Seeley v. Dept. of Rev.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
TC-MD 250116R 1
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Income Tax
THERESA M. SEELEY, )
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Plaintiff,1 TC-MD 250116R
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION	Defendant.
This matter came before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary injunction, filed
on December 8, 2025. Plaintiff seeks an order to stop Defendant from engaging in collection
activity for the tax years currently on appeal pursuant to ORS 305.565.2 Defendant filed its
response on December 12, 2025. The matter is ready for determination.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff appealed Notices of Assessment for the 2021 and 2022 tax years on March 26,
2025. The appeal also references the 2014, 2015, and 2016 tax years; however, the court has yet
to determine whether those years are properly before the court. Defendant marked Plaintiff’s
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2022 tax years as “under appeal” in its system but omitted the 2021 tax
year in error. (Def’s Resp at 2.)
On May 2, 2025, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a distraint warrant for the 2021 tax year.
(Id.) On September 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Regular
1 The court admonishes Plaintiff that in the Magistrate Division of the Oregon Tax Court, taxpayers
appealing a determination by the Department of Revenue are referred to as “Plaintiff” and not “Relator/Petitioner.”
Additionally, the department is referred to as “Defendant” and not “Adverse Party.” See Tax Court Rule-Magistrate
Division (TCR-MD) 1.
2 Plaintiff raises additional allegations beyond this court’s jurisdiction, which are not addressed here.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
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Division of this court. See Seeley v. Dept. of Rev., TC 5489. Upon observing the new case in
the Regular Division, Defendant “closed” the instant case in its system, thereby lifting the
collections hold for the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2022 tax years. (Def’s Resp at 2.) Defendant’s
system automatically mailed Plaintiff a distraint warrant for the 2022 tax year dated October 6,
2025. (Id. at 3.) On October 21, 2025, Defendant updated its system to mark Plaintiff’s 2014-
2024 tax years as under appeal “to ensure no collection activity would occur while [this] appeal
and [the] mandamus petition are separately pending.” (Decl of Timothy Wade at 3.) Defendant
has not recorded its distraint warrants in any county, and no garnishments, liens, or levies have
occurred. (Def’s Resp at 6.)
II. ANALYSIS
The present issues in this case are whether the issuance and mailing of distraint warrants
constitute proceedings for the collection of taxes for tax years under appeal, and if so, whether a
temporary injunction is necessary to prevent any future collection activity. The court begins by
taking up the collection proceedings issue before turning to whether injunctive relief is
warranted.
A. Tax Collection Proceedings
ORS 305.565(1)3 provides, in pertinent part, for a stay on “proceedings for the collection
of any taxes, interest or penalties resulting from an assessment of additional taxes imposed by”
certain tax laws administered by the Department of Revenue. 4 ORS 305.565(2) allows limited
exceptions to the restriction on collection proceedings while an appeal is pending, but Defendant
did not invoke any of those exceptions in this case.
3 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to the 2023 edition.
4 ORS chapters 118, 305, 310, 314, 316, 317, 318, and 321.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
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Plaintiff contends that issuance and mailing of a distraint warrant during the pendency of
her appeal is a per se violation of the statute and should be enjoined. (See Ptf’s Mot at 1).
Defendant counters that a taxpayer may only obtain an injunction by demonstrating “clear and
convincing proof of irreparable harm.” (Def’s Resp at 3, quoting Christensen v. Dept. of Rev.,
23 OTR 155, 173 (2018).) Defendant also asserts that the mere mailing of a distraint warrant,
without recording or enforcement, does not meet the likely definition of “proceedings for the
collection” of taxes. (Def’s Resp at 4.) Absent a statutory definition of “proceedings for the
collection of any taxes,” Defendant argues that a dictionary definition of “proceedings” is “the
course of procedure in a judicial action or in a suit in litigation” or “a particular action at law or
case in litigation.” (Id.) Defendant reasons that “proceedings for the collection” “refers to
formal legal steps taken to enforce a tax debt, like recording a distraint warrant, initiating
garnishment, or levying property.” (Id.) Further, Defendant maintains that “[m]erely mailing
taxpayer a distraint warrant * * * is not a judicial action, nor is it a legal proceeding in the sense
contemplated by the statute” and “[t]he warrants did not initiate any legal action against
taxpayer’s property.” (Id.) The court will address these arguments in turn following a brief
review of the statutory authority for Defendant’s use of warrants for the collection of taxes.
1. Tax warrant issuance procedure
To undertake a collection action against a taxpayer’s real or personal property, Defendant
must issue and mail a warrant for the tax, along with any added penalties, interest and any
collection charge incurred. ORS 314.430(1); see ORS 305.895(1) (mandating issuance of
warrant before taking action against a taxpayer’s real or personal property.) Prior to mailing a
warrant, however, The Taxpayer Bill of Rights contains a provision requiring Defendant to send
a notice and a demand for payment to the taxpayer “at least 30 days before issuing a warrant for

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
TC-MD 250116R 4
collection of any tax.”5 ORS 305.895(2). Such notice shall, among other requirements, notify
the taxpayer that if the tax is not paid within 30 days, a warrant may be issued and recorded as
provided in ORS 314.430. Id. Among other contents, the notice shall also include:
“alternatives available to the taxpayer * * * that would prevent issuance of the
warrant[, i]nform the taxpayer that certain types of income are exempt from
garnishment[, and i]nform the taxpayer * * * of possible consequences to the
taxpayer * * * of noncompliance, and of issuance of a warrant, including
garnishment of wages or bank accounts and seizure and sale of real or personal
property.”
Id. When Defendant issues a warrant 30 days after the notice and demand for payment, Oregon
law indicates “[u]ntil a warrant issued under [ORS 314.430] is satisfied in full, the department
has the same remedies to enforce the claim for taxes against the taxpayer * * * as if the state had
recovered judgment against the taxpayer for the amount of the tax[.] ” ORS 314.430(4).
Following the issuance and mailing of a warrant, Defendant may pursue other administrative
collection actions or judicial actions following the recording of the warrant in the county clerk’s
lien record. 6, 7
2. Collection action in this case
Defendant’s characterization that “[t]he warrants did not initiate any legal action against
taxpayer’s property” becomes tenuous when set against the statutory requirements described
above that it must comply with to pursue Plaintiff’s property for a tax debt. Indeed, assuming
5 ORS 305.860 to 305.900. See ORS 305.900.
6 See, e.g. ORS 18.854(1) - 18.854(2) (authorizing an agency empowered to issue warrants for the
collection of taxes and debts owed to the state to garnish property of a debtor without recording the warrant in the
County Clerk Lien Record); ORS 305.182(3) (authorizing Defendant to file warrants for unpaid taxes with the
Office of the Secretary of State to be marked, held and indexed in accordance with the provisions of ORS 79A.5190
as if the warrant were a financing statement within the meaning of ORS chapter 79A).
7 ORS 205.125(2) (describing that a recorded warrant “shall have the attributes and effect of a judgment
that has been entered in the register of the circuit court for that county, including but not limited to the creation of a
judgment lien for any monetary obligation in favor of the officer or agency issuing the * * * warrant[.]”)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
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that Defendant fulfilled the statutory obligations for the warrants in this matter, the process
Defendant followed entitled it to “the same remedies to enforce the claim for taxes against
[Plaintiff]” as if it “had recovered judgment against [Plaintiff] for the amount of the tax[.]” ORS
314.430(4). Stated another way, Defendant perfected its claim for the tax debts using a process
that necessarily promotes collection of the tax debt through voluntary payment set against a
backdrop of collection by involuntary enforcement measures. While Defendant is correct that
the process it followed did not involve a court, the steps are part of a statutorily prescribed
sequence involving a collection demand and are undertaken to allow Defendant access to
additional collection procedures to collect Plaintiff’s tax debt. Pursuing that objective, at
minimum, violates the spirit of a stay on collection activities. An issue remains, however, as to
whether the legislature intended the phrase “proceedings for the collection” in ORS 305.565(1)
to stay only certain collection proceedings—such as recording a warrant or taking other formal
legal steps to enforce it—as Defendant argues, or to stay all collection proceedings—including
the administrative issuance of warrants, as Plaintiff argues.
3. The meaning of “proceedings for the collection” of taxes
To interpret the meaning of a statutory phrase, the court applies the process set out in
State v. Gaines to analyze the text, context, and any useful legislative history of statutory terms
before turning to maxims of statutory interpretation. 346 Or 160, 172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).
The role of the court in this statutory interpretation process “is simply to ascertain and declare
what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to
omit what has been inserted[.]” ORS 174.010.
/ / /
/ / /

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a. Text analysis
The word “proceedings” is used in dozens of statutes across ORS chapter 305 covering a
wide variety of subject matter and contexts. Perhaps in recognition of this, the legislature has
left “proceedings” undefined. Considering its varied usage in the chapter, the court evaluates
several of the word’s plausible dictionary definitions to guide its analysis.
The most specific dictionary definition describes proceedings as “the course of procedure
in a judicial action or in a suit in litigation: legal action[.]” Websters Third New Int’l Dictionary
1807 (unabridged ed 2002). The proffered examples for that definition include “took divorce
proceedings against him” and “during the court proceedings[.]” Id. A slightly more general
definition describes proceedings as “a particular action at law or case in litigation,” with the
example for that definition adding a modifier “judicial proceedings.” Id. (Emphasis added.) A
third definition broadly describes proceedings as “a particular thing done: affair, transaction,
negotiation,” as in “an illegal proceeding” or a “business proceeding.” Id. While these
definitions are not determinative on their own, the court observes that “proceedings” best aligns
with Defendant’s concept of formal legal proceedings when paired with a modifying word
linking it to a judicial setting. Absent a modifying adjective, “proceedings” may point generally
to a particular thing, affair or transaction. The court turns to the word’s usage in other sections
of the statute, along with related statutes, to determine which meaning the legislature intended
for its use of “proceedings” in ORS 305.565(1).
b. Context
Additional subsections of ORS 305.565 use “proceedings” or “proceeding” to contrast
circumstances where the stay of collections does not apply. ORS 305.565(2)(a) and (3). In ORS
305.565(2)(a), “proceedings” is modified by “wholly or partially ineffectual” to cover a broad

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range of scenarios where “[c]ollection of taxes, interest or penalties” will be jeopardized by a
taxpayer taking actions to impair Defendant’s successful collection against the taxpayer’s
property. Similarly, ORS 305.565(3) clarifies:
“[n]o proceeding for the apportionment, levy or collection of taxes on any
property shall be stayed by the taking * * * of any appeal to the tax court * * *
unless the assessor or tax collector * * * requests [as much and the court agrees]
that a substantial public interest requires the issuance of a stay.”
This subsection’s unmodified use of “proceeding,” followed by a list of judicial and
administrative type actions, is another instance that suggests a broad meaning of the term rather
than a specific usage limited to proceedings involving a court.
The court next looks beyond ORS 305.565 to the statute for Defendant’s warrant
authority: ORS 314.430. That statute indicates that “[a]t any time after issuing a warrant under
this section, the department may record the warrant in the County Clerk Lien Record of any
county [in Oregon].” ORS 314.430(2). ORS 314.430 confirms the warrant’s effect by cross
referencing its description in ORS 205.125, part of the chapter describing county clerks’
authority. The next statute, ORS 205.126, describes what may occur following the recording of
a warrant (or an order) in the County Clerk Lien Record. ORS 205.126(1) provides a list of the
“proceedings [that] may thereafter be commenced by the agency * * * for the
enforcement of the order or warrant, in the same manner as provided for the
enforcement of judgments issued by a court. Enforcement proceedings may
include:
“(a) Writ of execution proceedings under ORS 18.252 to 18.993.
“(b) Proceeding in support of execution on ORS 18.265, 18.268 and 18.270.
“(c) Garnishment proceedings under ORS 18.600 to 18.850.”
(Emphasis added.) This usage and the inclusion of the modifier “enforcement” before
“proceedings” is illuminative. When speaking about the use of recorded warrants (what
Defendant refers to as involving formal, legal steps), these types of “proceedings” receive a

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
TC-MD 250116R 8
narrowing “enforcement” modifier absent from the “proceedings” referenced in ORS 305.565.
Notably, the “enforcement proceedings” identified in ORS 205.126(1) are all judicial
proceedings.8 In comparison, the legislature used the term “proceedings” without any modifiers
in ORS 305.565, indicating a broader meaning of the term. Had the legislature desired a narrow
application of the stay to prevent only judicial proceedings, it could have used the phrase
“enforcement proceedings,” “judicial proceedings,” or even have included a cross reference to
proceedings described in ORS 205.126. In the absence of any such inclusions, the court lacks
the authority to insert what has been omitted in ORS 305.565(1). ORS 174.010. The court
therefore applies the general meaning of “proceedings” and finds that ORS 305.565 stays both
administrative and judicial proceedings for the collection of any taxes, interest or penalties.9 As
such, Defendant’s issuance and mailing of two distraint warrants to collect tax debts for tax years
presently under appeal constitute violations of the stay imposed by ORS 305.565(1) and are void.
B. Injunctive Relief
The court addresses Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief only to determine whether,
assuming such authority exists, the request would be granted. Plaintiff seeks a temporary
injunction to stop Defendant from engaging in the collection activity discussed above. “An
injunction is a judicial order requiring a person to do, or refrain from doing, certain acts.”
Christensen v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 155, 173 (2018) (quoting 43A CJS Injunctions § 1
(Aug 2018 Update)). It is “an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only on clear and convincing
proof of irreparable harm[.]” Knight v. Nyara, 240 Or App 586, 597, 248 P3d 36 (2011).
8 Although garnishments obtained from a court are included in this list, Defendant’s own authority to issue
garnishments, pursuant to ORS 18.854, is necessarily excluded from the statute’s list.
9 Without obvious ambiguity remaining and having been provided no legislative history by the parties, the
court declines to engage in that analysis.

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Defendant marked Plaintiff’s 2014-2024 tax years as under appeal in its system to ensure
no collection activity would occur during the pendency of this appeal. No distraint warrants
have been recorded, and no garnishments, liens, or levies have occurred. Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that irreparable harm would result without an injunction, because Defendant has
stopped its collection action against Plaintiff. “A claim is moot if, due to a change in facts since
the commencement of the action, the ‘court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on or
concerning the rights of the parties.’” Christensen, 23 OTR at 173. Issuance of a temporary
injunction would have no practical effect on Plaintiff’s rights, and so this issue is moot.
Plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction is denied.10
III. CONCLUSION
Having considered the motion and the response, and for the reasons stated above, the
court grants Plaintiff’s motion in part and denies it in part. Now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the distraint warrants, mailed on May 2, 2025, and October 6,
2025, are void.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary injunction is denied.
RICHARD D. DAVIS
MAGISTRATE
This interim order may not be appealed. Any claim of error in regard to this
order should be raised in an appeal of the Magistrate’s final written decision
when all issues have been resolved. ORS 305.501.
This document was signed by Magistrate Richard D. Davis and entered on
February 3, 2026.
10 The issue of whether this division of the court may grant injunctive relief was not fully briefed by the
parties. Furthermore, because the issue is moot, the court declines to rule on its authority to order such relief.