State v. Sanchez

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Filing Date: October 31, 2024

No. S-1-SC-39893

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

JACKIE SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Douglas R. Driggers, District Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Teresa Ryan, Assistant Solicitor General
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

DECISION

VARGAS, Justice.

{1} This matter came before the Court on the State’s petition for writ of certiorari filed
pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA. The State requests that we reverse the Court of
Appeals’ order dismissing the State’s appeal because the district court’s directed verdict
on the battery upon a peace officer charge amounted to an acquittal precluding
appellate review. See Order Dismissing Appeal, State v. Sanchez, A-1-CA-40438 (N.M.
Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2023). Because the district court directed a verdict based on insufficient
evidence, we hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State’s appeal,
notwithstanding that the district court’s ruling was in error. We therefore affirm the order
of the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant Jackie Sanchez was charged with battery upon a peace officer,
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-24 (1971), among other charges.

{3} The alleged officer-victim, sheriff’s Sergeant Jorge Frias (Sgt. Frias), was not
listed on the State’s Final Witness List. On the morning of the trial, and outside the
presence of the jury, the district court reviewed the State’s Final Witness List and
confirmed that Sgt. Frias was unavailable to testify and then asked the State whether it
planned to “dismiss the count in which [Sgt. Frias] was the alleged victim,” battery upon
a peace officer. The State indicated that it did not plan to dismiss that count because
three eyewitnesses were going to testify to prove the elements of that offense. In
response, the district court warned, “Well, it puts you on notice that you are subject to
directed verdict.” Defense counsel then asked the judge to clarify whether he meant
there may be a directed verdict “on one count or all counts,” and the district court
responded, “Only on the count that the court believes there is insufficient evidence for
the matter to be presented to the jury.”

{4} During its pretrial review of the proposed jury instructions, the district court again
expressed concern about the charge of battery upon a peace officer. Reviewing the
“essential elements” of the charge, the district court read aloud the fourth element of the
offense, “the defendant’s conduct caused an actual threat to the safety of [Sgt. Frias]
. . . or a meaningful challenge to the authority of [Sgt. Frias],” and then instructed the
State, “You need to pick which theory you think is applied, understanding that the court
is concerned about the viability of that charge altogether.” See UJI 14-2211 NMRA
(Battery upon a peace officer).

{5} The State’s first witness, sheriff’s Sergeant Gabriel Sanchez (Sgt. Sanchez),
testified that he observed Defendant kick Sgt. Frias while Defendant was detained in the
jail’s holding cell after his arrest in a road rage incident. Sgt. Sanchez testified that he
watched another officer attempting to handcuff Defendant, who became combative and
yelled a profanity at Sgt. Frias, who was standing in front of Defendant. Defendant then
did “a Spartan kick from 3001⸻just straight kicked [Sgt. Frias] in the chest,” leaving a
foot-shaped impression on Sgt. Frias’s bulletproof vest. On cross-examination, defense
counsel elicited testimony from Sgt. Sanchez that Sgt. Frias had been fired from the
Sheriff’s Office. Per defense counsel’s request, Sgt. Sanchez also demonstrated the
alleged “Spartan kick,” after which defense counsel noted for the record that Sgt.
Sanchez’s demonstration of the kick only reached waist-level, not chest-level, like his
testimony had reflected. Defense counsel ended its cross-examination of Sgt. Sanchez

1“300” is presumptively a reference to the 2006 movie by that name, featuring an ancient warrior battle.
by asking about the “thin blue line,” and, specifically, whether “officers will sometimes
support their brothers in blue,” to which Sgt. Sanchez agreed.

{6} After the court dismissed Sgt. Sanchez from the witness stand and the jury exited
the courtroom for lunch, defense counsel raised an objection pursuant to Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), alleging that the State had failed to disclose
relevant information about Sgt. Frias’s dismissal from the force. See id. at 154 (holding
that nondisclosure of material evidence “is the responsibility of the prosecutor,”
regardless of “whether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design”). The
district court responded that “Giglio is not an issue” because Sgt. Frias was unavailable
to testify and continued, “I’m going to dismiss the case involving [Sgt.] Frias. I believe I
made that clear in the pretrial conference. . . . If [Sgt. Frias] is not available to testify on
the evidence in reference to that charge . . . then a directed verdict will issue. Period.
. . . I’m not going to allow this charge to go forward. I haven’t heard anything that would
change my mind.” When the State attempted to respond by stating that the elements of
the crime do not require the victim’s testimony, the district court interjected, “That would
be true in every case where there was a witness that chose not to show up as an
alleged victim. If you had somebody else observe something, then you could say, well
we don’t need the victim . . . .” After the State noted that it has obtained a conviction
against a perpetrator of domestic violence when the victim was not present, the court
responded, “Well, you can argue all you want. I’ve pretty well decided what I’m going to
do. But you can continue to object and make a record if you like.”

{7} Once the trial resumed, two additional sheriff’s officers, Detective Nathan
Jimmerson and Carlos Enriquez, testified that they observed Defendant kick Sgt. Frias
while Defendant was detained in the jail’s holding cell.

{8} At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on
the battery upon a peace officer charge. Defense counsel argued that the officer’s
testimony about the alleged kick was not believable, there was no documentation (such
as medical testimony or photos) to corroborate the alleged kick, and the officers’
testimony was not credible because it was “biased to protect their own.” After hearing
the State’s response, the district court granted Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
The district court articulated its ruling as follows:

I advised counsel at the pretrial conference and advised [the State] that
the alleged victim, especially one that is battery on a peace officer,
requires the testimony of that victim. You chose not to call that witness
and failed to comply with the Giglio requirements regarding that officer’s
prior misconduct.2 And that was a choice made by the State. As I stated
earlier, if the court adopts your theory, that a law enforcement officer need
not bother to show up and testify if he . . . has been battered, he has
something else he wants to do, he just has a fellow officer who witnessed
the alleged incident to come in, and then the defendant would be denied

2Although the district court mentions Giglio, 404 U.S. 150, in the explanation of its ruling here, earlier in
the trial, the district court indicated that “Giglio is not an issue” because Sgt. Frias did not testify at trial.
his right to confront and cross examine . . . a critical witness, to wit the
victim, or alleged victim of the crime.

So, for a number of standards and reasons, the court believes it is
following the law and the absurd arguments to the contrary would upend
justice. With your theory, the victim of any crime would not have to appear
and testify if it were witnessed by someone other than the victim himself or
herself, then that would be sufficient and the defendant would be denied
the right to confront and cross examine the accuser who is obviously the
alleged victim. The motion for directed verdict on [Count 1, battery upon a
peace officer] is granted. There will be no amendments to the indictment.
It is so ordered.

The State then asked if it could respond to “the Confrontation Clause issue,” to which
the district court responded, “You may not. The Court has heard enough. The court
gave you specific opportunity to research and convince the court otherwise, . . . that
opportunity is now closed.”

{9} The Judgment and Sentence listed “Disposition: Directed Verdict” for the count of
“Battery upon a Peace Officer.” The State appealed that judgment.

{10} Before issuing its dismissal of the State’s appeal, the Court of Appeals ordered
supplemental briefing “instructing the State to address the issue of whether the State
can appeal the directed verdict because it was unclear whether the district court ended
the trial on a constitutional basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.” Order
Dismissing Appeal, Sanchez, A-1-CA-40438, ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that “the district court’s decision was an
evidentiary ruling where it determined that without the testimony of the victim officer,
there was insufficient evidence to support the charge because Defendant could not
confront his accuser.” Id. ¶ 7. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed the State’s appeal
on the basis that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision that
amounted to an acquittal. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

{11} The standard of review for the question of law in this case—whether double
jeopardy principles bar appellate review of the district court’s dismissal of the battery
upon a peace officer charge—is de novo. State v. Baca, 2015-NMSC-021, ¶ 25, 352
P.3d 1151.

{12} The single issue in this case is whether the district court’s dismissal of the battery
upon a peace officer charge amounted to an acquittal. A verdict of acquittal “cannot be
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy, and
thereby violating the Constitution.” State v. Lizzol, 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 7, 141 N.M. 705,
160 P.3d 886 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see also U.S.
Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb.”); N.M. Const. art. II, § 15 (“[N]or shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.”). “[T]here is no exception permitting retrial once the
defendant has been acquitted, no matter how egregiously erroneous the legal rulings
leading to that judgment might be.” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{13} To determine whether a dismissal amounts to an acquittal, “what matters is not
the words of the trial court—either written or oral[.] . . . Instead, whether a defendant
was acquitted depends on whether the trial court’s ruling, however labeled, correctly or
incorrectly resolved some or all of the factual elements of the crime.” Lizzol, 2007-
NMSC-024, ¶ 7. This Court has enumerated the following parameters to determine
whether double jeopardy bars retrial after a dismissal:

(1) the [s]tate is barred from appealing when a defendant is acquitted by
the trial court no matter how egregiously erroneous the trial court’s ruling;
(2) whether a defendant was acquitted does not depend on the trial court’s
characterization of its ruling; (3) an acquittal results when, after making an
erroneous evidentiary ruling, the trial court concludes that the evidence is
insufficient to proceed; (4) an acquittal does not result when,
notwithstanding the defendant’s possible culpability, the trial court
determines the defendant’s prosecution is constitutionally or statutorily
prohibited; (5) a defendant may not be retried after the conviction is set
aside because of insufficient evidence; (6) a defendant may be retried if
the conviction was set aside because of trial error, including the situation
when the trial court wrongly admitted incriminating evidence or wrongly
excluded exculpatory evidence.

Id. ¶ 15.

{14} The district court in this case granted Defendant’s motion for directed verdict on
the battery upon a peace officer charge after the State rested its case. A directed verdict
“requires a court to decide at the conclusion of the state’s case whether the direct or
circumstantial evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom, will sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Baca, 2015-
NMSC-021, ¶ 31. And if the district court dismisses a case on the basis that the state
presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction, the district court’s order,
“however characterized, ha[s] the legal effect of an acquittal.” Id. ¶ 32 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Wayne R. LaFave et al., 6 Crim. Proc. § 25.3(c)
(4th ed. 2015) (“If the judge determines at the end of the government’s case that the
evidence on one count is insufficient to sustain a conviction, the Constitution bars
reconsideration of that acquittal by the judge once the trial proceeds to the defendant’s
introduction of evidence on the remaining counts.”).

{15} But here, the State argues that “the ruling was a directed verdict in name only.”
Instead, according to the State, it was a “procedural dismissal” that did not implicate
double jeopardy because it was ‘unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.’” The State
notes that the district court did not comment on the sufficiency of the evidence in its
ruling, nor did it comment on the “merits of Defendant’s culpability.” Also, the district
court did not explicitly verbalize that it was in agreement with Defendant’s argument in
its motion for directed verdict—that there was insufficient evidence for the charge
because the officers were biased and their testimony about the alleged kick was
implausible. Instead, the State argues that the district court’s remarks showed that the
ruling was based solely on the legal conclusion that the “State’s failure to call the victim
as a witness was an infringement on Defendant’s confrontation rights,” and therefore
the ruling was not “a true directed verdict of acquittal” because it did not contemplate
Defendant’s possible culpability.

{16} We disagree with the State’s position that the district court’s ruling did not
amount to an acquittal. The record does not support the State’s contention that the
district court’s ruling was a “Confrontation Clause-based procedural dismissal” because,
as Defendant explains, the district court did not make a confrontation ruling. For the
district court to have made a confrontation-based ruling, it would have had to exclude or
otherwise limit testimonial hearsay of Sgt. Frias—but the State never introduced any
statement or testimony of Sgt. Frias. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68
(2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants a defendant the
right to confront an out-of-court declarant’s statements against him). Even though the
district court mentioned Defendant’s confrontation rights in the explanation of its ruling,
those comments alone did not convert the district court’s directed verdict into a
constitution-based ruling unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. Instead, the district
court concluded that the evidence presented was insufficient because Sgt. Frias did not
testify, a ruling that does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

{17} The record supports a conclusion that the district court’s ruling was a true
directed verdict of acquittal. Before trial, the district court warned the State that the
battery upon a peace officer charge “was subject to directed verdict” and elaborated that
only the count for which there was “insufficient evidence for the matter to be presented
to the jury” would be subject to directed verdict. The district court later expressed
concern about which of the alternative theories was the State’s theory for one of the
essential elements of the charge—whether Defendant’s conduct caused an actual
threat to the safety of Sgt. Frias or a meaningful challenge to the authority of Sgt.
Frias—during its pretrial review of the proposed jury instructions. See UJI 14-2211.5.

{18} The timing of the ruling itself also supports a conclusion that the district court
granted a directed verdict on the battery upon a peace officer charge—the district court
granted Defendant’s motion only after the prosecution had rested, and immediately
before ruling on Defendant’s remaining directed verdict motions on other counts. See
Baca, 2015-NMSC-021, ¶ 31 (explaining that the district court decides a motion for
directed verdict “at the conclusion of the state’s case”). But the State argues that the
timing of the district court’s remarks before the prosecution concluded its case dictates
otherwise; after the first State’s witness testified, the district court remarked that he was
“‘pretty well decided’” that he would not allow the charge to go forward because Sgt.
Frias was not present to testify. According to the State, these remarks show that the
district court did not weigh the State’s evidence of the crime because it had made up its
mind before the remaining State’s witnesses testified. The State likens this case to
Baca, where the magistrate court “dismiss[ed] the case with prejudice” during the trial,
before the prosecution had presented all its evidence, and after the court suppressed
the testimony of a key state’s witness as a sanction for a procedural-rule violation—that
the state’s refiled complaint did not comply with the requirements of the governing rule.
See id. ¶¶ 7, 12. In Baca, this Court concluded that the dismissal did not “trigger an
acquittal because it was unrelated to the sufficiency of the [s]tate’s evidence.” Id. ¶ 38.

{19} We agree with Defendant’s position that Baca is inapposite. In Baca, the
magistrate court dismissed the case on a purely procedural basis—as a sanction for the
state’s noncompliant pleading—which did not require the court “to evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence,” and the court did so before hearing the remaining
prosecution witnesses’ testimony on the merits of the charge in question. Id. ¶¶ 36, 38.
But here, on the other hand, the district court made its ruling only after hearing all
testimony about the alleged battery upon Sgt. Frias. And even though (as the State
notes) the district court did not comment specifically on the sufficiency of the evidence
in its ruling, its order was in direct response to Defendant’s motion for directed verdict,
which was made on the basis that the State had not presented sufficient evidence of
that charge because the witness-officers were biased and their account of the kick was
not plausible. Even though the district court’s label of its ruling as a directed verdict is
not determinative, the district court here “resolved some or all of the factual elements of
the crime” in response to Defendant’s motion, constituting an acquittal. See Lizzol,
2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 7.

{20} The district court’s remark that it was “pretty well decided” on the issue before the
close of the prosecution’s case does not definitively show that the district court did not
consider the sufficiency of the remaining evidence before making its decision. The
district court was free to change its mind before making its ruling and it could have done
so after hearing the remainder of the State’s case. Cf. State ex rel. Regents of N.M.
State Univ. v. Siplast, Inc., 1994-NMSC-065, ¶ 5, 117 N.M. 738, 877 P.2d 38 (holding
that a district court has the inherent authority to reconsider an interlocutory order). The
district court’s remarks more accurately reflect its skepticism regarding the sufficiency of
the State’s evidence for the battery upon a peace officer charge—skepticism that was
likely grounded in unreviewable legal error.

{21} We therefore agree with the State that the district court likely erred in its
application of the directed verdict standard. “A directed verdict is not proper where there
is substantial evidence to support the conviction. Substantial evidence is defined as that
evidence which is acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate support for a
conclusion.” State v. Robinson, 1980-NMSC-049, ¶ 11, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the testimony of the three eyewitness-
officers was likely acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate support for the
conclusion that Defendant battered Sgt. Frias. See State v. Gilbert, 1982-NMSC-137, ¶
5, 99 N.M. 316, 657 P.2d 1165 (“It is well established in New Mexico that upon motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal, the trial court must review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State to determine if that evidence will support a conviction on the
crime charged.”). But, even if the district court egregiously erred in its application of the
directed verdict standard, this Court cannot review the district court’s directed verdict of
acquittal without violating Defendant’s double jeopardy protections. See Lizzol, 2007-
NMSC-024, ¶ 15 (“[T]he [s]tate is barred from appealing when a defendant is acquitted
by the trial court no matter how egregiously erroneous the trial court’s ruling.” (second
alteration in original)); Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 320 (2013) (“[A]n acquittal due
to insufficient evidence precludes retrial, whether the court’s evaluation of the evidence
was ‘correct or not,’ and regardless of whether the court’s decision flowed from an
incorrect antecedent ruling of law.” (citation omitted)).

{22} We also agree with the State that the district court erred to the extent that it
required the testimony of Sgt. Frias as a matter of law. But, as Defendant notes, even if
the district court “incorrectly applied such a bright-line rule,” it still concluded that without
Sgt. Frias’s testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for battery
upon a peace officer. The district court’s ruling here is akin to the district court’s ruling in
Lizzol. In that case, the district court erroneously suppressed the defendant’s blood-
alcohol test for lack of foundation and, because of its suppression ruling, it “concluded
that the [s]tate lacked evidence sufficient to convict” the defendant of DWI. Lizzol, 2007-
NMSC-024, ¶¶ 2, 24.

{23} Here, like in Lizzol, the district court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling when it
concluded that Sgt. Frias’s testimony was required for the battery upon a peace officer
charge as a matter of law, “which led to an acquittal for insufficient evidence.” Id. ¶ 24
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, applying Lizzol to the facts here,
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State’s appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

{24} We affirm the order of the Court of Appeals.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice