308.142(1)(b) to have meanings differing from each
other; rather, ORS 308.510(5) is a signpost pointing to the
Measure 50 statutes and restating the definition of property
there.
Based on that understanding, the court concludes
that the lack of any reference to “value” in ORS 308.510(5)
undermines the department’s argument. Rather than read
ORS 308.142(1)(b) as redefining property as something
else, the court believes the more plausible interpretation
is to read ORS 308.142(1)(b) and ORS 308.510(5) together
as performing two functions. First, these provisions define
the assessable and taxable unit of property for Measure 50
purposes as “all” property assessed to a business listed in
ORS 308.515, as opposed to treating component parts as sep-
arate units of property, such as land, or improvements, or
tangible personal property, or intangible property. The word
“total” in ORS 308.142(1)(b) emphasizes this point. Second,
by referring to property “assessed to” a listed business, both
provisions limit the unit of property to property in Oregon.
Although the property tax statutes nowhere define the term
“assess,”9 the statutes make clear that the department has
no power to “assess” property not sitused in Oregon. ORS
308.515(1) (“The Department of Revenue shall make an
annual assessment of any property that has a situs in this
state * * *.” (Emphasis added.)). ORS 308.142(1)(b) emphasizes
that point by referring to the “statewide” value of property.
This reading of paragraph (b) of ORS 308.142(1)
squares exactly with the definition of “unit of property”
under Measure 50, as determined by the Supreme Court
in Flavorland Foods v. Washington County Assessor, 334 Or
562, 591, 54 P3d 582 (2002) (“We conclude that the voters
intended the phrase ‘each unit of property in this state’ to
9 This court has defined “assessment” generally, for locally assessed prop-
erty, as the annual process of valuing property and recording specified informa-
tion about it on the roll. See Gray v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 220, 230-32 (2018). For
centrally assessed property a similar working definition would seem to apply. See
ORS 308.540 (department to prepare assessment roll annually, showing assessed
value of centrally assessed property); ORS 308.560(2) (specifying additional infor-
mation to be shown on central assessment roll); see generally Northwest Natural
Gas Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 347 Or 536, 553, 226 P3d 28 (2010) (declining to “engage
in the complicated and nuanced analysis of whether and when ‘assessment’ is
‘taxation’ ”).

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	463
refer to all the property in a property tax account, which, in
this case, includes both land and improvements.” (Emphasis
added.)). This same reading also fits with the definition of
“property” that is locally assessed, in the preceding para-
graph of the same statute: “ ‘Property’ means * * * all prop-
erty included within a single property tax account.” ORS
308.142(1)(a) (emphasis added).10
Additional relevant context is in the provisions gov-
erning “new property or new improvements”—the statutes
most directly at issue in the case, which the legislature also
enacted as part of the Measure 50 implementation law. See
ORS 308.149(6) (defining “new property or new improve-
ments”); ORS 308.153 (applying same); Or Laws 1997,
ch 541, §§ 9, 11. The court observes first that the definition
in ORS 308.149(6)(a) refers repeatedly to physical activities
such as “construction” of property, “remodeling” of property,
“renovation” of property, and “rehabilitation” of property.
These terms would be difficult to apply to the abstract con-
cept of “value,” yet no provision in ORS 308.149(6) suggests
that a centrally assessed taxpayer is protected from a poten-
tial MAV increase when it holds property that undergoes
construction or any of the other listed changes.
The statutory definition of “new property or new
improvements” begins by declaring: “ ‘New property or new
improvements’ means changes in the value of property as
the result of * * * [n]ew construction * * *.” ORS 308.149(6)
(emphasis added). Here too, the legislature seems at first
blush to define “property” as something else (“changes” or
“changes in value”).11 But the court must, if possible, read
the statute consistently with the portion of Measure 50 that
the statute interprets. See Salem College & Academy, Inc.
10 This latter definition in paragraph (a) of ORS 308.142(1) might have
resolved the issue in Flavorland Foods, which involved locally assessed property.
However, for tax year 1998-99 at issue in that case, ORS 308.215(1) contained
a contradictory instruction. See Flavorland Foods, 334 Or at 565 n 2. Although
the legislature eliminated the contradiction by amending ORS 308.215 in a
1999 technical corrections bill, the Supreme Court chose to not rely on either
statute. See id.; see also Testimony, House Committee on Revenue, HB 2129,
Mar 16, 1999, Ex 3 (statement of James Manary, Department of Revenue)
(describing Measure 50 “clean-up” provisions).
11 The first entry listed in Webster’s defines the noun “change” as the “action
of making something different in form, quality or state * * *.” Webster’s at 374.

464 Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.
v. Employment Div., 298 Or 471, 481, 695 P2d 25 (1985).
Section 11(9)(a) of Measure 50 defines “improvements” in
terms that reflect the ordinary meaning of “property”:
“ ‘Improvements’ includes new construction, reconstruc-
tions, major additions, remodeling, renovation and rehabil-
itation, including installation, but does not include minor
construction or ongoing maintenance and repair.”
Or Const, Art XI, § 11(9)(a). And the next subsection in
Measure 50 states:
“In calculating the addition to value for new property
and improvements, the amount added shall be net of the
value of retired property.”
Or Const, Art XI, § 11(9)(b). The references in subsection (b)
to the value “for” or “of” property show that the legisla-
ture in framing Measure 50, and the people in adopting it,
understood property as different from value or changes in
value, undermining any interpretation of ORS 308.149(6)
that would equate those terms.12
Most telling is the portion of the definition of “new
property or new improvements” that directly applies here:
“The addition of machinery, fixtures, furnishings, equip-
ment or other taxable real or personal property to the prop-
erty tax account.” ORS 308.149(6)(a)(C) (emphasis added).
That provision requires that the “new” property that is
added be “taxable.” As the court pointed out in its order,
to be taxable, property must be “within [the state’s] terri-
torial limits.” Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus,
154 US 439, 446, 14 S Ct 1122, 38 L Ed 1041 (1894). For
centrally assessed property, the reference to “taxable” prop-
erty thus invokes the “situs” limitation. See ORS 308.515(1)
12 The court is aware of one other instance in which resort to context is required
in order to understand whether the legislature intended to refer to “property” as
opposed to the “value” of property. ORS 308.550(1) states in part: “[I]f the depart-
ment values the entire property within and without this state as a unit, it may
ascertain the property subject to taxation in Oregon by the proportion” of miles of
rail, wire, pipe or lines in Oregon vs. everywhere. (Emphasis added.) On its face,
subsection (1) seems to support the department’s view that the allocated system
“value” is the “property subject to taxation in Oregon.” However, the legislature’s
intent becomes clear in subsection (2), which describes the function of subsection (1)
as determining “the value of any property having a situs in this state.” ORS
308.550(2). (emphasis added).

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	465
(requiring department to “make an annual assessment of
any property that has a situs in this state” if used or held for
use in a listed business); ORS 308.505(10) (defining “ ‘prop-
erty having situs in this state’ ” as property “situated wholly
within” Oregon or as proportion of “movable, transitory or
migratory personal property” used partly within and partly
without Oregon). By contrast, the point of unit valuation is
to allow the state to look beyond property sitused within its
borders in order to determine the in-state value as an allo-
cated share of the overall valuation unit.
Based on this statutory context, the court concludes
that ORS 308.149(6)(a)(C) treats only the addition of Oregon
real property, Oregon-sitused tangible personal property, or
Oregon-sitused intangible property as triggering the “excep-
tion” for new property under Measure 50. If this exception
applies, there is no doubt that ORS 308.555 allows the
department to use the allocated value of the worldwide val-
uation unit to determine the value that this new property
adds to the MAV of the Oregon unit of property. However,
the addition of property sitused outside Oregon does not
cause the new property “exception” to apply.
The parties have not submitted legislative his-
tory. The court is generally aware that the combined vol-
ume of material is voluminous, encompassing Measure 47
as drafted by its proponents and presented to the voters in
1996 (former Or Const, Art XI, §§ 11, 11f-11j (1996)), Measure
50 as drafted by working groups with legislative oversight
and as referred to the voters for the May 1997 election (SB
1215 (1997)), and the statutes implementing Measure 50,
which the legislature began working on before the May
1997 election and adopted a few weeks thereafter (SB 541
(1997)). From the limited portions readily available to the
court at reasonable expense and under pandemic conditions
of access, the court has found only a passing reference in the
committee hearings on SB 1215 (1997). Legislative Revenue
Officer Jim Scherzinger explained to the Senate Revenue
Committee:
“One of the issues that comes up here * * * is, ‘what is the
unit of property?’ * * * In other words, when we say that the
value of the property * * * cannot grow by more than 3%,
the question is, ‘what is the property? What do you define

466 Tesoro Logistics Northwest Pipeline LLC II v. Dept. of Rev.
the property to be?’ * * * If you have an industrial plant, is
the whole plant just one property? Or [are] different pieces
of it different pieces of property? * * * Under current law for
Measure 5, it says that ‘all contiguous property within a
single code under common ownership in use or appraised
for a single integrated purpose, whether taxed as a single
account or multiple accounts, is the unit of property for
Measure 5.’
“* * * * *
“* * * [W]hat the [proposed] statute does do here * * *,
is that [the] ‘unit of property’ would be the property tax
account. So, if you have two separate tax accounts, * * * that
would be two units of property * * * even though they’re
contiguous.
“* * * * *
“* * * [W]hat this measure does is make the unit of prop-
erty to be an account, except for utilities, which is the entire
utility statewide.
“The key point—and there’s a little example here that
shows you that—it does make the value of your property
partially dependent on how the assessor splits the property
into accounts.”
Audio, Senate Committee on Revenue, HB 2129, June 3,
1997, 10:01:13 - 10:05:52 a.m. (statement of Jim Scherzinger,
Legislative Revenue Office), available at http://records.sos.
state.or.us/ORSOSWebdrawer/Record/7519797 (emphasis
added). Although imprecise and of only modest weight, this
conversational statement tends to support the court’s view
that the legislature did not intend, either in Measure 50 or
in ORS 308.142(1)(b), to introduce a new and unusual con-
cept that “property” is “value.” Rather, the court believes
that the legislature would have understood this comment
as emphasizing that the unit of property for a centrally
assessed taxpayer is the statewide property, and that the
MAV of that unit of property should be set for the unit, not
for component items of property within that unit.
As in its original order, the court concludes that the
department’s position goes too far, conflating the concept
of unit valuation with the taxable unit of property sitused
in Oregon. The department continues to maintain that

Cite as 24 OTR 454 (2021) 	467
“[a]ssets are not separately assessed,” implying that the
Oregon unit of property for Measure 50 purposes is a con-
ceptual construct created simply by formulaically allocating
the dollar amount of the worldwide valuation unit. Based
on the foregoing analysis of the text, context, and available
legislative history of the statute on which the department
relies, however, the court reaffirms its conclusion that the
legislature and the people intended the unit of property to
refer to the property sitused in Oregon, including all Oregon-
sitused real property, Oregon-sitused tangible personal
property or Oregon-sitused intangible property. The evi-
dence shows that taxpayer acquired the same unit of prop-
erty that had been assessed to Chevron for tax year 2013-14,
and that taxpayer added no Oregon-sitused new property or
new improvements as of tax year 2014-15. Accordingly, ORS
308.162(1) “precludes revaluation” of the Property’s MAV.
DISH Network, 364 Or at 284.
The court hereby grants the department’s motion
and replaces the section of the February 19, 2021, order enti-
tled “CONCLUSION,” and all subsequent text in that order,
Tesoro I, 24 OTR at 452-53, with the following:
“CONCLUSION
“Because the evidence demonstrates that taxpayer
acquired the unit of property previously assessed to the
account of Chevron, the court applies ORS 308.162(1) and
grants taxpayer’s motion for case TC 5252 and tax year
2014-15. The court directs the parties to confer and seek
agreement on the MAV for each of the Later Years. Now,
therefore,
“IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. The MAV of the Property in Plaintiff’s
account is $10,786,200; and
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.”
Now, therefore,
IT 	IS 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for
Reconsideration is granted. The order dated February 19,
2021, is modified and adhered to as modified.